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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
As the reach and power of the Internet and networked systems widen, and
thanks to the emergence of paradigm shifting technologies and delivery
models like Web Services (WS) and Software as a Service (SaaS), ever
larger numbers of users are sending huge amounts of private data to remote
systems that they do not have any control over. On the other side of the
same technology-coin, commercial digital content distributors are using
the wide reach of the Internet to help disseminate digital content like music,
videos and software to individual client machines, be it generic desktop
machines or consumer appliances like multimedia players.
In general, these data and content providers have a strong interest in
protecting their data from being misused. They would like their data to be
used as specified by them, accessible only to explicitly allowed external
parties and even after said access has been granted, allowing only specific
actions to be performed on the data.
These access and usage specifications are usually expressed in the form
of policies which can then be bundled with the data that they govern and
sent over to the remote machines.
Several previous works have focused on how to express the restrictions
that the policies define at the level of specification languages, while oth-
ers have considered the problem from a more theoretical angle by formally
defining models and classes of the policies that can be enforced based on
various assumptions and capabilities of the system. Fewer works have,
however, investigated the actual system level requirements involved in en-
forcing these policies on the remote machines. This is the angle from which
we approach the problem in this dissertation.
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PROBLEM STATEMENT
The broad problem statement that the work reported in this dissertation
addresses can be expressed as follows:
Given a data object that the user wishes to submit to an remote host
and a policy that defines access and usage restrictions on the data object,
design and implement an architecture that enables the enforcement of these
policies at the remote host.
While the development of a fully functional policy enforcement frame-
work would involve several complementary areas of research including the
policy expression language, policy modelling, formal analysis and the sys-
tem architecture development, it is only the last of these research areas that
form the subject of this dissertation. Where possible, existing works in the
other areas are leveraged to fill in the gaps in the rest of the framework.
1.1. TRUST MODEL
In order to clarify and understand the requirements of the system that
needs to be implemented at the remote host and the measure of trust that
the data provider must place on the remote party, a judicious threat model
that captures the interest of the various parties involved is necessary.
While the specifics of the threat model would vary with the different
application scenarios’ environment, like the open or closed nature of the
remote host environment, certain characteristics of the threat model can
still be generalised for most policy enforcement scenarios.
The data that are submitted to the remote host is assumed to be of high
value to the data provider, like financial, personal or similar. Hence the
data provider is trusted to compose the right access and usage policies. At
the same time, the data provider is assumed not to have any direct control
over the working of the remote host.
The entity in charge of the remote host (user or administrator) is as-
sumed to have its own interest at heart when dealing with the data provider
and it is assumed to be untrusted from the data provider’s point of view. It
has varying degree of control over the run-time environment of the remote
host. On open systems like a typical desktop or a server, the entity has
almost full control over the hardware and the software that power the host.
However, in the case of closed application devices like mobile phones or
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multimedia players like iPod, the entity has limited control over the ma-
chine’s hardware and the software. In general, the remote host is assumed
to be capable of running any application locally and these applications are
not trusted to adhere to the policies defined by the data provider.
The remote host is assumed to run a middleware, developed as part of
this dissertation work, that enable the enforcement of the policies. This
middleware, the operating system and all the hardware below it is assumed
to be trusted to behave as expected. In order for the remote host to obtain
the policy-attached data, it needs to prove to the provider that it is running
this stack of trusted hardware and software layers. However, as mentioned
before, the application is assumed to be untrusted in nature.
Thus a “Trust but verify" mantra sums up the trust relationship of the
provider with the remote host. This ability of the data providers to verify
the environment of the remote system, termed attestation in literature, is a
strong assumption and requirement, which though discussed in detail later
on, is not the primary focus of this work.
1.2. OUR APPROACH
The policy enforcement problem, as defined here, can be approached
from various angles and using various levels of abstraction. Some of the
earlier works and systems consider enforcing policies for specific applica-
tions or classes of applications [Jobs, 2007; Microsoft Corporation, 2009].
In these works the logic required to make enforcement decisions are built
into the application code itself. Others, on the other hand, take a much
lower level approach and consider the problem at the level of the operating
system, exploring intricacies at the level of the operating system processes,
describing which process can communicate with which other processes or
access specific input or output channels [Zeldovich, 2007].
Based on the level at which policy enforcement is performed, the classes
of policies that can be interpreted (and hence enforced) also varies. Oper-
ating system level enforcement limits the enforcement classes to those that
are readily describable at the process and system call level, while those at
the level of specific applications confine themselves to those applications
and their semantics alone.
In this dissertation, we consider the policy enforcement problem from
a data-centric view point, assuming that the policy is attached to the data
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that are operated on by the applications. Our work approaches the prob-
lem at the middleware level, with the intention of exploiting the features
of the higher and lower level solutions. This approach allows the architec-
ture to enforce data-specific, and not application specific, policies across
multiple applications while at the same time not running the risk of losing
application-semantic level information that would be valuable in enforcing
a wider variety of policy classes. In particular we consider the enforcement
of policies for applications run in the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) [Gosling
et al., 1996] environment. The rationale for this choice and details of the
design of such an architecture are discussed in detail further on in this dis-
sertation.
One of the key concepts that we leverage in our architecture is that
of Information Flow Control (IFC), which deals with restrictions placed
on how information can be transferred from one entity to another. While
IFC as a research topic can be investigated from various angles, our work
considers it from the perspective of the application’s programming lan-
guage semantics. Works in the area of IFC can be divided into two broad
approaches–compile time and run time. In compile time systems, the in-
formation flow constraints are checked and verified at the time of com-
pilation. Run-time systems, on the other hand, perform these checks dy-
namically during the execution of the application. While each approach
has its pros and cons, our architecture uses a hybrid approach, using the
run-time mechanism enhanced with static control flow analysis, due to two
main considerations: the ability of the enhanced run-time system to work
without having access to the actual source code of the application and the
larger classes of policies that can be enforced using this hybrid run-time
approach.
1.3. THESIS CONTRIBUTION
In this dissertation we present the design, implementation and applica-
tion of a Java Virtual Machine based policy enforcement architecture. The
contributions of this work are as follows:
• We examine in detail the previous work done in the problem space
of policy enforcement and highlight the gaps our work aims to fill.
• We present the design and implementation of a JVM based informa-
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tion flow control based middleware architecture aimed at enforcing
policies associated with data objects.
• The middleware developed is used to implement an application inde-
pendent Digital Rights Management (DRM) system using a widely
studied usage control model as its basis.
• The JVM framework is also used to design a Web Service architec-
ture capable of enforcing usage policies associated with the submit-
ted data, as specified by the data provider.
The results obtained during the course of this work has been published
in several peer-reviewed international journals, conferences and workshop
proceedings.
The initial thoughts on the design of the policy enforcement architec-
ture was presented in a paper in 2006 [Nair et al., 2009] and the preliminary
results of the implementation were discussed in a subsequent international
workshop the same year [Nair, 2006]. This was followed up by a detailed
paper on the implementation of Trishul in REM 07 [Nair et al., 2008b]
which explained in detail the approach we took, as detailed in Chapter 3
of this dissertation, as well the initial set of performance results obtained.
The work done on using Trishul to enforce DRM policies, as presented
in Chapter 4 of the dissertation, was published in ACM DRM 08 [Nair
et al., 2008a]. This approach can be used to implement the Nuovo DRM
Paradiso system aimed at enabling DRM-preserving digital content redis-
tribution, proposed initially in the CEC 05 paper [Nair et al., 2005] and
later expanded in the Fundamentae Informatica journal paper [Dashti et al.,
2009].
1.4. STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION
The rest of the dissertation is organised as follows.
Chapter 2 introduces the concept of access and usage control and infor-
mation flows and outlines the existing research work in these areas within
the problem space of this dissertation. We highlight the limitations of the
current state of the art and explain the need for the work that this disserta-
tion undertakes.
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In Chapter 3 we present the design and implementation of the JVM
based information flow control system, named Trishul, that forms the core
of the dissertation. We explain in details the various design and implemen-
tation choices made during the course of the work and how they influence
the performance of the achieved system, which is investigated in detail us-
ing microbenchmark performance measurements reported in the chapter.
In chapters 4 and 5, we present the applications of the Trishul frame-
work in building policy enforcement systems in various application scenar-
ios:
• In Chapter 4 we present the implementation of a Digital Rights Man-
agement (DRM) system using the theoretical concepts proposed in a
widely researched usage control model, UCONABC, and the Trishul
framework.
• In Chapter 5 we show how Trishul can also be used to implement a
policy enforcement architecture for Web Services, the core compo-
nents of the Service Oriented Architecture paradigm.
Finally, we conclude the dissertation in Chapter 6. There we review
the contributions of the dissertation work, the lessons learnt and point out
directions for future work.
CHAPTER 2
Background and related work
In this chapter we discuss the background work related to the area of se-
curity policy enforcement. We start with an introduction of basic access
control and usage control policies as they form the core of any policy
enforcement system. We then introduce the concept of information flow
control. Information flow control plays an integral part in the systems we
consider in this dissertation as a form of very fine grained abstract access
control policies. We look at various types of systems that enforce these
flow-based policies and discuss their key differences. A discussion on the
security of Java architecture and that of trusted computing systems is also
presented in this chapter.
2.1. SECURITY POLICIES
Broadly defined, security policy is a "statement or set of statements that
partitions the states of the system into a set of authorised, or secure, states
and a set of unauthorised, or insecure, states” [Bishop, 2002] or "a formal
specification of the restrictions to be enforced” [Sterne, 1991].
This definition allows for categorisation of security policies into three:
confidentiality policies which deal with (read) access to restricted informa-
tion, integrity policies which deal with who can alter restricted informa-
tion and how it can be transformed and availability policies which specify
which entities can have access to specific system resources [Bishop, 2002].
In this work, we concentrate on the enforcement of confidentiality and
availability policies and integrity policies are not discussed further on in
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this dissertation. Interested readers are referred to [Bishop, 2002] for a
systematic analysis of this category of policies.
2.1.1. Access Control
Access control policies, a form of availability policies, define which sub-
jects can gain access to a restricted object, usually files, processes or ma-
chine resources like disk, network and CPU.
An access control matrix model, proposed by Lampson [Lampson,
1971] and later refined by Denning and Graham [Graham and Denning,
1971], provides the simplest framework for such a policy. The framework
describes the rights R of domains over resources using a matrix represen-
tation A, an example of which is shown in Table 2.1. The protected entities
(files in this case) are termed objects O while subjects S denote the set of
active players in the system like users and processes. Each element a[s,o]
∈ A denotes the rights exerted by the subject on the object.
object→
subject ↓ file 1 file 2 process 1
user 1 read, write read, execute execute
user 2 read write -
Table 2.1: An access control matrix with two subjects (users)
and three objects (files).
Access control policies can be divided into two broad categories. In
discretionary access control (DAC) [US DoD, 1985], individual users are
given control over specifying who can access a particular resource they
own. On the other hand, in mandatory access control (MAC) [US DoD,
1985], the system specifies access control restrictions associated with an
object and the individual user is not allowed to change the settings. Mod-
ern operating systems in general enforce DAC, using a set of rules which
describe conditions under which the access is allowed. When the access
constraints are specified in terms of the identity of the subject, these kind
of policies are know as identity based access control (IBAC) policies.
Originator controlled access control (ORCON) [Bishop, 2002] is a hy-
brid form of the DAC and MAC systems proposed to model scenarios
where the originator of the objects retain control over them even after they
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have left the originator. In ORCON, implemented as a decentralised access
control system, the originator1 of an object controls who can access it. In
such a model, the owner of the object cannot override the originator’s set-
tings on the access control restrictions on the object. Thus if the originator
has specified that subject S1 cannot read a particular file, the owner cannot
overrule this and provide S1 with the read rights.
Often, the role played by the subject in an organisation–more than the
identity of the subject–defines the access control rights he or she enjoys.
For example, a company policy could be defined that the CEO of the com-
pany should have access rights to reports marked ‘top-secret’, while the
manager of a group should have access to only reports marked ‘secret.’
Instead of associating the read right to the top-secret to a specific subject
whose identity might change, the right is associated with the role of the
CEO and the subject is then assigned this role. In this way, a change in the
role can be reflected by simply changing the access matrix instead of hav-
ing to re-assign the role to all the subjects. Such a model in which the role
(a set of job functions) of the subject defines the access rights to restricted
objects is termed role-based access control (RBAC). RBAC can be consid-
ered as a form of MAC model with DAC providing further restrictions on
the allowed actions.
Bell-LaPadula [Bell and LaPadula, 1975] is a hybrid MAC-DAC ac-
cess control policy model aimed at enforcing a confidentiality policy in a
military-like environment for subjects, which constitute active components
in the system, and objects, which form the passive entities. In this model, a
set of security clearances is associated with the subjects and security clas-
sifications with the objects. The “need to know” principle is captured using
the concept of categories for each security classification. Objects can be
placed in several of these categories and subjects are given access to power
set of the category set. Each security clearance/security classification and
security category form a security level.
The Bell-LaPadula security model is described using three properties,
the first two specifying MAC policies, while the last being DAC:
• The Simple Security Property states that a subject at a given security
level may read an object at the same or lower security level and if
it has discretionary read access to the object. This property is often
described as the “no read-up.”
1Note that originator need not be the owner of an object.
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• The *-Property states that a subject at a given security level cannot
write to any object at a lower security level. This is often described
as the “no write-down" property.
• The Discretionary Security Property states that access must be per-
mitted by the access control matrix.
“Unclassified,” “Confidential,” “Secret" and “Top Secret” is one exam-
ple of one such classification. Consider the example of subject S1 with a
clearance of “Top Secret” and S2 with clearance “Secret” and objects O1
with security classification “Top Secret” and O2 with classification “Con-
fidential.” As per the simple security principle, S1 can read both O1 and
O2 while S2 can read only O2. *-property places the restriction that S1 can
write into O1 but not O2 while S2 cannot write into O1 or O2.
However, there are occasions where a subject at a high clearance has
to communicate with a subject with a lower clearance. The Bell-LaPadula
restrictions prevent this from happening. Instead, in order to allow such
a communication, the concept of maximum security level and current se-
curity level are introduced in the model. A subject is given a maximum
security level clearance to which it can raise itself but at the same time is
able to lower his current security level to a lower value than this maximum
in order to communicate with another subject at that lower security level.
Of course, with the current security level, the associated access privilege
will be reduced.
Over the years, several other access control models have been proposed
and studied, including Biba [Biba, 1977], LOMAC [Fraser, 2000], System
Z [Mclean, 1987] etc. These are not discussed here for reasons of brevity.
2.1.2. Usage Control
Since its introduction in early military systems, the use of authorisation has
been a means to limit access to resources. However, researchers have been
coming to the realisation that the traditional classic models are falling short
of serving the needs of the modern distributed computing environment and
associated work-flow management.
Once a subject has been given access to the object, one may still wish to
control the way in which the object is used by the subject. Classically, this
had to do with the time allocated to the access of the object. For example,
a subject which has been granted access to use the network should not
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be allowed to hog the resource in such a way that no other subjects can
gain access to it. In recent years, the use of usage control has expanded
to encompass issues like privacy and intellectual property protection. For
example, a subject who has been granted access to a piece of data should
still be restricted on what operations can be performed on the data. For
example, a policy could state that playing an MP3 file could be allowed
but not more than three times.
One of the more recent and coherent theoretical modelling of the vari-
ous aspects of usage control is that of UCONABC model.
UCONABC Model
The core aspect of the UCONABC model proposed by Park and Sandhu [Park
and Sandhu, 2004] deals with the decision-making aspects of the subjects’
usage of the objects. Subjects and objects are endowed with attributes that
capture the properties and/or capabilities of these components. One of the
main innovative aspects of the UCONABC model is its concept of mutable
attributes of the subjects and objects. While earlier models considered only
immutable attributes that can only be modified by the manual intervention
of an administrator, like the clearance of the subject or the classification
of the object, in this model subject and object attributes can be modified
as a result of the exercise of a right by the subject. This allows the frame-
work to model modern applications like DRM, where the subject attributes
capture variables like credit balance and object attributes the variables like
cost per-use.
Subjects can be either provider subjects, consumer subjects or identifiee
subjects. Provider subjects are the provider of the objects and hold some
limited rights on it while the consumer subjects are the ones that exercise
most usage rights on the objects. The identifiee subjects are those entities
that are identified by the object, for example patients in medical records.
The subjects exercise privileges termed rights. However, unlike the
traditional predefined access matrix based rights, the rights in UCONABC
model are approved/provided in real-time as and when the access is at-
tempted after the evaluation of various constraint conditions. This is sim-
ilar in nature to the task-based authorisation [Thomas and Sandhu, 1998]
model, which was proposed as an extension to the traditional model in
which authorisation decision is made during the completion of the task. In
it, the rights are created and consumed just-in-time and the exercise of a
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consumable right can in turn enable other rights for different subjects and
objects.
In UCONABC, the decision to allow the exertion of the rights by the
subject on the object are based on—Authorisation (A), oBligation (B) and
Conditions (C).
Authorisation evaluates the rights requested, the subject and the ob-
ject attributes and provides decision on whether to allow it or not. These
authorisation checks could be performed before the rights are granted (pre-
authorisation or preA) or while the rights are being exercised, at periodic
intervals (ongoing-authorisation or onA). Obligations [Park and Sandhu,
2002], an aspect not considered in most traditional access control models,
specify the mandatory requirements that the subjects have to perform be-
fore access is provided (preB) or during the exercise of the rights (onB).
For example, accepting the End User License Agreement is an obligation,
specifically a preB. Conditions capture the system and environment states
that influence the decision to allow a right. Unlike authorisation and obli-
gation evaluations, condition evaluations do not lead to the update of the
subject or object attributes. The associated condition variables are also not
mutable.
The primary components of the framework and their relationships with
each other are illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Denoting the mutability of the attributes by 0 for immutable, 1 for pre-
updates, 2 for ongoing and 3 for post-updates, the core UCONABC models
can be represented as preA0, preA1 and preA3, onA0, onA1, onA2, onA3,
preB0, preB1, preB2, preB3, preC0 and onC0.
UCONABC model has been used in modelling various scenarios like
resource sharing in collaborative computing systems [Zhang et al., 2008a]
and data control in remote platforms [Berthold et al., 2007a]. Work has
also been done in expanding the scope of the model. Katt et al. [Katt et al.,
2008] has extended the original UCONABC model by adding the notion of
post-obligations using a continuity-enhanced usage control enforcement
model and adding continuous usage sessions.
2.2. INFORMATION FLOW CONTROL
When a security policy is associated with a data object, it becomes im-
perative to trace the flow of the data within the system as it is used by
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Authorization
          (A)
Obligation
(B)
Condition
(C)
Rights
(R)
Usage Decision
Objects
(O)
Subjects
(S)
Subject Attributes Object Attributes
Figure 2.1: Components of the UCONABC model.
various applications and that the access to this data object by these appli-
cations be mediated as per the policy restrictions. The field of work related
to information flow control studies this requirement and a brief discussion
on it is presented here.
2.2.1. Information Flow Problem
Information flows from object2 x to object y, denoted x ⇒ y, whenever
information stored in x is transferred to, or used to derive information
transferred to, object y. Denning formally defined a control flow model
FM [Denning, 1976] as
FM = 〈N,P,SC,⊕,→〉
2used here in a broader sense than that of Java objects
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N denotes a set of storage objects that receive and store data. P is a set
of processes that move information around in the system. SC is defined as a
set of security classes that each object in N is bound to. This security class
also includes L, the lower bound of the security classes which is attached
to objects in N by default. ⊕ is the binary operator that defines the security
class of the result of a binary operation performed on any pair of operand
classes. In most cases it is equivalent to an OR operation. → denotes the
legal can-flow of information from one security class of object to another.
Without losing generality and specifically in the context of this dissertation,
the objects that form N can be considered as program variables, and in
certain instances, as seen later on, blocks of program code.
Many programs perform their computation using one or more variables
as operands and store the resulting values into another variable. For ex-
ample, in the pseudo-code y = x, when the value of x is transferred to y,
information is said to flow from object (variable) x to object (variable) y
and the flow can be denoted as x⇒ y [Denning, 1976].
Flows due to codes like y = x are termed explicit flows, more accurately
explicit direct flows after the convention in [Guernic et al., 2006], because
the flow takes place due to the explicit transfer of a value from x to y. On
the other hand, consider the code shown in Listing 2.1. Even though there
is no direct transfer of value from x to y, once the code is executed, y would
have obtained the value of x.
Listing 2.2 shows another example of a convoluted information flow
causing code fragment. At the end of the execution of this code fragment,
boolean variable b ends up having the same value as boolean a. In tra-
ditional literature these two examples are grouped together as examples of
implicit flows but to differentiate the level of complexity needed to trace in-
formation flow in them, we follow the convention in [Guernic et al., 2006]
and terming the information flow exhibited in Listing 2.1 as explicit indi-
rect flow and that in Listing 2.2 as implicit indirect flow. Thus x ⇒ y is an
explicit indirect flow and a⇒ b is an implicit indirect flow.
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1 boolean x
2 boolean y
3 i f ( x == t rue )
4 y = t rue
5 e l s e
6 y = f a l s e
Listing 2.1: Explicit indirect flow.
1 boolean b = f a l s e
2 boolean c = f a l s e
3 i f ( ! a )
4 c = t rue
5 i f ( ! c )
6 b = t rue
Listing 2.2: Implicit indirect flow.
Fenton [Fenton, 1974a] proposed a mechanism to handle implicit in-
formation flow by adding a new security class for the program counter pc.
Whenever a control branch occurs, pc is set to the ⊕ of the class of objects
that form the arguments of the branch decision. Within the branch block,
pc is added to every control flow. Thus in the example illustrated in List-
ing 2.1, when the i f statement is executed, pc is set to x and y is set to
L⊕ pc = x. Thus the implicit information flow from x to y is captured by
the security label y and the process x⇒ pc⇒ y.
However, the proposed solution does not capture the trickier implicit
indirect flow shown in Listing 2.2. When a is true, the first i f fails so c
remains L. The next i f succeeds and b = pc = c = L. Thus, at the end of
the run, b attains the value of a, but b 6= a. The same is true when a is
f alse. The underlying problem is that even though the first branch is not
taken, the very fact that it is not followed contains information, which is
then leaked using the next i f .
A trivial (and ineffective) approach to this problem is to ignore it, as
done by Beres and Dalton [Beres and Dalton, 2003]. Fenton [Fenton, 1973]
and Gat and Saal [Gat and Saal, 1976] proposed a solution which works by
restoring the value and class of objects changed within the branch struc-
ture, back to the value and security class it had before entering the branch.
This however would not work in practice since existing application codes
routinely use similar control structures without paying any consideration
to information flow leaks.
Aries [Brown and King, 2004] takes a more drastic approach wherein
a write to an object within a branch structure is disallowed if its security
class is less than or equal to the security class of the program counter, pc.
Thus, in the previous example if a is f alse, when the program tries to write
to c, the compile time system prevents it from doing so, since c’s security
class L <= pc (= a). This approach works only if the security classes have
an explicit notion of high and low.
Denning [Denning, 1975] proposes a more secure approach whereby
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the compiler inserts an extra instruction at the end of the i f (!a){c = true}
code block to update c to pc (= a). Thus, irrespective of whether the branch
was followed or not, the class of object acted upon within the branch is
updated to reflect the information flow.
2.2.2. Managing Information Flow
In general, two different approaches have been explored with the aim of
providing information flow control—static and dynamic, each associated
with compile-time and run-time systems.
In the compile-time approach, applications are written in specially de-
signed programming languages in which special annotations are used to
attach security labels and constraints to the objects in the program. At
compile time, the compiler uses these extra labels to ensure the security of
the flow control model. These compile-time checks can thus be viewed as
an augmentation of type checking.
We say that x can flow to y, denoted by x → y, iff information in x is
allowed to flow into y [Denning, 1976]. In the context of information flow,
the necessary and sufficient condition for a system to be considered secure
is that, for all (x, y), x ⇒ y is allowed iff x → y [Denning and Denning,
1977]. When information flow occurs between more than two objects, the
compiler has to verify that each of the flows is allowed. For example, in
the code segment z = x + y, it is clear that information flows from both x
and y to z. A compiler would, in theory, need to verify x→ z and y→ z. In
general, if b = f (a1,a2 . . .an), each ai → b has to be verified. However for
the sake of simplicity, the compiler computes A = a1⊕ a2 . . .an and then
verifies A→ b.
Compile-time information flow analysis was used by Denning [Denning,
1976; Denning and Denning, 1977] as a mechanism to add a certification
mechanism into the compiler analysis phase in order to prove the security
of the system. In JFlow [Myers, 1999], an example of a modern compile-
time system, the Java [Gosling et al., 1996] programming language is ex-
tended in order to let the programmer specify security labels to the objects.
At compile time, a special compiler uses the labels to verify the informa-
tion security model of the system. Once this has been verified, the code
is translated to normal Java code and a normal Java compiler transforms it
into bytecode.
Run-time solutions take a different approach by using the labels as an
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extra property of the object and tracking their propagation as the objects
are involved in computation. Instead of verifying x⊕ y → z at compile
time, the system propagates the security class of the information source
into the information receiving object. Thus, the assignment z = x⊕ y oc-
curs. These assignments however only track the flow of information as it
moves through the system. The actual enforcement of security policies is
carried out by another part of the system, termed the “Policy Engine.” It
intercepts all information flows from program objects (such as variables) to
output channels, and allows the flow to proceed only if they are not disal-
lowed by the relevant policies. Examples of such output channels are files,
shared memories, network writes, etc. Whenever an object x tries to write
information into an output channel O, the policy engine checks whether
x→ O is allowed by the specified policy and if not, the flow is disallowed,
by aborting the program or silently returning the failure return value for
that execution.
Pure run-time enforcement systems are, however, unable to distinguish
implicit information flows and hence control them since by definition these
flows exploit execution branches that have not been executed in a particular
run, which hence have not been under the scrutiny of the pure run-time
system. In order to enforce information flow policies on systems that have
implicit flows in it, the policy engine also has to consider the program as a
whole and perform a non-realtime analysis of all execution branches in the
program.
Fenton’s Data Mark Machine [Fenton, 1974a] was one of the earli-
est systems that proposed the use of run-time information flow control to
enforce policies. However the machine was an abstract concept and no
implementation was attempted. The security mechanism proposed by Gat
and Saal [Gat and Saal, 1976] works in a similar fashion. The system
however relies heavily on specialised hardware architecture to trace infor-
mation flow. The RIFLE architecture [Vachharajani et al., 2004] is a more
recent system that implements run-time information flow security with the
aim of providing policy decision choice to the end user. They use a combi-
nation of program binary translation and a hardware architecture modified
specifically to aid information flow tracking. Again, the use of the modified
hardware architecture prevents it from being used on a normal machine.
Beres and Dalton [Beres and Dalton, 2003] use the DynamoRIO [MIT,
2003] dynamic instruction stream modification framework to dynamically
rewrite machine code in order to support dynamic label binding. Taint-
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Bochs [Chow et al., 2004] uses a similar idea to track flow of information
within a system but with the aim of tracking how ‘tainted’ data flows in
the system. With a similar objective in mind Haldar et al. [Haldar et al.,
2005a] use bytecode instrumentation to track tainted data received from
the network. They also attempt to extend this idea by using bytecode in-
strumentation to perform mandatory access control on Java objects, in or-
der to enforce security policies [Haldar et al., 2005b]. However, the level
of granularity that is considered (objects) is too coarse-grained to be use-
ful in many applications. For instance, they provide as an example a class
method that tries to leak a secret file into a public file [Haldar et al., 2005b].
This is prevented by tagging the whole class instance as ‘secret’ as soon as
the secret file is read and denying access to public channels once this tag
has been set. The coarse nature of this tagging however prevents the class
method from accessing any public channels even if the operation it wishes
to perform is not on the data read from the secret file.
Recent years have seen considerable interest in research of the compile-
time approach towards information flow [Myers, 1999; Sabelfeld and My-
ers, 2003]. One of the reasons for favouring the compile-time approach
is that all such systems are deemed to be secure even before execution of
the program. The belief was that these systems leak only at most one bit
of information per program execution and hence are inherently more se-
cure than run time systems [Myers, 1999]. However, it has been shown
by Vachharajani et al. [Vachharajani et al., 2004] that termination channel
attacks, usually considered the Achilles’ heel of run-time systems, can be
engineered to leak arbitrary number of bits in both compile-time as well as
run-time systems.
One of the most important distinguishing points of the two approaches
is the kinds of policies that can be enforced by them. Compile-time sys-
tems suffer from the important limitation that the policies are bound to the
code in a static manner. There is no easy way to handle scenarios where the
policies are not purely information flow based and where different policies
need to be attached to different runs of the application using different input
data. These system perform policy-code binding early in the lifecycle, pre-
venting their use in application scenarios where the policy is bound, not to
the application but instead, to the data. An example application where such
limitations occur is that of an email system in which each incoming email
has its own specific policy, none of which are constant within the same
or across different application runs or known at compile-time. Compile-
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time systems are also limited by the fact that these systems cannot enforce
policies that depend on the dynamic run-time properties of the system and
the user. For example, a policy that states “This application should not
be allowed to send more than 1 MB of data across the network in one
day” cannot be verified at compile time, since the enforcement requires
the maintenance of a state that tracks the network usage of the application
at run-time. While some sophisticated compile-time systems address this
indirectly by checking that the application itself contains the logic to per-
form this enforcement check, such a mechanism cannot be formalised for
a generic class of policies.
Compile-time systems are in general more efficient than run-time sys-
tems in that the verification is done only once, at compile time. At run-
time, these systems can thus confine themselves to checking the proof
of the verification. However, run-time systems perform flow control on
each run of the code, slowing the system. The gain in speed enjoyed by
compile-time systems however is in exchange for the limitation on the
kind of policies that can be enforced. These include policies that depend
on the dynamic run-time properties of the system and the user. Similarly,
compile-time systems cannot ensure the enforcement of system-wide obli-
gations [Park and Sandhu, 2002] that may be stated in the usage policy,
unless they can be expressed at compile-time in a static, immutable man-
ner.
Compile-time systems are written in special languages; hence most ex-
isting applications, written in C, C++, or Java, will have to be rewritten
in these languages before they can be verified. Yet another shortcoming
is that the verification process is performed by the programmer and the
user has to trust the programmer. Although proof carrying codes [Necula,
1997] can be used to enhance the trust, practical use of the concept has not
reached a critical mass.
Inline reference monitors (IRMs) [Erlingsson, 2004] use a hybrid ref-
erence monitor with post-compile-time (but not strictly run-time) code
rewriting approach to the problem of high-level policy enforcement. How-
ever, McLean [McLean, 1990] proved that information flow policies equiv-
alent to noninterference are not trace properties and Schneider [Schneider,
2000] has shown that execution monitors (IRMs being a form of execu-
tion monitors) are only capable of enforcing properties. Information flow,
not being a safety property is thus not enforceable by the use of reference
monitors [Schneider, 2000]. This limitation can be intuitively understood
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as follows—monitors see executions as a series of executed actions, how-
ever in order to enforce strong information flow constraints as discussed
earlier, the enforcement system must also be aware of actions which were
not evaluated by a given execution, something that monitors are not capa-
ble of.
What this means at the enforcement level is that because they are un-
able to trace information flow within the system, in order to enforce a fine
grained policy like ‘do not allow data accessed from /secret to be sent over
the network,’ IRMs have to resort to enforcing a coarser policy like ‘do not
allow data accessed from anywhere within the local file system to be sent
over the network.’ Hence, while IRMs are able to enforce a policy like ‘do
not allow transmitting on network once data has been read from /secret,’
because they are unable to trace information flow within the system, they
cannot enforce a finer policy like ‘do not allow data accessed from local
file system to be sent over the network.’ In the former, all access to net-
work resources will have to be denied, irrespective of the origin of the data
that are being attempted to be sent, as long as the local file system has been
accessed before the network usage. In the latter, network access will be
denied only if the data that are attempted to be transferred is actually read
from the local file system.
This conservative approach to dealing with the enforcement of infor-
mation control policies is by itself a property of compile-time enforcement
system, due to its inability to use the information available at runtime.
2.2.3. Covert Channel and Noninterference
Covert channels are a form of hidden communication channels that use the
bandwidth of a legitimate channel to leak information about various aspects
of the system. A simple example of such a channel is that of a process that
opens and closes a file, leading to a lock / unlock being placed on the file,
in a timed pattern. This lock on the file can be observed by another process
in the system, which may not, in the first place, be allowed to communicate
with the first process. However, the former process could represent the in-
formation it wants to leak (basically a string of bits) as the timed pattern,
allowing the latter to gain knowledge about the information. The Trusted
Computer Security Evaluation Criteria [US DoD, 1985] defines two gen-
eral forms of covert channels—storage channels where communication is
established by the act of storing or modifying objects, and timing channels
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in which relative timing of events is used to convey information.
Covert channel attacks are known to be hard to eliminate by the very
nature of the attacks. Since the channel from which the covert channel
‘steals’ the bandwidth to leak the information is almost always a legitimate
channel and since the subjects have legitimate need and proper authori-
sation to access this channel, the use of this channel is hard to control,
especially given that the timing pattern could be adhoc and dynamic in
nature.
The use of covert channels points to an alternative way of looking at
information flow security—in the form of interference at the system level.
Viewed this way all channels, and not just those which are explicitly de-
signed to conduct information between subjects, need to be controlled for
controlling information flow within a secure system.
Goguen and Meseguer define their notion of noninterference [Goguen
and Meseguer, 1982] as follows:
“commands in A, issued by users in G, are noninterfering with users
in G’ provided that any sequence of commands to the system, given by
any users, produces the same effect for users in G’ as the corresponding
sequence with all commands in A by users in G deleted”
Though modelling security policies as noninterference assertions and
system security as a set of state transitions fulfils strong security require-
ments, the sweeping nature of the model makes it difficult to design and
implement actual generic systems that satisfy the model at the system level.
Hence, in this dissertation, noninterference aspects of security are not con-
sidered at the overall system level. Similarly, covert channels are also not
considered in this dissertation due to this inherent difficulty in building
covert-channel-free as a practical system and its limited usage in the broad
scope of policy enforcement. Furthermore there is a large body of existing
work that investigates various aspects of this problem [Shaffer et al., 2008;
Cabuk et al., 2004].
However, information flow control at the code semantic level as dis-
cussed before can itself be modelled as a noninterference system. A nar-
rower definition of noninterference stated as follows is however used in
these contexts. A process, P is said to be noninterfering if the values of its
public (or low) outputs do not depend on the values of its secret (or high)
inputs. The system presented in this dissertation can be used to enforce/im-
plement such a noninterference policy.
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2.3. JAVA SECURITY
Since its early days of the 1990s, Java technology has seen wide accep-
tance in the whole spectrum of computer systems, from backend servers to
embedded devices. This was due mainly to the “write once, run anywhere"
cross-platform nature of Java applications as well as to the rich program-
ming language available to application developers. Built-in mechanisms
like type-safe reference casting, automatic garbage collection and struc-
tured memory access make the language inherently more secure than other
commonly used languages. Java Virtual Machine’s (JVM) features like the
class loader architecture and class file verifier further enhance the security
of the execution environment.
The Java security manager is assigned the responsibility of managing
the access control restrictions of the code running inside the JVM to re-
sources external to the JVM. The Java API asks the security manager for
permission to perform potentially unsafe actions by invoking the check-
Permission method. Only if allowed by the manager will the API go ahead
with the execution. If the permission is denied, a security exception is
thrown.
The early implementation used the concept of sandboxing to create
two levels of security environment. This was refined later on (JDK 1.2
and above) to provide more levels of security environments whose security
permission could be specified with a finer granularity [Gong et al., 2003].
Cryptographic signatures are used to bind the application code to the origin
of the code and policies are defined based on the principals (origin) of the
code.
For example, consider an application trying to read the /etc/passwd file.
The Java API would create a java.io.FilePermission object and pass the
strings ‘/etc/passwd’ and ‘read’ to the object’s constructor. It then passes
this Permission object to the checkPermission() method of the java.security.
AccessController object. The AccessController uses the information con-
tained in the protection domains objects (which encapsulates the permis-
sions granted to the code source in the policy file) of classes whose methods
are present in the call stack (using stack inspection [Wallach and Felten,
1998]) to determine whether the action is to be allowed or not.
In Java 2 the use of -Djava.security.manager initiates a concrete Securi-
tyManager class and allows the system administrator to specify the access
policy (used by the security manager to make it decisions) via a policy file.
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Policy File
The Java policy file is used to grant permission(s) to class files loaded into
the JVM. Each class file is associated with a code source which indicates
where the code came from. This allows application developers to vouch
for codes they develop using digital certificates and code-signing methods
and users to grant permissions based on their trust on these developers.
1 grant signedBy ` `VU-CA" {
2 permiss ion java . i o . F i lePermiss ion
3 ` ` / e tc / passwd " , ` ` read " ;
4 }
Listing 2.3: Policy object example.
Listing 2.3 shows a sample policy file which grants specific permission
to codes signed by ‘VU-CA.’ A permission object has three parts—type,
name and optional action. The permission class’s name indicates the type,
for example java.io.FilePermission. The name is obtained from the Permis-
sion object, /etc/passwd being the example used above. The action prop-
erty of the Permission object specifies the action requested, for example
read. One or more such Permission objects is associated with a CodeS-
ource and forms a Policy object. The policy file consists of several such
objects.
The current security manager design, even with all the above-mentioned
features, still has limitations. Consider an application that wants read ac-
cess to the /etc/passwd file of an UNIX/Linux system. Such an access
is normal, since information present in the file is used to perform routine
housekeeping operations. However, there is no reason to send the informa-
tion obtained from the file outside the system via the network connection.
An application that tries to do so would, for example, be trying to harvest
system user information in order to perform an efficient brute force pass-
word attack. What is needed is a policy that allows an application to read
the content of the password file but prevents it from sending that infor-
mation out on the network. Current policy architecture does not support
this level of control. In order for it to enforce a similar functionality, the
Security Manager would have to prevent all writes to the network, thus
preventing all network communication capability of the code.
Furthermore a more fundamental issue with the stack based approach
to JVM security has recently been identified. When an application attempts
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to access a restricted resource, the JVM performs a walk over the execu-
tion stack to verify that all callers currently in the stack have been granted
permission to access that resource [Wallach and Felten, 1998] using the
checkPermission primitive, in order to prevent the Confused Deputy At-
tacks [Hardy, 1988]. However it has been shown [Pistoia et al., 2007] that
the stack-based access control approach is not secure as it allows untrusted
code to influence the execution of trusted code that accesses restricted re-
sources. Consider as example the code fragment in Listing 2.4.
1 p u b l i c c lass Trusted {
2 p u b l i c s t a t i c main vo id ( S t r i n g [ ] args ) throws Except ion {
3 Helper h = new Helper ( ) ;
4 S t r i n g fname = h . name ( ) ;
5 Fi leOutputStream f = new Fi leOutputStream ( fname ) ;
6 } }
7 p u b l i c c lass Helper {
8 p u b l i c S t r i n g name ( ) {
9 r e t u r n ` ` /home / user / sec re t . t x t " ;
10 } }
Listing 2.4: Class Trusted code fragment.
Assume that the class Trusted is provided by a trusted party and is al-
lowed to perform a security sensitive operation like creating a FileOutput-
Stream. However, unknown to the user, the class is using an untrusted
Helper class to supply the name of the FileOutputStream, fname.
When the JVM performs a stack walk, it sees the following callers on
the stack—security.checkPermission, FileOutputStream.<init>(File, bool),
FileOutputStream.<init>(String) and Trusted.main. Since all these callers
have permission as strong as FilePermission “/home/user/secret.txt", “write",
checkPermission will pass. However this allows the class Helper, an un-
trusted code, to influence the execution. Since h.name was not in the stack
when the stack walk was performed, this influence was not captured.
In addition to all this, the current Security Manager architecture is only
capable of enforcing basic credential based access control policies and not
usage control policies. In addition the notion of obligations as a set of
directives that has to be carried out before or after the access/usage is al-
lowed is neither conceptually expressible nor enforceable by the current
Java Security Manager implementation.
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2.4. TRUSTED COMPUTING
Trusted computing aims to provide open commodity systems with cer-
tain desirable properties usually associated with high-assurance closed sys-
tems. Cryptographic co-processors [Smith et al., 1998] work as secure
tamper resistant processing units used to perform processing of sensitive
operations, including tamper-proof execution of programs and protection
of secrets. However, due to the high degree of secure functionalities it im-
plements, these processors are very expensive and cannot be cost-effective
for use in large-scale deployment of cheap commodity systems.
One of the fundamental problems that these trusted platforms try to ad-
dress is allowing external parties to measure and evaluate the security of
the platform. Software based solutions that aim at providing such function-
alities can be easily circumvented by basing the attack at a lower level of
the computer architecture than which the solutions work at.
2.4.1. Trusted Platform Module
The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) specifications [Trusted Computing
Group, 2006], defined by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [Trusted
Computing Group, 2009], provide a mechanism to implement a cheap
trusted computing architecture. The TPM, implemented as a chip that is
attached to the motherboard of the machine, is aimed at providing a hard-
ware root of trust for, among other functionalities, implementing a founda-
tion for verifying the software processes running on the system.
The chip implements several cryptographic operations, such as random
number generation, asymmetric and symmetric key encryption and decryp-
tion, signing, secure hashing, etc. The architecture uses a combination of
hardware and software features to provide a high-assurance environment.
For this, each TPM has several cryptographic keys either built in or gener-
ated within the chip.
The Storage Root Key (SRK) always resides in the nonvolatile memory
of the TPM and its asymmetric private part never leaves the TPM. When
the TPM generates a new key, it is encrypted by its parent key and SRK
forms the root of this tree, forming the Root of Trust for Storage. Endorse-
ment Key (EK) is used to uniquely identify the TPM. Each TPM manufac-
turer provides a certificate to the EK attesting the compliance of the TPM
to the specifications. The TPM produces Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs)
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that are linked to the platform using certificates from the EK. The private
AIK never leaves the TPM unless it has been encrypted by the SRK. A
Privacy Certificate Authority uses the certificate issued by the EK and the
manufacturer’s certificate of EK to attest the authenticity of the AIKs.
Remote Attestation
A crucial functionality provided by the TPM is that of remote attestation
that allows for the platform to attest its state in response to a challenge from
an external party. The state of the system is captured in the form of a log
of events, maintained by an integrity measurement architecture (IMA) like
that of IBM IMA [Sailer et al., 2004]. It is the responsibility of the IMA to
produce measurements as requested by the external parties, as follows.
The TPM contains a number of Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs)
that hold the SHA-1 cryptographic hash of the event. Each measurement
is extended into one of the PCRs by hashing the result of the concatena-
tion of the PCR’s current value and the new measurement value: PCRi
= SHA-1(PCRi + m). Thus the PCR value reflects the digest of all the
measurements taken so far as well as the order in which they are taken.
The latest version of the TPMs have at least 24 PCRs. In order to capture
the complete boot sequence of a platform, each step of the boot process
is captured as a hash in the PCR. This starts when the system is booted.
At this point the TPM take control, hashes the BIOS and stores the value
in the PCR@. It then hands control to the BIOS, which in turn computes
the hash of the operating system and extends the PCR with the measured
value and transfers control to the OS. Taking this process further, the IMA
captures details of the various binaries that are being executed by the op-
erating system and stores the hash in the PCR. This process is shown in
Figure 2.2, where CRTM stands for Core Root of Trust for Measurement,
which forms the part of the platform whose integrity is trusted.
When an external party contacts the platform with an attestation re-
quest, the TPM uses its AIK’s private key to sign the content of the re-
quested PCR and sends it to the challenging party. The verifier authenti-
cates the public AIK by validating the AIK’s certificate chain provided by
the Privacy Certification Authority. It then reads the value of the PCR and
decides to trust the integrity of the platform by comparing it against a list
of know ‘safe’ values. In turn, the challenging party must have in place a
policy on how to classify the reported fingerprint values if they turn out to
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Figure 2.2: Extending trust from trusted (root of trust) hard-
ware to the higher level of application code using induction of
digest measurement.
be unknown or untrusted fingerprints.
Sealed Storage
The TPM also provides the functionality of sealed storage by which data
can be encrypted using a key whose private part never leaves the TPM.
In addition, the sealing process can be bound to a particular state of the
platform as specified by the value contained in a specific PCR(s) of the
TPM. Later the TPM performs the decryption operation only if the PCR(s)
contain the same value as it did when the sealing was performed, thus
ensuring that the decryption happens only if the system is in the same state
as when it was performing the decryption.
Dynamic PCRs
TPM specification v1.2 [Trusted Computing Group, 2006] extends the na-
ture of PCRs by introducing dynamic PCRs. In this version, unlike PCRs
1-16 which are reset only when the system reboots, PCRs 17-23 can be
reset to zero dynamically on the receipt of a hardware command from the
CPU. On system reboot these PCRs are reset to the value of -1 to distin-
guish static and dynamic resets of these PCRs.
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The dynamic sets of the PCR work as follows: AMD’s Secure Virtual
Machine (SVM) extensions allow for the late launch of a Virtual Machine
Monitor (VMM) with built-in protection against software-based attacks. In
order to launch the VMM, the kernel code residing in protection ring 0 of
the CPU invokes the SKINIT instruction3 with a physical memory address
as the only argument. The first two words in the memory at this location,
termed the Secure Loader Block (SLB), are the SLB’s length and entry
point (max of 64KB). In order to protect the SLB launch from software at-
tacks, the CPU disables direct memory access to memory pages composing
the SLB and also disables interrupts to prevent codes that were executing
earlier from regaining control. The processor then enters the 32-bit pro-
tected mode and jumps to the entry point specified.
In order to support attestation of the proper invocation of the SLB, as
a part of the SKINIT instruction the processor resets the dynamic PCRs
values (PCR 17-23) to zero and then sends the content of the (max 64KB)
SLB at the entry point to the TPM. The TPM in turn computes the hash of
the content and extends the value into PCR 17. Future TPM attestation can
then include the value stored in PCR 17, attesting to the invocation of the
SKINIT instruction and the (hash based) identity of the SLB code.
Though the SVM technology’s use of SLBs and dynamic PCRs was
meant for use in the secure late launch of VMMs, the Flicker project by
McCune et al. [McCune et al., 2008] has extended the SKINIT technology
for the execution of other security sensitive application codes in a secure
and isolated environment with support for multiple session runs using the
TPM sealing functionality. They have demonstrated its use in applications
like SSH password authentication, distributed computing applications and
certificate authority application.
We make use of these TPM functionalities to provide attestation assur-
ance for our system.
2.5. SUMMARY
In this chapter, we looked at background work related to various as-
pects of security policies, information flows and Java security. However,
3Intel has a similar GETSEC[SENTER] instruction for its Trusted eXecution Technol-
ogy extension
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as evident from the discussion in this chapter, current systems have various
failings and are not engineered towards enforcing comprehensive sets of
policies and there is a need for a JVM based dynamic run-time time policy
enforcement architecture with information flow tracing capability.
In the next chapter we present the design and implementation of such a
system, which forms the core of this dissertation.
It is to be noted that this chapter only provides a basic overview of the
various aspects of security we are interested in. We go into more detailed
analysis of the various related works and associated issues in the chapters
that follow this.
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CHAPTER 3
Trishul
For a system to be able to enforce policies attached to data, it needs to be
able to trace the data as they are used within the system and then verify
that such usages are allowed by the policy. Therefore one of the important
aspects of a data-oriented policy enforcement system is the information
flow tracing system.
In this section we present the design and implementation of Trishul, a
Java Virtual Machine (JVM) based IFC system. Java was chosen to imple-
ment Trishul on because of its wide use as a mature platform-independent
technology. Furthermore, the interpreted nature of the code execution
within the JVM allows Trishul to interpose itself between the Java appli-
cation and the lower level system on which it is being executed, the details
of which are discussed in this chapter.
The source code of Trishul has been released under the GPL license
and can be obtained from the project’s homepage [Nair, 2009].
3.1. ARCHITECTURE
In this section we provide an introduction to Trishul’s architecture and
discuss various associated design issues. Discussion of implementation
specific issues are left for later parts of the chapter.
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3.1.1. Design
Trishul is designed to be an information flow based policy enforcement ar-
chitecture aimed at providing an application independent platform for en-
forcing policies. Hence, instead of handcrafting it as a specialised system
to solve a specific application’s requirements, Trishul is designed in such
a way as to be generic and extensible to suit various applications’ needs.
With this in mind it is engineered to implement the following features:
• dynamic runtime information flow tracing mechanism that is capable
of introducing and propagating taint labels
• Java method call interpositioning mechanism that allows for exami-
nation of all aspects of the method call
• pluggable modular policy engine that controls various aspects of the
information flow tracing mechanism and makes decision on whether
to allow the method call to proceed or not
In addition to this we also provide a Java-like language to allow the
policy engine developers to write the engines modules for the various ap-
plication scenarios that Trishul can be used in.
Figure 3.1 illustrates Trishul’s architecture and its basic working. It
consists of two parts: the core Trishul JVM system and the pluggable pol-
icy engine module. The core JVM implements information flow tracing
as explained later in this chapter and provides the policy engine the hooks
needed to specify the method calls made by the untrusted application that
it is interested in examining. These hooks allow the policy engine to load
appropriate policy enforcement logic into the Trishul system based on the
policy associated with the data being used by the application and later,
based on the operation being performed on the data by the application, to
decide whether to allow the application’s function call.
The system works as follows. When a Java application is started, the
application is loaded and executed in the JVM as usual. A policy engine
is also loaded into the JVM, based either on the application being run or
via a command-line argument to the JVM. When the application performs
certain actions which introduces data into the JVM that the policy engine
is interested in, for example reading from a local file (step 1 in Figure 3.1)
or receiving data over a network socket, the JVM intercepts the call and
attaches a taint label to the data (step 2). The information flow tracing
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Figure 3.1: Trishul architecture.
functionality of Trishul ensures that, irrespective of what the application
does or where the data are moved in the JVM (step 3), the label remains
associated with the data. When the application tries to act on the data (step
4), for example send it over a socket connection (step 5), Trishul interposes
(step 6) and transfers the control to the policy enforcement engine (step
7). The engine checks with the respective data’s usage policy (step 8) and
decides whether or not to allow the application to proceed. For example,
if the application tries to write the data chunk D2, which originated from
‘Data’ which has an associated policy ‘Do not send over the network,’ to a
network socket, the call will be blocked.
As seen in the figure, the policy enforcement engine is a pluggable
module separate from the core of the Trishul VM. By allowing the engines
to be loaded as pluggable modules, the same framework can be used to
enforce policies based on the logic provided by various trusted third parties.
For example consider a policy ‘play 3 times’ associated with a media file.
A vendor V1 would consider a ‘play’ as having played more than half the
file’s content, while another vendor V2 would consider it a play only if the
whole file is played fully. Thus V1 and V2 would be able to specify different
interpretations of the application semantic of ‘play’ and provide different
engine codes to enforce the policy.
In addition, by design Trishul’s architecture is not bound to the use of
any specific policy specification language for expressing the data’s usage
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policy. It is up to the policy engine writer to decide which sets of pol-
icy specification language he wishes to write the language parser in and
provide the interpretation logic of policy expressions for.
3.1.2. Handling Indirect Flows
In order to capture the explicit and implicit indirect flow of information
discussed earlier in Chapter 2, Trishul introduces the concept of a context
taint, which extends the concept of associating a security class with the
program counter pc, as proposed by Fenton [Fenton, 1974a].
The context taint is used to capture the indirect taint flow associated
with a code branch, for example the case blocks in a switch statement or an
if/else statement, by examining the variables that influence the conditional
branch’s control flow instruction (CFI) and then passing the taint of these
variables into the branch blocks and augmenting the already existing direct
taint flows with this additional direct taints.
1 boolean a
2 boolean b = f a l s e
3 i f ( a )
4 b = t rue
Listing 3.1: Explicit indirect flow code.
Consider the code fragment in Listing 3.1 that causes a simple explicit
indirect information flow. The context taint ct is initialised to null at the
beginning of the application run. The CFI is in line 3 and is influenced by
the value of variable a. Trishul captures this influence in the context taint
by adding to it the security/taint label of the variable a. For a CFI like if (a
== 5) && (b == 6), where the value of a and b influences the CFI, ct is
computed as ct = ct ∪ (a∪b), where as before a denotes the security label
associated with the object a and ∪ denotes a union/combination operator
that combines taint labels.
It is to be noted that Trishul taint labels are implemented as binary
bitmaps (more on that later) and hence ∪ operator is equivalent to the bi-
nary ∨ (OR) operator and is used henceforth in the explanations below.
Once the current context taint for a CFI is calculated, Trishul then iden-
tifies all the objects (variables, actual Java objects, its members etc.) whose
values are modified within the taken and non-taken branch blocks. This is
done at the loadtime of the application bytecode into the JVM and exact
mechanism is described further in Section 3.3.3. At run-time, when the
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Line Branch a=true, Taint computation a=false, Taint Computation
01 no - -
02 no b = L b = L
03 yes ct_03 = a ct_03 = a
04 no b = ct ∨L = ct_03∨L = a b = ct ∨b = ct_03∨L = a
Table 3.1: Reasoning of how the concept of branch context
taint is used to capture the indirect flow present in Listing 3.1.
conditional CFI is actually executed, the objects that are modified in any of
the possible (taken and non-taken) paths are tainted with the context taint
ct using the following rule:
• If the branch is taken: ob ject = ct ∨ explicit_ f low_in_statement
• If the branch is not taken: ob ject = ct ∨ob ject
This captures the fact that irrespective of whether the branch is taken
or not, the CFI objects influence the value of the objects in these branches
and this influence of the CFI is captured in the taint propagation through
the use of the context taint.
Consider again the code in Listing 3.1. The analysis at load time com-
putes that the ct at line 3 (ct_03) is a. It also computes that the block of
code (just one line in this simple case) 4-4 is modified based on the CFI
branch in line 3. Based on the value of a, this block (line) can either be
executed or skipped. Table 3.1 looks at these cases.
1 boolean b = f a l s e
2 boolean c = f a l s e
3 i f ( ! a )
4 c = t rue
5 i f ( ! c )
6 b = t rue
Listing 3.2: Implicit indirect flow code.
Consider again the pseudo-code introduced in Section 2.2 as implicit
indirect flow, reproduced here for convenience as Listing 3.2. The analysis
at load time computes the ct at line 03 (ct_03) as a and ct_05 = c. Consider
a scenario when a = f alse at run time. Table 3.2 shows how the context
taint approach described above correctly identifies implicit flow of infor-
mation from a to b by successfully computing b = a. Assume that lines 1
and 2 when executed set the taint label of the variables b and c to L. Line 3
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Line No. Branch? Taken? Taint computation
01 no - b = L
02 no - c = L
03 yes yes ct_03 = a
04 no - c = ct ∨L = ct_03∨L = a
05 yes yes ct_05 = c
06 no no b = c∨b = ct_05∨b = b∨ c = a
Table 3.2: Reasoning of how the concept of branch context
taint is used to capture the implicit flow present in Listing 3.2.
is a CFI whose associated context taint was already calculated as a at load-
time. Line 4 is executed since a was f alse. As per the rule stated earlier,
taint on the variable c is calculated as ct ∨ explicit_ f low_in_statement.
This calculation leads to c = a. Line 5 is again a CFI whose associated
context taint was calculated as ct_05 = c. Since c is true, line 6 is not ex-
ecuted and hence the taint label of the implied flow into b is calculated as
ct_05∨b, which is equal to a. A similar result is computed when a = true,
the details of which are left as a thought exercise.
In a way, the use of context taint can be thought of as performing a
translation that converts all indirect flows into direct flows using augment
security flow instructions, without actually effecting the execution logic of
the actual instructions.
Simplifying the complexities associated with the objects and arrays and
their use of the heap (we get into them later in section ), the interpreted
mode of the JVM can be considered as using a stack oriented approach
wherein which the VM executes the instructions by moving data from local
variable arrays to the operand stack, or vice versa, and performing compu-
tation on these values in the operand stack using it to also store intermediate
values.
In effect Trishul virtual machine extends every slot on the variable ar-
ray as well as the operand stack to store a bitmap based labels. In addition
to performing the traditional bytecode instructions, the Trishul JVM uses
the augmented stack to track the direct information flows by executing in-
structions that store into the stack slot’s taint value the bit-wise ∨ of the
taint values of the stacks involved in the traditional instruction. In order to
track indirect flows, the JVM uses additional security registers to hold the
context taints and instructions to manipulate these security registers and
labels associated with the stacks and arrays. For every instruction ib influ-
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encing the control flow of the program, the label of the taint label of the
stack slot conditioning the behaviour of ib is stored in security register rb
as the context taint. This label is added to the label of every instruction
which is control dependent on ib. This handles the explicit indirect flows.
In order to take into account implicit indirect flows, the label of the secu-
rity register rb is added to the taint value of every stack slot in which a
value is assigned to the variable array. An important thing to note is that
these additional instructions are performed dynamically at run-time (using
information gained by performing static analysis performed at load-time)
and that the actual bytecode of the compiled Java classes are not modified
at all.
3.2. THE POLICY ENFORCEMENT ENGINE
The policy enforcement engine module of Trishul is responsible for
providing two main kinds of functionality:
• tainting the data as it is introduced into the JVM by the application.
The data of interest are usually those which have an access or usage
policy or similar restrictions associated with them.
• deciding on how the tainted data can be used at a later stage by the
application, in accordance with the policy associated with them.
In order to ease the development of the policy engines, a Java-like lan-
guage named Trishul-P was developed as part of this dissertation work.
The language is used for two main purposes:
• as a mechanism to specify the Java method calls that the policy en-
gine is interested in, so that at run-time, Trishul can transfer the con-
trol to the policy engine when they are invoked
• provide the logic to be used to decide on how to enforce the policies
when these methods are invoked.
Trishul-P has three key abstractions: actions, orders and policies. Ac-
tions allow the engine writer to specify the method calls that are of interest
to the policy engine by abstractly specifying the method calls performed by
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the Java application. Each time an action specified by the engine is about
to be executed by an application, the JVM intercepts it and passes the con-
trol over to the policy engine and queries it for a decision. The decision
is returned in the form of an Order indicating a specific action the JVM
should take, such as disallowing the action, or attaching a taint label to the
data.
Let us consider an example engine code fragment shown in Listing 3.3
for further explanation.
1 public class Tes tAbs t rac tAc t i onPo l i cy extends Engine {
2 public Order query ( Act ion a ) {
3 private e n g i n e t a i n t { sec re tTa in t , t opsec re tTa in t , pwdFile }
4 aswitch ( a ) {
5 case <* java . i o . Pr in tSt ream . p r i n t l n ( . . ) >:
6 return new OKOrder ( this , a ) ;
7 case <* java . i o . Pr in tSt ream#< secre tTa in t >. p r i n t l n ( S t r i n g s#< topsec re tTa in t >)
>:
8 return new Hal tOrder ( this , a ) ;
9 case <* java . i o . F i le Inpu tS t ream . < i n i t > ( . . , F i l e f ) >:
10 i f ( f . getName ( ) . indexOf ( " / e tc / passwd " ) >= 0) {
11 return new ObjectTa in tOrder ( a . ge tTh isPo in te r ( ) ,# ob jec t : pwdFile ) ;
12 case <abstract * t r i s h u l . t e s t . t r i s h u l _ p . Tes tAbs t rac tAc t ion ( i n t p1 , S t r i n g p2 )
>:
13 System . out . p r i n t ( p1 + " : " + p2 ) ;
14 return new OKOrder ( this , a ) ;
15 }
16 break ;
17 }
18 return nul l ;
19 }
20 public void handleResul t ( Ac t ion act ion , Order s , Object r e s u l t , boolean
i sExcep t ion )
21 {
22 System . out . p r i n t ( ( i sExcep t ion ? " Except ion " : " Normal " ) + r e s u l t ) ;
23 }
24 }
Listing 3.3: Example of Trishul enforcement engine code expressed using Trishul-P.
Every policy engine class is defined as an extension of the parent En-
gine class (line 1) and has to provide a definition of the query class method
(line 2), in which the core code for the policy engine is defined. Since the
policy engine provides the reply to the JVM in the form of an Order, the
return type of the query method is specified as an Order (line 2).
Line 3 defines enginetaints that are used in this code segment. engine-
taints are used to assign values to the taint labels and are discussed in detail
in Section 3.2.3. Line 4 marks the beginning of an aswitch block. aswitch,
like the traditional switch statement, is a control statement which allows the
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value of the action a to control the flow of execution of the decision logic
of the policy engine. The case statements that follow (lines 5, 7, 9 and
12) are presented as action patterns, which are discussed in detail below.
Lines 6, 8, 11 and 14 specifies the return Order for each of the case blocks.
Orders are discussed in detail in Section 3.2.4. As in the case of regular
Java code, further code logic can be added to the case statements (line 10).
handleResult method (lines 20–23) is executed after the execution of
the actual method the application was attempting to execute when it was
intercepted, following a match among one of the case statements for the
earlier aswitch block. Its functionality is also explained further on in this
chapter.
3.2.1. Actions
The method invocations that the policy engine is interested in intercepting
are specified as Action objects within a set of case statements (Listing 3.3)
using the syntax
< modf retTp pkg.class#<thisTaint>.mthd(..#paramTaint)#<contextTaint> >
(3.1)
The action objects are contained within the outer < and > delimiter
characters. The constraints that can be specified for the Java method in-
clude the modifier modf (like public, private, final etc.), the return type of
the method retTp, the calling object’s identity pkg.class, the method’s name
mthd and its parameters. The policy engine distinguishes between different
actions using the aswitch statement. It is similar to Java’s switch statement;
the switch expression being an action and the case labels the action pat-
terns.
Action signatures can also use wildcard patterns: ‘*’ matches any one
constraint and ‘..’ matches zero or more parameter types. For example,
the first case statement in Listing 3.3 (line 5) matches the println method
call defined in the PrintStream Java class file of the java.io package for
zero or more parameters of any type, while the second case statement (line
7) matches a similar method call only if there is only one parameter of
type String. The various Taint matching criteria specified in syntax (3.1),
thisTaint, paramTaint, contextTaint, enclosed using delimiters < >, are ex-
plained further in Section 3.2.3.
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3.2.2. Abstract actions
Consider a policy engine which is interested in any application’s write ac-
cess to a specific output channel. Java provides several different library
methods that can be used to perform this operation. In order to capture
these different methods, a single Order would have several actions asso-
ciated with it. It becomes cumbersome to list each of these actions sepa-
rately. Abstract action makes writing policies in these circumstances easier
by providing a syntax to group several related actions into a single abstract
action and referencing this abstract action in the policy engine code. In
other words, abstract actions summarise a set of application method calls
into a single action statement.
Listing 3.4 shows an example of how an abstract action TestAbstrac-
tAction is defined. Line 5 declares a matches method that returns true or
false based on whether the Action under consideration matches one of the
action patterns specified in the method. As before an aswitch statement is
used to check the various action patterns that constitute the abstract action,
specified in the case statements of lines 7 and 12. Lines 8, 9, 13 and 14 are
used to provide a uniform parameter list of the TestAbstractAction action.
Thus in Listing 3.4, TestAbstractAction is defined to be consisting of two
actions trishul.test.action1(int a1, String a2) and trishul.test.action2(String
a2, int a1), and line 12 of Listing 3.3 shows how the abstract action is used
within a policy engine code.
3.2.3. Taint Labels & Patterns
Taint labels are considered within Trishul as bitmaps whose bits can be set
or unset as a part of the tainting process. The enginetaint keyword is used
to assign values to taints labels, as used in line 3 of Listing 3.3. Taint labels
declared in this way can then also be specified as constraints in the action
pattern. It need to be kept in mind that enginetaint does not introduce any
implicit ordering to the lattice.
In syntax (3.1) thisTaint, enclosed with delimiters < >, specifies the
taint of this pointer of the Java class. paramTaint can be used to match
tainted parameters. It can be specified for individual parameters or ‘..’,
in which case it matches if any of the parameters is tainted. contextTaint,
again enclosed within < >, can be used to match a tainted context. Thus
the case statement in line 7 of Listing 3.3 matches println method only
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1 public class Tes tAbs t rac tAc t ion extends Abs t rac tAc t i on {
2 private in t param1 ;
3 private S t r i n g param2 ;
4
5 public boolean matches ( Act ion a ) {
6 aswitch ( a ) {
7 case <* t r i s h u l . t e s t . ac t ion1 ( i n t a1 , S t r i n g a2 ) >:
8 param1 = a1 ;
9 param2 = a2 ;
10 _ t h i s = a . ge tTh isPo in te r ( ) ;
11 return true ;
12 case <* t r i s h u l . t e s t . ac t ion2 ( S t r i n g a2 , i n t a1 ) >:
13 param1 = a1 ;
14 param2 = a2 ;
15 _ t h i s = a . ge tTh isPo in te r ( ) ;
16 return true ;
17 }
18 return fa lse ;
19 }
20 }
Listing 3.4: Example of abstract action definition.
when the string parameter is tainted with value topsecretTaint and when
the object instance is tainted with secretTaint taint label.
Several additional options are available for matching taints labels in
action patterns. If multiple taint patterns need to be specified, it is possible
to match when any taint match occurs, or only when all the taints matches.
Furthermore, when matching against an object’s taint, either the reference
taint or the object taint can be matched. The following Backus-Naur Form-
like syntax is used for defining these taint patterns
#<[type:]{taint1,taint2,..}[how]> (3.2)
The ‘#’ delimiter is used to separate the pattern from the rest of the
statement, while < > delimiters are used to enclose the pattern. The op-
tional parameters are denoted within the [] characters.
The type is either object, primitive or auto, to match either an object’s
taint, a primitive value’s taint, or an object taint in case of an object and a
primitive taint in case of a value. The main purpose of this flexible syn-
tax is to allow matching against the reference’s taint label when matching
an object, by specifying the primitive keyword. For example, if a String
parameter matching pattern uses:
#<object:secretTaint> (3.3)
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the match will happen only if the String object is tainted. The pattern below
#<primitive:secretTaint> (3.4)
on the other hand provides a match when the reference to the string is
tainted. This provides greater flexibility for an engine writer to identify
taints at greater granularity.
The taint keyword in syntax (3.2) is either an asterisk (*) to specify
any taint value except 0, or a set of comma-separated taint labels, declared
previously using the enginetaint keyword and enclosed in curly brackets
‘{}’, as shown in (3.5).
#<{secretTaint, cryptoTaint} &> (3.5)
how keyword in (3.2) is either an ampersand (&) or pipe symbol (|),
to match either all or any specified taints. For example the pattern in (3.5)
matches if both secretTaint and cryptoTaint taint values are set. On the other
hand (3.6) matches if either or both of the taint values are set.
#<{secretTaint, cryptoTaint} |> (3.6)
This flexibility allows the policy engine writer to enforce various logic
based on circumstances. For example, he could decide to halt the appli-
cation exception if the input channel being read from is labelled both se-
cretTaint and cryptoTaint or just throw an exception if it is tainted only
secretTaint or cryptoTaint.
Just as object and primitive can be specified as pattern matching syntax
for case statements of the aswitch block, they can also be specified when
(un)tainting an object as a result of the Order returned by the policy engine.
In these cases, the taints are specified as named literals of the format
#[type:]taint (3.7)
The type (object or primitive) is optional and specifies whether to (un)taint
the object or the reference. If not specified, object taint is assumed if the
taint applies to an object, and primitive is assumed otherwise. As in taint
patterns, taint specifies the actual taint label. Line 11 of Listing 3.3, ex-
tracted here in (3.8), provides an example of such a tainting, in which the
this object is tainted with the pwdFile label.
#object:pwdFile (3.8)
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3.2.4. Orders
Once the policy enforcement engine intercepts the application’s method
call specified by the actions, it ascertains the consequence of the action,
decides on the way to handle the action and returns the decision back to
the JVM in the form of an Order object. In order to capture the various
flow control requirements, Trishul-P implements the following subclasses
of this Order object:
– OKOrder: the matched method is allowed to be executed
– InsertOrder: decision is deferred until after some specified code is
executed and evaluated
– ReplaceOrder: instead of executing the method, this Order returns
the value specified in the Order as the return value of the method
execution
– SuppressOrder: suppresses the method execution and throws a Run-
time exception
– HaltOrder: method call is not allowed and the application is termi-
nated
– Param(Un)TaintOrder: (un)taints the specified parameter and then in-
vokes the method
– RetVal(Un)TaintOrder: the return value of method call invocation is
(un)tainted
– Object(Un)TaintOrder: calling object is (un)tainted
– ExceptionOrder: same as SuppressOrder, except that the class of ex-
ception thrown is specified by the policy engine
– CompoundOrder: allows for multiple orders to be combined, as ex-
plained further below
Consider again the example code in Listing 3.3. If the second case
statement (line 7) is matched, line 8 instructs the JVM to terminate the ex-
ecution of the application and exit the JVM by returning a HaltOrder while
the third case statement (line 9) causes the policy enforcement engine to
instruct the JVM to taint the FileInputStream object associated with the file
/etc/passwd with the pwdFile taint label (line 11).
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Listing 3.5 shows an example of how InsertOrder is used. The first
time the println action pattern is matched, InsertOrder specified in line 6 is
executed (since boolean variable first is true) which in turn invokes the test
method call. test sets first to false, preventing further execution of Inser-
tOrder (line 6) when the next instance of the println pattern matches. Once
test is executed, the control is again passed back to line 6. ConcreteAction,
line 6, is used to create actions that can be inserted into the system. It takes
three parameters, the this object, the method name and the parameters for
the method.
1 boolean f i r s t = true ;
2 i n t counter = 1 ;
3 public Order query ( Act ion a ) {
4 aswitch ( a ) {
5 case <* * . * . p r i n t l n ( . . ) >:
6 i f ( f i r s t ) return new I nse r tOrder (new ConcreteAct ion ( this , " t e s t ( i n t ) " , new
Object [ ] { counter } ) , th is ) ;
7 break ;
8 }
9 return nul l ;
10
11 private void t e s t ( i n t i ) {
12 System . out . p r i n t ( i ) ;
13 f i r s t = fa lse ;
14 counter ++;
15 }
16 }
Listing 3.5: Example of InsertOrder usage.
Note that Trishul-P also provides for a way to analyse the state of the
system after the method call has been executed. This is done by providing
an implementation of the handleResult interface in the policy engine code,
as shown in lines 20-23 of Listing 3.3 and extracted here in Listing 3.6 for
easy reference.
1 public void handleResul t ( Ac t ion act ion , Order s , Object r e s u l t , boolean
2 i sExcep t ion )
3 {
4 System . out . p r i n t ( ( i sExcep t ion ? " Except ion " : " Normal " ) + r e s u l t ) ;
5 }
Listing 3.6: Example of handleResult usage.
If the order returned by the query method of the policy engine allows
for the application to execute the matched method call, once the method
is invoked, the handleResult method is executed. This allows the engine
to check whether the system is still in a specific (secure) state after the
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method has been invoked. In line 1 of Listing 3.6, action is the action
originally passed to the query method, order is the order returned by query
method, result is the action’s result as an object. If the execution of the
action caused an exception, captured with the boolean isException, the ex-
ception is passed in the variable result.
3.2.5. Policy Engine Tree
Trishul allows policy engines to be loaded and unloaded at runtime as well
as to be combined with the existing engines. These new engines can then
load other policy engines, thereby creating a tree of policy engines. This
allows for the creation of a flexible hierarchy of policy decision engines in
a scenario that involves multiple interested parties. For example, a mobile
phone could be shipped with the basic policy engine of the phone man-
ufacturer, which could then be supplemented by the policy engine of the
carrier. Later, when the mobile phone is used to buy and play a multimedia
content, the manufacturer and carrier policy engines can be supplemented
by the content provider’s policy engine to enforce policies specific to the
use of the multimedia content.
The loading is performed by using the addEngine call while the un-
loading is done using the removeEngine function. addEngine takes two
parameters, the class file of the policy engine and the traditional Java pol-
icy file that specifies what access rights are allowed for this newly added
policy engine. The getDisallowEnginePolicy() method loads an engine that
has no access rights. Listing 3.7 is an example of a code fragment which
loads a new policy engine contained in the Java classfile ‘Local.class’ and
sandboxes its privileges with no access rights. Security aspects of the pol-
icy engine is discussed below.
1 private EngineHandle localEngineHandle ;
2 public Order query ( Act ion a ) {
3 aswitch ( a ) {
4 case <* * . * . testLoadUnload (boolean b ) >:
5 i f ( b )
6 localEngineHandle = addEngine ( Local . class , ge tD isa l lowEng inePo l i cy ( ) ) ;
7 else {
8 i f ( localEngineHandle != nul l )
9 removeEngine ( localEngineHandle ) ;
10 }
11 break ;
12 }
13 return nul l ;
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14 }
Listing 3.7: Example of loading an engine with no access rights.
With such a tree in place, a very interesting situation rises with regards
to action pattern matching and the execution of the orders as returned by
these engines. In order to preserve the hierarchy of the engines inherent in
the tree, the following logic is used–each engine in the tree is allowed to
match against any action and return any order. However, a child engine’s
order must be at least as restrictive as its parent. Since the default action
as per Trishul-P’s syntax is to allow an action, this restriction means that a
child policy engine cannot allow anything that its parent explicitly forbids.
This is implemented internally using CompoundOrder by placing all
the orders returned by the different policies in the CompoundOrder, which
is then evaluated by the policy engine. In some cases, evaluating the com-
bined orders is straightforward. For example when multiple (un)tainting
orders are combined, they are executed in order. However, when a Halt
and OKOrder are combined the results must be specified explicitly. The
following rules are used to decide on the outcome of multiple orders.
– If any order is a HaltOrder, the program is halted.
– If any of the order is a Suppress or ExceptionOrder, the first one en-
countered (in breadth-first search order through the tree of policies)
is executed.
– If any order is an InsertOrder, it is executed.
– The last ReplaceOrder encountered is executed.
– All taint orders are executed as and when it is encountered.
In general, when there is a conflict, the most restrictive order is exe-
cuted.
3.2.6. Policy Engine Security
Trishul policy engines are executable code in their own right and following
the principle of least privileges, should be run with minimal permissions.
SEC. 3.3 THE POLICY ENFORCEMENT ENGINE 47
The standard Java security model [Gong et al., 2003] is used for this pur-
pose. The policy engine is by default run in a sandbox without any per-
mission. Additional permissions have to explicitly assigned using the Java
policy files by the administrator of the machine. This ensures that the exe-
cution of the policy engine code is as secure as the standard Java security
model.
A separate Java security manager is used to enforce the engine’s per-
missions in Trishul. Whenever the JVM is about to make a call into the
Trishul-P policy, the security manager is installed. When the call returns
the original security manager is restored. The advantage of using a sepa-
rate security manager for the engine code is that it can be stricter than the
application’s security manager, often granting no permissions at all to the
engine.
Permissions are granted to the engine only when strictly required, for
example when it needs to load a secondary engine. In this case, it can
selectively be granted the permission to load the new engine class, not a
blanket permission to load any file or access any network resource. When
a secondary engine is loaded, it will again be initialised with no permis-
sions. Its set of permissions, specified when it is loaded, must not exceed
the permissions that are granted to the parent engine, to avoid permission
escalation loophole. Likewise, the default base policy engine receives no
permissions, unless a set of permissions for it is specified explicitly when
Trishul starts.
For example, if the default policy engine is granted the permission to
read files in the ‘/engine’ directory, and it loads ‘engineA’ from this direc-
tory, it may assign ‘engineA’ the permission to read ‘/engine’, or a sub-
directory of that, but not the permission to read ‘/secret’. If ‘engineA’ is
granted permission to read ‘/engine/A’ and it in turn loads ‘engineB’ , it
may grant ‘engineB’ the permission to read the contents of ‘/engine/A’,
but not of ‘/engine/misc’, as it does not itself have permissions to that di-
rectory.
Now that we have described how the Trishul JVM and the policy en-
gine works and have introduced Trishul-P, the language for writing policy
engines, we go into the actual implementation details of this information
flow tracing system in the next part of this chapter.
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3.3. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we discuss the details of Trishul’s implementation, with
specific reference to its information flow tracing capability as well as the
policy engine module. Since Trishul is implemented as a Java virtual ma-
chine, we start with with an overview of some salient aspects of Java ar-
chitecture and the JVM’s working.
3.3.1. Java Architecture
The Java architecture comprises of two distinct environments: compile-
time and run-time. In the compile-time environment, programs written in
Java programming language are compiled into machine architecture inde-
pendent bytecodes using the Java compiler and stored in what are called
class files. At runtime an abstract computer called Java Virtual Machine
(JVM) loads these class files and executes the bytecode instructions in
them in a platform-dependent manner. By keeping the bytecode platform
independent and the JVM implementation platform specific, the Java ar-
chitecture is able to support platform-independent applications that can be
compiled once and run everywhere.
The JVM specifications [Lindholm and Yellin, 1999] define the func-
tionality that every virtual machine implementation should support, while
leaving design choices to the individual implementations. This open na-
ture of the specifications has led to the development of several proprietary
as well as open source JVM implementations. Trishul was implemented
as a modification to the existing codebase of the open source Kaffe JVM
version 1.1.7 [Kaffe, 2009]. In the rest of this subsection we describe the
internal design of the JVM that is relevant to the implementation of Tr-
ishul. A detailed treatment of the full design aspects of a JVM is beyond
the scope of this dissertation and interested readers are referred to other
resources [Venners, 2000].
The simplest implementation of the JVM is an interpreter. In the inter-
preted mode the JVM executes each bytecode instruction one at a time. The
drawback of a pure interpreted mode is that the execution is time consum-
ing. Instead, a just-in-time (JIT) compilation mode is often used wherein
which the execution starts off in the interpreted mode but as the lifetime
of the application progresses, the JVM performs profiling of the applica-
tion execution and dynamically converts the frequently run methods from
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bytecode into native machine code which have much faster execution time.
A JIT-based information flow tracing system is however much more dif-
ficult to implement and debug. Hence the initial development of Trishul
was done for the interpreted mode of the JVM and once the core code was
stable, the JIT mode was also implemented.
A JVM interpreter has three distinct parts (1) the class loader, respon-
sible for loading Java classes and interfaces and performing associated se-
curity checks; (2) the execution engine which executes each bytecode in-
struction; and (3) the runtime data area, consisting of a method area, heap,
Java stacks, native method stacks and a program counter (pc) register. Each
Java application is run inside a separate virtual machine. The method area
and the heap are shared across all threads running in a JVM. The method
area holds per-class structures including method data, method code and
runtime constant pool1, while the heap holds all the objects dynamically
instantiated by the VM.
The Java architecture consists of two kinds of methods: Java and na-
tive. Java methods are written in the Java programming language, com-
piled into bytecode, stored in classes, and interpreted by the JVM. Native
methods are typically written in C or C++ and compiled into machine code
and stored as machine architecture specific system libraries. They usually
provide direct access to host resources. Java code can call these native
methods directly from the JVM using the Java Native Interface (JNI). Di-
rect access to these native methods however renders the Java code platform
specific, so their use is discouraged. Instead, Java distributions are pack-
aged with a set of Java classes that abstract away the native method calls
and Java applications are encouraged to call the method in these classes
instead.
Every thread started in the JVM is given a separate Java stack that is
used to maintain the state of all Java methods called by the thread, like
the local variables, intermediate calculations and parameters used for its
invocation. The state of the native methods invoked by a thread is saved
using a separate native method stack, registers and platform specific mem-
ory areas. This internal layout of the JVM is represented in Figure 3.2. If
the thread is executing a Java method, the program counter (pc) register
indicates the next instruction to be executed.
Each Java stack is made up of frames, with each frame containing the
1A runtime constant pool is a per-class or per-interface runtime representation of the
constant_pool table in a class file.
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Figure 3.2: Internal layout of a JVM.
state of a separate Java method invocation. In interpreter mode, Kaffe JVM
uses the variables array to hold the local variable values and the operand
stack to hold intermediate operation results. The VM executes the instruc-
tions by moving data from the local variable array to the operand stack or
vice versa and performing computation on these values in the operand stack
using it also to store intermediate values. In order for the virtual machine
to track the flow of information as the instructions are executed, every slot
on the variable array as well as the operand stack has to be extended to
store the label of the information that is stored in the slot.
In the next section we describe the actual implementation details of
Trishul, starting with how taints for various Java system pieces are stored.
3.3.2. Taint Propagation
Trishul enforces information flow control for access to three types of ap-
plication data: locals, which reside on the stack and in registers; objects,
which reside in the heap; and statics, which reside in a global table.
Taints are implemented as bitmaps in Trishul and the associated join
operator ∨ is implemented as the bit-wise OR of the values. Each lo-
cal variable, parameter, return value and all values that are present in the
JVM’s operand stack have individual taints. Taints are stored in two places:
stacks for local and temporary variables and, the heap for object members
and array elements.
In Trishul, the taints for variables in the stack are stored within the
same stack, implemented by extending the stack-entry structure with a taint
entry. Since the memory allocation for the stack–and hence the stack re-
lated taints–are automatically handled by Kaffe’s stack management sub-
routines, our extension did not have to do it. Object taints are stored di-
rectly in the memory allocated by the JVM for the object while the mem-
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ber taints are stored in specially allocated shadow memory to optimise their
allocation only when the member is assigned an initial value.
Each traditional Java object has a taint, termed the object taint, asso-
ciated with it, while each of the object’s member variables have their own
individual member taints. Whenever an object member is assigned a value,
the value’s taint is included in the object taint. Thus the object taint is the
combination of all the associated member taints.
In order to be efficient, Trishul calculates the object taint in a lazy man-
ner. The taint is not reset automatically when member taints are reset.
Since multiple member taints may have the same taint value, simply sub-
tracting the reset member’s taint value from the object taint bitmap would
not capture the taint update correctly. A full scan and combination oper-
ation of each of the member taints on the object is needed to capture the
object taint and performing this frequently would result in large overheads.
Instead, this scan is performed only when the policy engine explicitly asks
for the object taint’s value.
In addition to the object and member taints, the reference used to access
the object is also tainted. This taint is included whenever a member is read
or written into, along with the context taint.
Since static variables defined in the class are not object members and
there exists only one instance of these variables in a process, only one taint
value is associated with these variables, stored in the variable descriptor
used by the JVM. Array taint and associated element taints work in a
similar way to the object and member taints.
The process of taint propagation is implemented in Trishul in a straight-
forward manner–by extending the macro code implementing the Java byte-
code instructions to combine the taint labels when the values are computed.
For example, consider the iadd instruction, which removes two integers
from the top of the stack, adds them and places the result on the top of the
stack. This is a simple case of explicit flow of information from the vari-
able containing the two integers to the variable containing the result. Inter-
nally the iadd instruction was realised by Kaffe using the C macro shown
in Listing 3.8 (tint is the internal datatype representing integers and v is the
C struct for the slots). In Trishul this macro was extended to propagate the
taint label’s value of the operands, as shown in Listing 3.9.
1 #define add_in t ( t , f1 , f2 ) ( t ) [ 0 ] . v . t i n t = ( ( f1 ) [ 0 ] . v . t i n t ) + ( ( f2 ) [ 0 ] . v . t i n t )
Listing 3.8: C macro that implements iadd.
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1 #define t a i n t 2 ( t , f1 , f2 ) ( t ) [ 0 ] . t a i n t = ta in tMerge2 ( ( f1 ) [ 0 ] . t a i n t , ( f2 ) [ 0 ] . t a i n t )
2 #define ta in tMerge2 ( t1 , t2 ) ( ( t a i n t _ t ) ( ( t1 ) | ( t2 ) ) )
3
4 #define add_in t ( t , f1 , f2 ) ( t a i n t 2 ( t , f1 , f2 ) , ( t ) [ 0 ] . v . t i n t = ( ( f1 ) [ 0 ] . v . t i n t ) +
( ( f2 ) [ 0 ] . v . t i n t )
Listing 3.9: Modified C macro that implements iadd and propagates the taint.
3.3.3. Indirect Flows
As described earlier in this chapter Trishul uses the concept of context taint
to capture the indirect flow introduced by control flow branches. In order
to capture the context taint Trishul performs a postdominator data flow
analysis [Aho et al., 2006] using a two-stage process. It is implemented
as a hybrid of the static and dynamic information flow control systems by
using a combination of static analysis and run-time enforcement.
The static load-time analysis captures the indirect flow contained in the
Java bytecode instructions while the runtime enforcement part allows for
the late binding of policies to the system at runtime instead of compile
time.
Load-time Static Analysis
The static analysis is performed during the initialisation/loading phase of
the application. However, in order to be efficient, instead of performing
the whole analysis at the load time of the class, it is deferred until the first
time each method is invoked by the application. This allows the process
to skip the analysis of those methods that are defined in the class but not
used by the application. In the first stage of the analysis, when a method
is invoked for the first time, its control-flow graphs (CFGs) [Aho et al.,
2006] with branch bitmaps are computed to detect context blocks. In the
second stage, these CFGs and branch bitmaps are summarised into context
bitmaps. These processes are explained in details below.
Creating the CFGs The CFGs are used to determine the conditional flow
instructions (CFI) that control the execution of a statement. Even though
the bytecode verifier of the Kaffe JVM already creates a CFG for its inter-
nal use, the produced graph is not in a readily useful format for analysing
context taints. Hence in this implementation of Trishul, a separate CFG is
calculated.
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The CFG is created using a single forward pass over the method’s code
with a node for each basic block. A basic block is a sequence of instruc-
tions with a single point of entry (the first instruction) and a single point
of exit (the last instruction). A CFI always forms the last instruction of
a basic block. Directed edges represent transitions between basic blocks,
either caused by the normal flow of instructions or by a CFI.
A basic block with a goto instruction or one without any CFI has an
outward edge leading to another block, while that with if-statements have
edges to two other blocks and those with switch instructions lead to any
number of other blocks. The basic block containing the last instruction in a
method has an outward edge leading to a special exit block. CFIs that exit
the current method (return and throw instructions) are linked to the exit
block ensuring that all blocks (other than the exit block) will have at least
one outward edge.
The CFI’s targets are checked to ensure that each basic block has a
single point of entry. If the target is before the current program counter
(i.e. a backward branch) and it branches into the middle of a basic block,
the target basic block is split so that the target instruction is the starting
point of its block. In the case of a forward branch, a new basic block
is created starting at the target instruction, which is initially empty. This
block is stored in a forward list, which is checked when a new basic block
is created. Later, when the basic block that includes the target instruction
(identified earlier in the forward branch) needs to be created, the basic
block from the forward list is used. If the target instruction is not the first
instruction of the new basic block, this block is split as required.
Consider the Java code in Listing 3.10 and the corresponding Java byte-
code in Listing 3.11. Figure 3.3 shows the CFG generated for this opcode
using the process explained above. The ‘?’ symbol in front of the bytecode
in Figure 3.3 denotes a CFI.
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1 p u b l i c s t a t i c vo id
2 main ( S t r i n g args [ ] ) {
3 boolean a = t rue ;
4 boolean b ;
5 i f ( a )
6 {
7 b = t rue ;
8 }
9 else
10 {
11 b = f a l s e ;
12 }
13 }
Listing 3.10: Code for CFG example.
00: icons t_1
01: i s t o re_1
02: i load_1
03: i f e q 11
06: icons t_1
07: i s t o re_2
08: goto 13
11: icons t_0
12: i s t o re_2
13: r e t u r n
Listing 3.11: Bytecode of
Listing 3.10.
iconst_0
istore_2
iconst_1
?ifeq
iload_1
iconst_1
istore_1
EXIT
?return
istore_2
?goto
Figure 3.3: Control-flow graph created from Listing 3.11.
Branch bitmaps Once the basic block of the CFG is calculated, a branch
bitmap is associated with each of the blocks. It contains a number of bits
for each conditional CFI, one bit representing each possible target of the
CFI. In the case of an if-statement there are two bits: one representing
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10 iconst_0
istore_2
01
iconst_1
istore_2
?goto
[00]
?ifeq
0−5
iload_1
6−10
iconst_1
istore_1
11−12
13−13
?return
EXIT
00
00
Figure 3.4: CFG showing initial branch bitmaps.
[00]
iconst_1
istore_1
iload_1
?ifeq[0]
0−5Instruction address
Context bitmap
Branch bitmap Java opcode
Figure 3.5: Details of the variable fields calculated in the CFG.
the case when the branch is taken, and one representing the case when the
branch is not taken. A switch instruction has one bit per case, and possibly
one bit for the default case.
The branch bitmaps are shown in the centre-left field in each node of
Figure 3.4, which is the same CFG as Figure 3.3. The rest of the numbers
shown in the left hand column of the block are explained in Figure 3.5.
The bitmap consists of two bits, both referring to the if-statement in the
top-most basic block. The fact that these bits represent the if-statement at
the end of the block is indicated by the ‘[]’ that enclose these bits.
At the start, the branch bitmaps are initialised to zero. Bits that repre-
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sent a branch target are initialised to 1 in the basic block containing that
instruction. Thus the bitmap in basic block <11 12> (indicating the pro-
gram counters in the top-left field) is initialised to 10, because block <0
5> branches into this block. Likewise, block <6 10> is initialised to 01.
Block <13 13> is initialised to 00, as the earlier branch instruction does
not branch directly into it. These are recorded in Figure 3.4.
Once all bitmaps have been thus initialised, they are then recursively
updated until each bitmap satisfies the condition that each bit that is set
in any block that precedes the block in question is also set in the current
bitmap. In other words, each bit that is set in a block, flows into every block
following it. Thus the bitmaps in <13 13> are updated from 00 to 11, as
shown in Figure 3.6. Once this is done, the bits controlled by a specific CFI
can be in one of two states: all bits have the same value (00,11), or they
have different values (01,10). In the first case, each possible path starting
at the CFI includes the basic block (11), or no path includes the basic block
(00). Either way, the execution of the basic block is not influenced by the
CFI anymore. When the bits have different values, only some of the paths
starting at the CFI reach the basic block, therefore the execution of the
block is influenced by the CFI. This is captured by a context bitmap.
Context bitmaps Context bitmaps summarise the information stored in
branch bitmaps. The bitmap contains a single bit per CFI. The bit is set
to 0 if all the bits in the branch bitmap are the same, else it is set to 1.
Thus the bit is set if the basic block is controlled by the CFI represented by
that bit. Context bitmaps are shown in Figure 3.6 in the bottom-left fields.
Again, rectangular brackets are used to show which bit represents the CFI
in a basic block. The basic blocks <6 10> and <11 12> are controlled
by the ifeq instruction in block <0 5> and ends up being calculated as 1,
while block <13 13> is not and its context bitmap is set to 0.
The context bitmaps are stored in a list, sorted on the program counter
of the first instruction in the basic block and passed to the run-time system
for use in updating the context taint accordingly.
Run-time analysis
Context taint At runtime the stack frame of each method contains an
array of partial context taints. This array contains an entry per conditional
CFI, and thus has as many entries as the context bitmap has bits. When a
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10 iconst_0
istore_2
01
iconst_1
istore_2
?goto
[00]
?ifeq
0−5
iload_1
6−10
iconst_1
istore_1
11−12
13−13
?return
EXIT
[0]
11
1 1
11
0
Figure 3.6: CFG showing final branch bitmaps and context
bitmaps.
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conditional CFI is executed, the condition’s taints are stored in the appro-
priate array entry. When a new basic block is entered, either through the
execution of a CFI or when the program counter advance beyond the cur-
rent basic block, the context taint is updated by combining the partial con-
text taints of all conditional CFIs whose bits are set in the context bitmap.
The code in Listing 3.9 which showed how Kaffe’s C macro was extended
to capture the taint propagation is further extended as shown in Listing 3.12
to capture the effect of the context taint. The way in which partial context
taints and context bitmaps are stored differ between the interpreted and JIT
modes of Trishul and is explained in detail later in the chapter.
1 #define t a i n t 2 ( t , f1 , f2 ) ( t ) [ 0 ] . t a i n t = ta in tMerge3 ( ( f1 ) [ 0 ] . t a i n t , ( f2 ) [ 0 ] . t a i n t ,
c u r r e n t _ c o n t e x t _ t a i n t )
2 #define ta in tMerge3 ( t1 , t2 , t3 ) ( ( t a i n t _ t ) ( ( t1 ) | ( t2 ) | ( t3 ) ) )
3
4 #define add_in t ( t , f1 , f2 ) ( t a i n t 2 ( t , f1 , f2 ) , ( t ) [ 0 ] . v . t i n t = ( ( f1 ) [ 0 ] . v . t i n t ) +
( ( f2 ) [ 0 ] . v . t i n t )
Listing 3.12: C macro that implements iadd modified to propagate the taints including the
context taint.
Method call Java methods by themselves do not have taints but as they
can be invoked at any point during the execution of the Java code, espe-
cially within a context that is tainted, it is instrumented to inherit an initial
context taint that captures the context taint (0 for the main method) at the
call point, and that of the this-pointer when an object method is invoked.
This initial context taint is then included in the method’s own context taint,
ensuring that invoking a new method call does not let the execution escape
the context taint in the caller’s execution context. When the method call
returns, the context taint of the caller code is updated to the value it was
before the method call.
The parameters passed to the method call preserve their existing taints
and their use within the method results in the propagation of these taints.
Non-taken branches As explained earlier, in order to capture indirect
flows, it is necessary that even those variables that are present in the non-
taken branches of a conditional CFI be tainted with the context taint. For
this, a list of all variables that are modified in each basic block of the CFG
is maintained. This list is then extended by including lists of any basic
blocks that are accessed through method calls. At runtime, even when a
branch basic block is not executed, the taints of the variables in the list
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are extended with the current context taint, since the decision to not exe-
cute the block is (potentially) influenced by the variables of the CFI whose
taints make up the context taint.
However, in some cases it may not be possible to create a complete list
of variables modified in the block until the branch is actually executed, be-
cause of dependence on information available only at runtime or because
the analysis is not rigorous enough. In order to ensure that this limitation
does not lead to the leakage of information, Trishul provides an optional
fallback taint termed the global context taint that can be disabled or en-
abled as per the system administrator’s requirement. Once it is enabled,
whenever the list of modified variables cannot be accurately determined,
the current branch context taint is added to the global context taint. Then,
by ensuring that this global context taint is always included in the currently
active context taint all through the execution of the application, Trishul
ensures that any later use of the undetermined variables in the non-taken
branch block will be tainted indirectly with the earlier branch’s context
taint.
However, since this global taint cannot be reset or untainted automati-
cally, it is up to the policy engine writer to decide on how to control it. It is
possible to disable it when the JVM is first invoked or it could be untainted
manually using the policy engine syntax made available by Trishul-P or
using the concept of annotations discussed below. The use of the global
context taint allows the system administrator to be very conservative in
approaching the tainting problem at the expense of taint creep (the phe-
nomenon of taints spreading uncontrollably throughout the system), ren-
dering the application unusable if the policy enforcement is strictly ad-
hered to. In our non-exhaustive analysis, Trishul was able to identify the
complete list of modified variables in a basic block 96% of the time across
various applications and did not have to report to using the global context
taint. However, in the 4% of the cases where the global context taint was
used, it did lead to extensive taint creep when manual untainting was not
performed.
3.3.4. Manual Taint Propagation
While most taints are propagated automatically as described in earlier sec-
tions, native method invocations necessitate manual taint propagation. Since
these methods also create and move values, they would also be creating
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and propagating taints. However, as these methods are executed outside
the JVM’s control (see Section 3.3.1), the tainting has to be implemented
either as modification to the native code by adding taint propagation code
(see Listing 3.13 for an example of System.arraycopy native method that
has been modified to propagate the taint this way) or by using the anno-
tation propagation method provided by Trishul. While the modification of
the native code provides better performance compared to the annotation
method, the permanent hardcoded nature makes it harder to maintain the
native method codebase.
1 i n = $src [ srcpos ] ;
2 i n T a i n t =src - > member_taint ; / * added * /
3 out = &dst [ dstpos ] ;
4 ou tTa in t = dst - > member_taint ; / * added * /
5
6 for ( ; len > 0; len - - )
7 {
8 * out++ = * i n ++;
9 * ou tTa in t ++ = * i n T a i n t ++; / * added * /
10 }
Listing 3.13: Native method System.arraycopy modified to propagate taints.
Annotations are Java classes that contain policy writer specified hook
methods for existing classes’ methods. When the original method is in-
voked by a Java application, control is transferred to the hook method
instead, which then adjusts taints before and after invoking the original
method.
Annotations can also be used to let the policy engine writer manipulate
the taints at a level higher than the implementation unit of objects and
variables that Trishul supports. For example, consider the String class.
Since a String is conceptually made up of a sequence of characters, it would
be natural to assume that any tainted character would taint the string as a
whole. However, in practice, the String class is implemented as an array
of characters. If one of the characters is tainted, it causes the array to be
tainted but not the String object. Annotations can be used to carry this
taint from the array to the object. Trishul’s code base is already supplied
with several of such annotations that ensure parity between the logical and
practical way of tainting the Java units.
Listing 3.14 shows how the String object annotation (trishultaint String)
is implemented in Trishul. Two hook methods are specified in the listing,
one for the String Java method and the other for the hashCode method. In
the former, the array’s taint is applied to the String object while in the latter,
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the integer returned by the invocation of the hashCode method is tainted
with the taint of the String object.
1 package java . lang ;
2
3 t r i s h u l t a i n t S t r i n g {
4 n o t r i s h u l t a i n t i n t hash ;
5
6 p u b l i c S t r i n g ( byte [ ] b , i n t o f f s e t , i n t l en )
7 {
8 se tOb jec tTa in t ( t h i s , ge tAr rayTa in t ( b ) ) ;
9 super ( b , o f f s e t , len ) ;
10 }
11
12 p u b l i c i n t hashCode ( )
13 {
14 i n t h = super ( ) ;
15 t a i n t ( h , ge tOb jec tTa in t ( t h i s ) ) ;
16 return h ;
17 }
18 }
Listing 3.14: Annotation applied to the String object.
Annotations can also be defined to specify that some variable do not
propagate taint values using the notrishultaint label as used in line 4 of
Listing 3.14. This is a clear security violation and a potential security hole,
but can be necessary in some cases to avoid taint creep. It can be used
securely if it can be guaranteed that the further use of the variable does
not transfer information, as can be the case if the variable is used for, say,
caching. A similar method is available to allow methods to be invoked
without a context taint, again to handle problems in certain application
scenarios.
In order to ensure security of the implemented annotations, they have
to be delivered alongside the Java-library and included in the library’s sig-
nature, making it impossible to load the core Java library without the asso-
ciated annotations or being able to add new unapproved annotations to the
system. For this, all annotations are stored in a single signed jar file, which
is loaded at start up and if its signature is invalid, the system refuses to start,
thus preventing non-administrative users and potential unsafe code from
adding security compromising annotations into the system. Since Kaffe
does not support verification of JAR signatures, this feature was added.
Furthermore, in order to ensure that all native functions are properly
annotated, a list of the allowed native libraries that are approved for use is
stored in Trishul along with the digest of these libraries. Thus any unau-
thorised library is prevented from being loaded and native methods defined
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in it are prevented from being invoked by Java programs.
3.3.5. Exception Handling
There are two kinds of exceptions found in Java: checked and unchecked
runtime exceptions. A checked exception must be handled explicitly when
the code is being written, either by containing the offending throw instruc-
tion in an appropriate catch block, or by declaring it as part of the method’s
signature. If declared as part of the method’s signature, the exception will
cause the current method call to be terminated and transfer the control to
the caller. If the caller contains an appropriate catch block, that will be
invoked. Otherwise, the process is repeated until a method with an appro-
priate catch block is reached, which must be present in the main function,
since Java main methods do not allow exceptions to be declared. Run-time
exceptions, on the other hand, are not declared. They are used by the JVM
to signal internal errors that may not be recoverable, such as dereferencing
a null pointer or division by zero.
As exceptions cause changes in the flow of control, they require spe-
cial handling to avoid information leaks. Exception handling in the JVM
is identical for normal and run-time exceptions. However the fact that run-
time exceptions are not declared makes their analysis harder, as does the
fact that most Java instructions can cause some form of run-time excep-
tion. Because these runtime exception causing instructions are so common
and the likelihood of them happening is low, tainted run-time exceptions
may be treated as rare abnormal events that causes the program to ter-
minate. Hence, they are disregarded during the exception analysis of the
taint propagation system in Trishul. Doing so does allow an application
to leak information. However, since runtime unchecked exceptions invari-
ably cause the application to terminate, the amount of information leaked
is very limited, mostly as little as 1 bit per exception.
In a checked Java exception, the throw statement transfers control to
the appropriate catch block, much like a goto statement, with the differ-
ence that in the case of exceptions, the target address may be in a different
method if the throw statement is not inside an appropriate try/catch block.
Also, unlike a goto statement which always has a fixed target address, the
target of a throw statement may not be known before runtime. This is due
to the fact that an exception that is thrown is just a normal object that re-
sides on the heap, the parameter to the throw instruction being a reference
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to that object. Before run-time only the static type of the reference can be
determined. The actual type of the exception object may be a subclass of
that type. As the catch block that is invoked depends on the actual type of
the exception object, the catch block may not be known before the throw
statement is actually executed. Also note that if the exception is thrown to
a different method, it is generally not possible to determine the catch block
before runtime, since that would require knowledge of each possible call
site.
In Trishul we aim to determine the run-time type of the exception object
by finding the instruction that places the reference to the exception on the
stack. If this is a new instruction (which it frequently is), the run-time type
is known. With the run-time type being known and there being an appro-
priate catch block, an edge is added in the CFG from the throw statement to
the catch block. In other cases, an edge is added to the method’s exit block.
This errs on the side of caution by assuming that no catch block will be ex-
ecuted and hence all the variables written in any of the catch blocks need to
be tainted, possibly triggering the global context taint fallback mechanism.
This is mostly not necessary as almost all non-malicious (more that 97%)
occurrences of exceptions are analysed judiciously by Trishul’s algorithm.
Method invocations also require special care in the light of exceptions.
If a method can throw an exception, the flow of control will not necessarily
pass to the instruction following the method invocation, but may instead
pass to a catch block or the caller of the method. This turns a method into
a conditional CFI. If run-time exceptions are treated as normal exceptions,
each instruction that can cause a run-time exception also becomes a con-
ditional CFI. In Trishul, when the CFG is being calculated, a method that
can throw an exception is treated as a CFI with an edge to the next basic
block, as well as an edge to each catch block that may be invoked, or the
exit block if a catch block cannot be determined. There can be multiple
such edges, as a method may declare different distinct exception types.
If an exception is thrown, the current context taint and the exceptions
taint are stored. At the catch block, this taint is included in the context
taint; each catch block has a bit in the context bitmap and thus an entry
in the context taint for this purpose. If the catch block is not in the same
method as the throw instruction, the call stack will be unwound. Each
method invocation on the stack is treated as a conditional CFI and requires
tainting of the variables that are written to in the current stack frame, since
the instructions following the method invocation are analogous to a control
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path that is not executed. As the stack will be unwound anyway, tainting
local variables and stack elements is not required. The entire unwinding
of the stack can be skipped if neither the exception nor the context were
tainted.
Information can be leaked if a method that declares an exception does
not end up throwing such an exception, much like an if statement can leak
information by not executing a certain control path. Consider the following
example in Listing 3.15
1 boolean b = t rue ;
2 t r y
3 {
4 leak ( sec re t ) ;
5 b = f a l s e ;
6 }
7 catch ( Except ion e ) { }
8
9 vo id leak ( boolean secre t ) throws Except ion
10 {
11 i f ( sec re t ) throw new Except ion ( ) ;
12 }
Listing 3.15: Leaking information through an exception that is not thrown.
In this case, if an exception is not thrown, it conveys the fact that secret
is false, which is captured in the variable b. In order to capture this infor-
mation flow, the assignment to b must also be tainted. This is handled by
maintaining in the leak function a taint of exceptions that are not thrown.
When the method executes, each conditional CFI that skips executing of
a throw statement causes the context taint to be included in this taint. As
the invocation of leak is considered to be a conditional CFI, it has a bit in
the context bitmap and an entry in the context taint. This entry is set to
leak’s non-thrown taint, which will ensure the assignment to b is tainted.
Note that after the catch block, the control paths merge, so the context is
untainted.
Finally blocks, which are executed when leaving a try/catch block re-
gardless of whether an exception is thrown, are implemented in Java as
catch blocks for any type of exception. The case when no exception is
thrown is handled by an explicit jump into the finally block. Therefore
these blocks are handled automatically in Trishul.
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3.3.6. Just-in-Time Mode
In order to improve the performance of the bytecode execution, the Just-
In-Time (JIT) compiler of a JVM compiles sections of the often used plat-
form independent Java bytecode to machine specific lower level code. Im-
plementing Trishul’s taint propagation and policy engine hooks in such a
system presented various challenges. The corresponding design decisions
made for such an implementation are discussed here.
In Kaffe, the JIT compiler mode is setup as follows. The Kaffe com-
piler generates and places short segments of code called trampolines [Inaba,
1998] at the address of the actual method. When an attempt is made to
invoke the method, the trampoline is invoked instead, as it occupies the
method’s address. The trampoline in turn invokes the JIT compiler to gen-
erate the method’s actual machine code and in the process replaces the
trampoline. Finally, the generated code is invoked. The next time around
when the method is invoked, the method’s native code in invoked directly
as the trampoline is no longer present.
In the JIT mode, Kaffe generates functions with this layout:
1. Load locals and parameters into registers
2. Perform calculations on registers
3. Store registers into locals and return value
Thus, there is no direct connection between the locals in steps 1 and 3,
except through the registers used in step 2. In order to ensure that the taints
on the locals and parameters are propagated properly, the JIT compiler
was modified so that each instruction generated in step 2 that operates on
registers also generates instructions to modify the associated taint registers
in order to track the taint flow.
In Trishul’s current implementation, each normal register used by Kaffe
has an associated (part of an) Streaming SIMD2 Extensions (SSE) register
that holds the corresponding taint value for that register. So the layout is
modified to:
1. Load locals and parameters into registers and corresponding taint
values into SSE register
2SIMD stands for Single Instruction, Multiple Data, colloquially, “vector instruc-
tions”.
66 TRISHUL CHAP. 3
2. Perform calculations on registers and associated taint registers
3. Store registers into locals and return value and SSE registers into
taint values
This process is explained in detail below.
Register Taints
The IA-32 architecture provides three sets of registers: eight 32-bit general
registers, eight 80-bit floating point registers and eight 128-bit Streaming
SIMD Extensions (SSE) registers. The program counter is a 32- bit register
known as the Extended Instruction Pointer (EIP).
The general registers (EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX, EDI, ESI, EBP and
ESP) are used for most integer calculations and control flow instructions.
Operations are generally performed on two operands: one or two input
operands and one output operand. Both operands may be registers, or one
may be a memory location. The floating point registers (FP0-FP7) are
organised into a stack, with FP0 being the initial top element. Floating
point operations are performed between two stack elements, or between
the top of the stack and a memory location. The result is always left on top
of the stack.
The SSE registers are not used by Kaffe and hence can be used by
Trishul to hold the taints of values stored in the registers. Each of the
eight 128-bit SSE registers (XMM0-XMM7) are made up of four 32-bit
parts. However in Trishul, each SSE register is used to hold only three
32-bit taints, leaving the last 32-bit part free for computations. This is to
overcome the limitation of the SSE instruction set that it does not have an
operation to move a part of the register into another part of another register,
only supporting shuffle operations that combine different parts of a single
register into another register.
Hence, in order to move, for example, the taint of register ECX to the
taint of ESI, three operations are needed: the destination part is cleared, the
source part is moved into the correct position in a temporary register, and
this temporary register is OR-ed into the destination register. As only the
destination part must be affected, the remainder of the temporary register
must be zeroed. Since the SSE instruction set does not provide an operation
to clear a specific part of a register, the highest 32-bit part is always kept to
0, allowing a shuffle operation to copy that 0 into one or more specific parts
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Figure 3.7: Moving ECX to ESI using SSE registers in 3 oper-
ations.
in a single operation and also move the source part to the correct position.
Figure 3.7 illustrates these steps.
Variable and Argument Taints
Trishul stores variable and argument taints on the stack. The layout of a
typical Kaffe stack is shown in Figure 3.8. The call instruction pushes the
arguments to the method on to the stack before storing the return address3.
In the prologue of the newly invoked method, the previous frame pointer
is then stored and the base pointer register EBP is made to point to the cur-
rent top of the stack. The local and temporary variables are stored below
that. Since it is known at compile time how many temporary variables are
required, Kaffe is able to reference them using addresses relative to EBP,
just like local variables. The stack pointer register ESP is used only when
a new stack frame must be created.
Figure 3.9 shows the layout of the modified stack frame in Trishul,
holding the taint values represented by the underlined names. All the taint
values for the method’s arguments are pushed onto the stack before the
arguments. This requires that the list of arguments be iterated twice. Had
the arguments and taint values been pushed as 〈argument, taint〉 tuples, the
3Remember that the stack grows downwards.
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Argument 0 
Return address
...
Previous frame pointer
Local variable 0
Local variable n
Temporary 0
Temporary n
...
Argument n
...
Next stack frames
Previous stack frames
EBP
ESP
Top of memory
Figure 3.8: Kaffe stack frame.
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Previous stack frames
Argument n
Argument 0
Argument 0
Argument n
Return address
Previous frame pointer
Local 0
Local 0
Local n
Temporary 0 
Temporary n
Context 0
Local n 
Temporary 0
Temporary n
Context n
...
...
...
...
...
EBP
ESP
Next stack frames
Top of memory
Figure 3.9: Trishul’s stack frame holding taints, denoted by
underlined names.
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list would only have to be iterated once, but that would cause problems for
native methods, which expect arguments to be pushed using the C’s calling
convention (which expects them to be pushed one after the other in reverse
order). It would also pose problems for double-sized values, which occupy
two consecutive fixed-sized argument slots.
The argument stack pointer, stored in a global variable, points to the
taint values. This allows native methods to access the taint values. The
taint values are pushed onto the stack in the opposite order from the argu-
ment values, allowing the taint values to be accessed using the index of the
formal parameter as it appears in the C code, whereas the argument values
are pushed in the opposite order, as required by C.
Taint values for local and temporary variables are stored as tuples of
the form 〈argument,taint〉. Because it is not known how many temporary
variables will be required before the full method’s code is generated, it is
not possible to determine the offset of a taint storage location if the taint
values are stored following the variables. This would require two passes of
the JIT compiler: one to generate the code and one to fix the offsets of taint
values. Using the tuple approach, only one pass is needed, but, as with
arguments, double-sized variables present a problem, as they require two
consecutive slots. To handle this, the order of variable and taint values are
reversed, so that two consecutive slots are used for the value and two for
the taint values. Two slots are used for the taint value for a double-sized
variable to make accessing slots easier. If a single slot was used instead,
finding the proper slot for a variable would require scanning the list of
variables to see if any double-sized variables precede the variable.
Context Taints
The Kaffe JIT compiler uses only six of the general registers present in
IA-32 architecture to hold program values. As all floating point operations
are implemented as register-to-memory operations, only FP0 floating point
register is used by Kaffe. Both EBP and ESP registers are used only for
bookkeeping and not for actual operations. Thus Kaffe needs to store only
7 register taint values (for the six general registers and FP0), each of which
can be stored in a full SSE register. The one remaining SSE register is thus
free to be used for storing the context taint, which can be thought of as the
taint for EIP register.
The different parts that make up the context taint are stored in the stack
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frame, as shown in Figure 3.9. Because the number of local and temporary
variables is known at compile time, the offset of the context taint parts (rel-
ative to EBP) is known at compile time and can be fixed in the generated
code. Entry and exit of basic blocks can be detected when code is gen-
erated by comparing the address of the instruction being generated to the
addresses in the current basic block. If it is detected that a different basic
block is entered, code to update the context taint is emitted.
Exception handling
The JIT compiler taints the required objects when an exception is thrown
at the time the stack is unwound to locate the exception handler. Tainting
these values is complicated by the fact that the code to handle nontaken
branches is invoked at JIT-compilation time which generates machine code
to handle tainting. The exception code is invoked at run-time, and must
taint values directly. To this end, it uses information in the exception’s
stack trace to locate the run-time information generated by the load-time
analysis and the locations of values that must be tainted. When the excep-
tion handler is invoked, the runtime simply jumps to the correct address,
without an opportunity to initialise the partial context taint array with the
exception’s taint correctly. Therefore, this is handled when the last stack
frame is unwound.
To handle non-thrown exception taint, an unused SSE register is used
as a special taint register, allowing easy update of the taint value. When
a method that may throw an exception is invoked, the current value of the
taint register is stored on the stack and the register is cleared. When the
method returns, the current taint value is stored in the partial context taint
array and the original value is restored from the stack. As the instruction
could throw an exception, it is treated as a conditional control flow instruc-
tion and the context taint is rebuilt before the next instruction is executed.
3.3.7. Trishul-P
The Trishul-P code compiler was implemented using a modified Java Com-
piler Compiler [JavaCC, 2009] and the policy engine was implemented to
run within the JVM, allowing it to compare and match static properties
of the method call, like the signature, and the dynamic taints of objects,
parameters and context taints.
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To match against run-time information as efficiently as possible, a two-
stage matching strategy was used. During the first stage, which is invoked
only when matching against a specific action for the first time or when the
policy changes, the static information is matched. The result of this match
is stored and reused whenever the action is executed again. The second
stage matching, that compares the dynamic information of taints, is per-
formed only when the first stage match is successful. This stage needs to
be executed every time the action is executed. For example, when match-
ing:
void java.io.PrintStream#<secretTaint>.println(String s)
the package, class, method names and parameter and return types are checked
in stage one, since they are the same for every invocation of the method.
However, as the taint values may be different for each invocation, it must
be rechecked every time the method is invoked.
To handle loading and unloading of policy engines, a global iteration
counter is maintained. This is initially set to 0 and increased every time
an engine is loaded or unloaded. When a first-stage match is executed, the
current iteration counter is stored with the match result. When an action
is executed, the stored value is compared against the global value. A mis-
match indicates that a new policy engine has been loaded or unloaded and
the first-stage match must be executed again.
When a method is invoked, Trishul-P passes information on this ac-
tion, including the values of actual parameters passed to the method, to the
engine. This information is copied into the Action object passed to the en-
gine, possibly converting primitive values to objects to allow them all to be
stored in a single array. As an optimisation, the parameters are now only
retrieved when they are accessed. To this end, a handle is passed in the
Action object. The first time any parameter’s value is accessed, the handle
is used to create the array containing the value for actual parameters. How
this is done differs between the interpreter and JIT compiler.
In the interpreted mode, as the interpreter has direct access to the ob-
jects that represent methods and variables at runtime, the matching is per-
formed directly on the method object passed to the method call function.
This object always represents the actual method that is invoked, which
may not be the declared method in the case of polymorphism, making the
matching process a simple case of comparing values. The actual parame-
ters and the location used to store the return value that are passed when a
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method is invoked, exist as simple objects on the interpreter’s stack, as do
the associated taint values. Therefore, they can be inspected and modified
as required, to handle inspection of parameter values and replacement of
the return value, as indicated by Trishul-P’s Orders.
In order to perform matching in the JIT implementation, the object
representing that method is required, as it contains the values that must be
compared in the Trishul-P matching process. When a polymorphic method
is invoked, this is not known, as only the address of the method’s code
retrieved from an object’s dispatch table is known. The code layout was
modified slightly in order to retrieve the method object correctly. When
Kaffe generates code for a method, it generates a method header (which
includes a pointer to the method object), followed by a variable length
constant pool, followed by the actual code. This has been rearranged in
Trishul so that the constant pool now follows the code. Thus a pointer
to the method object is always available at a fixed offset before the code
address.
A potential problem to this approach is the use of trampolines men-
tioned earlier–when a code address which is the target of a method invoca-
tion might actually contain a trampoline. Luckily, the trampoline already
contains a pointer to the method’s object, so this can still be retrieved.
However, an extra check must be made to see if an address points to a code
segment or a trampoline. This can be accomplished since a trampoline al-
ways starts with a jump instruction and a code segment always starts with
a push instruction.
The actual parameters and taint values can be accessed using the argu-
ment stack pointer, as described earlier. The return value and taint value
can be accessed since the register in which they are stored is known. To
allow compatibility with the interpreter, the parameters and return values
are copied into objects used by the interpreter if they are accessed.
3.3.8. Platform Integrity
The enforcement of policies using an architecture like that of Trishul in-
volves the assumption first and foremost that Trishul is installed on the
designated machine and that the install’s integrity is protected.
The problem of ensuring that the software is installed on the machine
and that the data to which the policy is attached is accessible only within
the Trishul-based JVM is easier to solve in an application specific manner
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than as a generic solution. Such a solution would be able to exploit the
nuances of the application: closed or open systems, end-user or server-
backend applications, etc. Examples of such solutions will be described
in the next chapters. In general, these solutions would involve the use of
trusted computing technology presented earlier in Section 2.4, exploiting
the functionality provided by features like sealing and attestation.
Trishul has also been designed to make it hard for the attackers to com-
promise the integrity of the installation. As explained earlier, the effective-
ness of the system depends on the application’s inability to invoke native
methods that have not been approved and packaged with the installation of
Trishul. For this, a list of all allowed native libraries and its SHA-1 digests
are stored securely in Trishul. Any attempt to load any native libraries not
present in this list is denied. Furthermore, if the attacker tries to substitute
one of the approved libraries with an unsafe one, the digest of this fake li-
brary would not match the digest stored in Trishul and any attempt to load
it will also be denied.
Trishul is also designed to load a default policy enforcement engine
that can be chosen by the system administrator. This default engine is then
allowed to load others as and when required. In order to ensure that this
engine, endowed with large privileges, is not subverted by an attacker, dur-
ing the compile process of the JVM (when the engine’s identity is specified
by the administrator), the SHA-1 hash of the engine is also securely stored
inside Trishul. At the start of every JVM instance, this hash is integrity
checked to ensure that the default policy engine has not been removed or
tampered with.
Now that we have introduced Trishul-P and explained in detail how Tr-
ishul is implemented in the interpreted and JIT modes of the JVM, let us
look at some simple applications that provide examples of how Trishul-P
is used and at the same time showcase the power of Trishul’s functional-
ities discussed earlier. Larger application scenarios are discussed in later
chapters of the dissertation.
3.4. EXAMPLE APPLICATIONS
Now that Trishul’s architecture and the policy engine language has been
covered, in this section we consider some examples of how Trishul can be
used to solve policy enforcement problems that the current JVMs cannot.
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3.4.1. Protecting system password file
Consider the scenario where an application wants read access to the /etc/-
passwd file of a UNIX/Linux system. Such an access request is normal and
mostly legitimate, since information present in the file is used to perform
several routine housekeeping operations in these systems. Since the actual
passwords are not stored in plaintext in the file, the read operation by itself
is not dangerous. However, consider an application trying to send out the
information read from this file via the network to a remote party. There is
almost always no reason why the information obtained from the file needs
to be sent out into the network. An application which tries to do so could,
for example, be trying to harvest user information in order to perform an
efficient brute force password attack using known user names.
1 grant signedBy ` `VU -CA" {
2 permiss ion java . i o . F i lePermiss ion ` ` / e tc / passwd " , ` ` read " ;
3 }
4 grant codeBase ` ` f i l e : / usr / share / java / r e p o s i t o r y / - " {
5 permiss ion java . s e c u r i t y . A l lPermiss ion ;
6 }
Listing 3.16: Java policy aimed at disabling leak of password file content into the network.
What is required is a policy setting that allows an application to read the
content of the password file but prevents it from sending that information
out into the network. Policies expressed in the form of currently supported
Java Policy objects do not support this level of control. For example, if
the policy in Listing 3.16 is used, it will allow read access to the password
file but prevent the application from creating a socket connection to a host.
But this is too broad a denial as it will also prevent the application from
ever sending anything over the network, irrespective of the actual content
that the application is trying to send. This is due primarily to the JVM’s
inability to trace the flow of information in the system and take access
control decision at the flow level.
In order to prevent this, the enforcement system needs to ensure that
the data read from the /etc/passwd file is (1) tainted with a label (2) the
label is propagated within the system alongside the data and (3) when at-
tempt is made to send the data via the network, it is prevented. This can be
done using Trishul with relative ease. Listing 3.17 shows the fragment of
a Trishul-P code used to write such an access control engine.
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1 p r i v a t e p o l i c y t a i n t {
2 pwdF , netC
3 }
4 aswi tch ( a ) {
5 case <* java . i o . F i le Inpu tS t ream . < i n i t > ( . . , F i l e f ) >:
6 i f ( f . getName ( ) . indexOf ( " / e tc / passwd " ) >= 0) {
7 r e t u r n new ObjectTa in tOrder ( a . ge tTh isPo in te r ( ) ,# ob jec t : { pwdF } ) ;
8 }
9 r e t u r n n u l l ;
10 case <* * . Socket . getOutputStream ( . . ) >:
11 r e t u r n new RetValTaintOrder (# auto : { netC } ) ;
12 case <* * . Pr in tSt ream #<{ netC } > . w r i t e ( . . # <{ pwdF } >) >:
13 r e t u r n new Except ionOrder (new java . lang . RuntimeException ( " Leak ! " ) ) ;
14 }
15 r e t u r n n u l l ;
Listing 3.17: Trishul-P policy engine to prevent leak of password file information into the
network.
It works as follows. The first action and associated Order (lines 5-7)
taints the FileInputStream object with a label pwdF if the file being used
for initialisation is /etc/passwd while the second case statement (line 10-
11) intercepts and returns a network socket with taint label netC. Trishul’s
underlying taint propagation mechanism would then ensure that any object
that uses this socket would be tainted with the netC label while any data
read from the FileInputStream object would be tainted with pwdF label.
The third action in the policy engine file (line 12) checks for a call to the
write method of a PrintStream object tainted with the netC label, which
uses pwdF tainted data as argument. If the application invokes the method
within these taint constraints, it is trying to send the data obtained from
the ‘/etc/passwd’ file via a socket to an external host. As a response Tr-
ishul returns an ExceptionOrder which in turn causes the JVM to throw a
java.lang.RuntimeException exception.
A couple of things have to be noted with regards to the example men-
tioned above. In Listing 3.17, the name of the password file is fixed to
make the code easier to read. In a real system, a SELinux [National Se-
curity Agency, 2009]-like policy structure would exist for every file that
has a usage policy associated with it. The Trishul engine would query the
related policy file first and then, based on the policy specified in that file,
would perform the engine logic. Attacks like copying the password file to
a new file and then reading this new file to perform network actions could
be stopped in two ways (1) disabling the writing of the file’s content into
a new file or (2) carrying the policy of the original file to the new file.
These are not shown in the listing above in order to keep the example code
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simple. Canonical attacks targeted at the path filename of the file are not
considered in this code fragment but a full policy engine would have to
defend against them using well-know counter-measures.
It should also be noted that PrintStream.write() is only one of the possi-
ble methods that an application can invoke to write data to network. A com-
prehensive policy engine would use an abstract action that encompasses all
possible methods that perform similar writes.
3.4.2. Multi-Level Security Systems
Multi-Level security (MLS) systems take inspiration from the defense com-
munity’s security classification system. Most MLS computer systems use
the Bell-LaPadula model [Bell and LaPadula, 1975] introduced earlier in
Chapter 2, that proposes two main mandatory access control security prop-
erties. The no read-up property states that a subject at a given security level
may not read an object at a higher security level, while the no write-down
property states that a subject at a given security level must not write to any
object at a lower security level.
Consider a CEO who has ‘Top-Secret’ security clearance. He has two
files, one with classification of Top-Secret and another with classification
Public, both of which he wants to write into. Current MLS system would
require that the CEO open the Top-Secret file, edit it, close the application
and change his current security level to Public by logging out of the system
and logging in again with the lower clearance. Only then would he be able
to open and edit the Public file. This is needed to prevent the CEO from
copying content from the Top-Secret file and writing it into the Public file,
which could then be read by anyone.
An MLS system implemented using Trishul JVM can avoid the need
for the manual change of the current security level without compromising
the security of the system. Trishul achieves this by preventing writes to an
object only if its classification (Public) is lower than that of the content that
is being written (Top-Secret). Thus the CEO is able to open and edit the
Top-Secret file and the Public file simultaneously and even copy content
from the Public file into the Top-Secret file but will be prevented from
copying the data from the Top-Secret file to the Public file.
Listing 3.18 shows a portion of the Trishul-P engine code that was used
to prototype such an enhanced MLS system in Trishul JVM. When an ap-
plication tries to access a protected file on behalf of a subject, the invoked
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method call (say java.io.FileInputStream) is intercepted and the control is
transferred to the policy enforcement engine. The engine checks the clear-
ance of the subject to access the file and if cleared, it labels the input stream
with the security classification of the object (specified in a global system
configuration file). Trishul then taints any data originating from this input
stream with the stream’s label and propagates the taint as the data gets used
in the system. Later when the application tries to write data into an out-
put channel (OutputStreamWriter), the engine throws a RuntimeException
using ExceptionOrder if the output channel’s security level label is lower
than that of the data being written (confidential > public). Note that in
the process above, only the specific instance of FileInputStream is tainted
and a new FileInputStream created later will remain untainted, preventing
taint spread. While our prototype system uses a custom configuration file
to specify the clearance of the subjects and objects, a production system
could use the information provided by a SELinux-like system file.
1 case <* java . i o . F i le Inpu tS t ream . < i n i t > S t r i n g path , . . ) >:
2 oLabel = ob jec tLeve l ( path ) ;
3 swi tch ( oLabel ) { / / c o n f i d e n t i a l =5 , p u b l i c = 1 . . .
4 case 5:
5 r e t u r n new ObjectTa in tOrder ( a . ge tTh isPo in te r ( ) ,# ob jec t : { c o n f i d e n t i a l } , t h i s , a ) ;
6 . . . .
7 }
8 case <* * . OutputStreamWriter #<{ p u b l i c l a b e l } > . w r i t e ( . . # <{ c o n f i d e n t i a l } >) >:
9 r e t u r n new Except ionOrder (new java . lang . RuntimeException ( ` ` Disal lowed ' ' ) , t h i s
,a ) ;
Listing 3.18: Trishul-P code fragment that implements the enhanced MLS system.
Note in this example that since Trishul’s taint label system supports
arbitrary lattice structure, it becomes necessary to explicitly code the logic
of the structure within the policy engine. This is abstracted away here as
a function in line 2. While this may seem cumbersome, the flexibility of
an unstructured lattice allows the policy engine writer to support arbitrary
decision logic, even those that do not use a lattice structure.
3.5. PERFORMANCE
As evident from the discussion on the implementation of Trishul-P, a
lot of work goes into the creation of the CFGs, calculation of the context
taint as well as the actual propagation of the taint labels. All these create
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overheads when using the Trishul system. We investigate this additional
overhead added by various parts of the Trishul system in this section.
Since Trishul itself is application independent, instead of comparing
the performance of Trishul and Kaffe when running a specific application,
in this section we concentrate on using microbenchmarks to compare the
two. All tests were performed on single node of a four-node AMD Opteron
system (model 852, 1Mb cache, 2593 MHz), with 1.5 GB of RAM. All
performance measurements were taken using the JIT version in a release
configuration and were compared against a standard Kaffe-1.1.7 release
built using the same compiler options.
The overhead introduced by Trishul architecture can be categorised
into three main components: (1) that due to the actual taint propagation
mechanism as well as the dynamic calculation of context taints etc. (2)
that incurred during the analysis of the bytecode to obtains CFGs, context
bitmaps etc. and (3) that introduced by the hooks needed to examine the
JVM’s method invocations to intercept method of interest to the policy en-
gine. The performance measurements were performed in such a way as to
isolate these overheads.
3.5.1. Taint Propagation Overhead
The run-time overhead due to taint propagation was measured by observ-
ing the execution times of the inner loops of a prime number sieve and
a file reader program. In order to measure only the runtime of the taint
propagation mechanism and not the load-time analysis, the inner loop was
executed twice and measured only the second time. The first execution
ensures that all the required classes have already been verified and anal-
ysed. No policy engine is used for these benchmark applications to avoid
the overhead introduced by the policy enforcement engine module.
Prime Number Generator
A prime number generator Java was used to test the performance of a CPU-
bound application. It loops over the first 16384 integers and determines
whether they are prime or not. As Table 3.3 shows, an overhead of 167%
was observed when Trishul’s performance was compared to that of the un-
modified Kaffe. Most of the overhead can be attributed to the repeated re-
calculation of the context taint due to the tight for loops in the algorithm. In
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Kaffe Trishul Increase
685ms 1828ms 167%
Table 3.3: Performance of prime number generator when run
in Kaffe and Trishul JVMs.
Kaffe Trishul Increase
7.7ms 7.8ms 1%
Table 3.4: Time taken to read and print a 10Mb file when run
in Kaffe and Trishul JVMs.
this example, for each outer loop (n = 2 to n = 16,384), an inner loop from
i = 2 to i=sqrt(n) is calculated, leading to around 230000 (re)calculations
of the context taints at the CFIs. We have identified ways to decrease this
overhead, as discussed later in this section; but the implementation has
been left as future work.
File Reader
This benchmark application measured the performance of I/O-bound appli-
cations. The application read a 10Mb file with randomly generated content,
into a 64Kb buffer. The data is then printed to standard output, which is
redirected to /dev/null. As Table 3.4 shows, a very low overhead of 1% was
measured for this benchmark application. In this I/O application, major
part of the run-time is spent on the actual reading of the content from the
file as well as the writing onto the standard output. The time taken to do
this dwarfs the extra overhead introduced by the taint propagation mech-
anism of the Trishul JVM, leading to an overall low overhead when the
application is run inside Trishul.
Since typical real-world applications are likely to be neither fully CPU-
bound nor fully I/O-bound, it is expected that the taint-propagation over-
head for these applications will be somewhere in between these measures.
3.5.2. Load-time Overhead
In order to measure the overhead due to the load-time analysis, an applica-
tion that prints a fixed date (1/1/1970) was executed in Trishul JVM. This
application was chosen because it was noticed that its invocation forced a
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Kaffe Trishul Increase
1052ms 1188ms 12.9%
Table 3.5: Runtime overhead due to load-time analysis of an
application printing a specific date.
Context 254800 bytes
Non-taken branches 1668928 bytes
Total 1923728 bytes
No. of methods 986
Bytes per method 1951 bytes
Table 3.6: Memory overhead due to load-time analysis.
large part of the Java library to be loaded and therefore a large number of
analysis to be performed and this is a good candidate for measuring the
load-time overhead. For example, this specific application run caused 986
methods to be analysed.
Table 3.5 shows that Trishul’s load-time analysis incurred a 12.9%
overhead compared to Kaffe. Table 3.6 shows the memory that was re-
quired to transfer information from the load-time analysis to the run-time
system. It was measured by recording all allocations of the objects that are
used to pass this information; these objects are used exclusively for this
purpose alone. On an average, 1951 bytes are required to hold all required
information for a single method, the main part being the information on
non-taken branches, i.e. the lists of variables that are modified in a CFI
branch. Some optimisations that may reduce the size of these lists are dis-
cussed further on.
3.5.3. Policy Engine Overhead
A microbenchmark application that invoked a specific method 200,000
times repeatedly was used to measure the overhead introduced by Trishul-
P’s hooks. The run-time taken to execute actions specified in various policy
engines were recorded. Table 3.7 summarises these measurements.
The first case statement in the policy engine code ‘never matched,
static’ specified a method that was not invoked by the application at all. It
also did not contain any taint comparison requirements and was discarded
purely based on static properties of the method’s signature. The second
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Policy Run-time (ms)
None 4.5
Never matched, static 4.6
Never matched, dynamic 31933
Matched, static 212842
Matched, dynamic 212245
Matched, dynamic, order 216000
Table 3.7: Runtime overhead due to Policy engine.
policy ‘never matched, dynamic’ specified a method which though was in-
voked by the application, was not matched due to the specified object taint
being different at run-time. While in the first case the overhead was just
2%, the second matching process performed by the engine increased the
runtime by 7100 times. This big increase is due to the fact that the dynamic
properties are checked during the second phase of the two-stage matching
process described in Section 3.3.7. In other words, the taint value needs to
be rechecked every time the method is invoked, 200,000 times in this case.
Matching on parameter taints and context taints show similar performance
results.
The next two policies ‘matched, static’ and ‘matched, dynamic’ matches
the method, either the static properties or the dynamic taint values. The
larger overhead observed is caused by the work needed to hook into the
policy engine: creating objects and arrays expected by the policy engine,
installing the security engine for the policy engine, etc.
The last policy ‘matched, dynamic, order’ also returns a taint order and
is used to capture the overhead of handling an order. When compared to
the case where no order is returned (matched, dynamic), this increases the
runtime by less than 1%. This shows that hooking into the policy incurs
a lot of overhead, regardless of the amount of work done inside the policy
engine.
The performance measurement suggests that the most efficient policies
are the ones that hook into the policy engine as little as possible, and per-
form as much work as possible whenever such a hook is eventually made.
Note however, that the performance reported here records a worst-case sce-
nario. Such high overhead is not expected of normal applications, since,
unlike the microbenchmark application which performs a very tight loop
for 200,000 times with only one method being called in the body of the
CFI block, they would spend more time calling other methods that may
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not be of interest to the policy engine, and performing IO processes in its
lifetime, decreasing the overall impact of Trishul-P’s hooks.
3.5.4. Optimisations
The prototype implementation of Trishul, though as stable as Kaffe, has
not been optimised due to lack of time and resources. Several possible
optimisation and fine tuning of the prototype implementation has however
been identified. Some of these are discussed here.
Currently the CFGs and context bitmaps of each method used by the
application are generated at normal verification time of the bytecode. This
overhead can be reduced by storing the calculated bitmaps and related in-
formation of the Java system libraries in a secure, integrity protected man-
ner and reusing it the next time. Along similar lines, as of now Trishul
creates its own CFG separate from the CFG used by the JVM’s bytecode
verifier due to earlier developmental constraints. However it is theoreti-
cally feasible to reuse the JVM’s own internally calculated CFG, thereby
decreasing runtime as well as memory overheads.
Some optimisation is also possible in the process of creating the lists
of variables and objects that are modified in nontaken branches needed to
handle indirect flows. For example, locations that are modified in each
branch do not need to be tainted explicitly, nor do locations that are mod-
ified in the branch that is actually executed. Additionally, locations may
appear in the lists multiple times; they of course need to be tainted only
once. These optimisations would not only benefit the run time of the taint
propagator, but also reduce the amount of memory required to perform the
propagation steps.
As seen in Table 3.3, Trishul suffers a large overhead in the pres-
ence of tight loops found in CPU-bound mathematically intense applica-
tion codes. As mentioned earlier, this overhead is mainly due to the re-
peated (re)calculation of the context taint for each run of the conditional
branching involved in the code. This overhead can be reduced by exploit-
ing the observation that if the arguments involved in the calculation of the
context taint (i.e., the CFI’s argument) have not changed their taint value
in either the taken or the non-taken conditional branches, the context taint
would also not have changed and hence need not be re-calculated. For ex-
ample in the calculation of the prime number generator, the variables used
with the CFI (n and i) are modified only once in the block where their val-
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ues are incremented by 1 for each loop (i.e., n++ and i++). Since these
operations do not change the values of taint labels n and i, there is no need
to re-calculate the context taint introduced by the CFI and hence can be
skipped, saving over 230,000 re-calculations, reducing the overhead.
A re-examination of the way registers are used for storing taints could
provide further optimisation in the JIT mode implementation of Trishul.
Due to the nature of the SSE instruction set, currently chosen to hold reg-
ister taints, accessing of individual elements is a slow process. Storing a
single taint per register could provide an improvement over this. In addi-
tion, unused MMX registers (Kaffe uses only one for floating point calcula-
tions) can also be used to store the taints. Additional low level instructions
available for manipulating these registers may make them more suitable
for storing the taints.
The global context taint used in Trishul is an imprecise part of Tr-
ishul’s architecture. The use of a better reaching-definition analysis al-
gorithm should be able to reduce the number of times the global context
taint fallback is invoked. In addition, several ways to automatically reduce
the scope of the taint can be studied as future work. For example, if it is
determined that all the variables that are control-dependent on the branch
are assigned new values before the method returns, the global context taint
needs to be increased only for that methods and can be reset after that
method has returned. Similarly, if the effected variables are all members of
a single object, the fallback taint could be limited to methods in that object.
As of now, the code to handle Trishul-P matches during method in-
vocations is generated for each method. Every time a method is invoked,
it must be checked if the policy engine’s list of actions have changed, in
which case the match must be performed again. If the list of actions change
infrequently (i.e. no dynamic addition or removal of policy enforcement
engines), it might be more efficient to use a different logic to regenerate
the method hooks whenever the policy engine tree changes, thus removing
the need to check if the tree has changed whenever a method is invoked.
This would lead to quicker method invocations. Methods that are not in-
spected by the policy enforcement engine would incur only the overhead of
regenerating the code, which in turn can be reduced further by regenerating
only when the method is used again, which might not happen at all.
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3.6. RELATED WORK
In order to certify software as complying to a static security policy,
Denning proposed a compile-time approach to solve the implicit informa-
tion flow problem [Denning, 1975]. In her system the compiler added extra
instructions to the existing instructions of the application such that, irre-
spective of whether the CFI branch is followed or not, the class of object
acted upon within the branch is updated to reflect the information flow. The
approach relies on the properties of a lattice structure among the security
classes and assumes that this structure is known to the compiler at the com-
pile time, like in a typical confinement problem [Lampson, 1973; Lipner,
1975]. This restricts the class of security properties that such a system can
be used to enforce. The wide range of security policies that current ap-
plication scenarios present go beyond these static lattice confinement and
confidentiality policies.
Volpano et al. [Volpano et al., 1996] later formalised Denning’s work as
a type system for which well typed programs respect the non-interference
property. A type system is a set of rules used to check if a typing envi-
ronment is compatible with a given program. These works have however
been proposed as models or as a purely theoretical system whose proposed
implementation depended on the use of specialised ‘tagging’ supported
hardware for supporting tracing. Trishul is a practical system that does not
rely on uncommon hardware support for its information flow control.
The system proposed by Andrews and Reitman [Andrews and Reitman,
1980] uses correctness proofs to establish the correctness of information
flow constraints. This allows security classes to change at run-time, but
is not applicable to practical systems as it is required that a program can
be analysed as a single entity, whereas most software is developed as a
set of modules. This approach can be extended to modular systems, as
demonstrated by Mizuno and Schmidt [Mizuno and Schmidt, 1992] where
they overcome this limitation by extending the work to work on modular
systems by using a link-time algorithm to combine multiple modules.
Jif [Jif, 2009], the successor to JFlow [Myers, 1999] implements a com-
pile time system by extending the Java type system to include security in-
formation. Jif introduces two new concepts into Java for information flow
security: the labelled type and the switch label statement. A labelled type is
a Java type annotated with an extended security class. A custom compiler
then ensures that no information flow violation occurs by validating the
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labels when values are assigned to the types. Generic labels may be used
to write code that works irrespective of the actual security class, much like
generics or templates allow code to work on variables of different types.
The switch label statement allows a program to inspect a variable’s actual
label, allowing security decisions to be made. JFlow includes some dy-
namic features through the use of the decentralised label model [Myers
and Liskov, 1997]. In this model, variables can be of type label. Value of
this type can be used as near first-class values or as a label for other values.
However they are only partially dynamic since variables of type label are
immutable after initialisation.
Sabelfeld and Myers [Sabelfeld and Myers, 2003] survey several com-
pile time static analysis IFC system, most of which are based on non-
standard type systems like Jif. Type-based analysis in general are not flow,
context or object sensitive, leading to higher false alarm. For example,
consider the Listing 3.19. It is deemed unsafe by type-based systems be-
cause of the potential flow of information from confidential to public in the
if. . . else block. The system does not capture the fact that any potential in-
formation flow is killed by the last assignment.
1 i f ( c o n f i d e n t i a l ==1)
2 p u b l i c = 42;
3 else
4 p u b l i c = 17;
5 p u b l i c = 0 ;
Listing 3.19: Flow that raises false positive in type-based systems.
The approach of using program dependence graph (PDG) in combina-
tion with constraint solving proposed by Hammer et al. [Hammer et al.,
2006] in order to perform static analysis of Java program codes produce a
graph similar in functionality to the one produced by our CFG approach.
Our system however does not have the ‘high’ and ‘low’ levels built into the
analysis, being lattice structure independent, and is thus more generic than
theirs. As is the case with other compile-time approach systems, Hammer
et al.’s system accepts or rejects a program based on whether information is
allowed to leak from high to low level security classes. It does not support
any run-time analysis, which means that like other purely static analysis
system, the system gives judgement for all executions of a program as a
whole and not for a single execution alone.
Fenton’s Data Mark Machine [Fenton, 1974a] was one of the earliest
systems that used the concept of run-time information flow control to en-
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force policies. It adds data marks (fixed except for the program counter’s
data mark) to the abstract computer model of Minsky [Minsky, 1967]. It
introduced the concept of adding a security class to the program counter
(pc) to handle indirect flows. When storing a value v to a fixed data mark
storage location l, the machine checks whether the data mark of l is higher
or equal to the upper bound of the data mark of v and the one of the program
counters. If it is not, the operation is considered as a NOP. When storing
v to a dynamic data mark location dl, the machine updates the data mark
of dl to the least upper bound of data mark of v and that of the program
counter, allowing for the program counter’s data mark to monotonically
increase at each conditional jump.
However, it has been shown [Fenton, 1974b; Guernic, 2007] that the
proposed system is not able to handle implicit indirect flows like in List-
ing 2.2 when destination of flow has a dynamic mark, as the machine is
not able to see the operation causing the flow and make necessary updates
to the data mark of the dl. Since Trishul uses a combination of static and
run-time analysis for handling indirect flows, the JVM is able to analyse
the operation causing the flow, even in the presence of implicit indirect
flows. Furthermore, as in Denning’s system, the machine was considered
as a purely abstract concept and no implementation was ever attempted.
The security mechanism proposed by Gat and Saal [Gat and Saal, 1976]
tries to handle the indirect implicit flow but ends up preventing reuse of
procedures due to its inability to store output of procedures in dynamic
storage. Brown and King [Brown and King, 2004] proposes a similar sys-
tem but it too has been shown to be unsafe for handling implicit indirect
flows, see Section 2.2.1 of [Guernic, 2007].
Beres and Dalton [Beres and Dalton, 2003] use the DynamoRIO [MIT,
2003] framework to dynamically rewrite machine code in order to support
dynamic label binding. The underlying concept behind the architecture of
our system Trishul resembles that of this system with an important prac-
tical difference: instead of using a separate code modification framework,
we make use of the interpreted nature of Java’s bytecode instructions to
perform dynamic tracing at runtime. Their system has the limitation that
since it works at the machine code level, there is limited support for im-
plicit information flows and it also assumes the existences of certain en-
hanced hardware support in order to perform the label tracing. Trishul
has the advantage that because it operates at the Java bytecode level, the
control flow and hence the information flow can be modelled much more
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precisely. In their approach to non-taken branches the system either aborts
the program or uses an approach similar to Trishul’s global context taint
mechanism. Since it is implemented completely in the JVM, Trishul re-
quires no changes to the operating system kernel. Working at the low level
of machine code also means that the system is not suitable for enforcing
security policies that are rich in application semantic level restrictions.
The RIFLE architecture [Vachharajani et al., 2004] was proposed as a
system that implements run-time information flow security with the aim of
providing policy decision choice to the end user. They use a combination
of program binary translation and a hardware architecture modified specif-
ically to aid information flow tracking. Their work uses security registers
to address explicit indirect flows, by capturing the data mark of registers
conditioning the behaviour of the CFI and using it in addition to existing
data marks for every instructions which is control-dependent on the CFI.
This is very similar in concept to the use of context taint within Trishul.
The difference between RIFLE and Trishul occurs in the way implicit
indirect flows are handled by the systems. In Trishul, the context taint is
added to taint of all the instructions along the non-taken path of a branch.
However, in order to prevent memory redirection problems inherent in the
way instrumentation is performed in RIFLE at the binary level, the secu-
rity register value is appended to the label of all instructions that poten-
tially use values defined by instructions control-dependent on the branch.
While this means that the append action is performed when the label is
used rather than when it is defined (as in the case of Trishul), the strat-
egy is proven to be safe [Vachharajani et al., 2004]. However the inherent
truncation automata-like [Ligatti, 2006] behavior of dealing with insecure
outputs create a new information flow that is not considered in their frame-
work [Guernic, 2007]. Trishul-P’s use of an edit automata-like[Ligatti,
2006] policy engine framework prevents such leaks by allowing the engine
writer to handle such occurrences using SuppresOrder and InsertOrder. RI-
FLE also requires enhanced hardware architecture support for the binary-
level information flow security instructions that need to be performed and
hence can only be run using a simulator environment.
Chandra [Chandra, 2006] proposed a hybrid taint propagation approach
for Java, similar to Trishul’s but by instrumenting the bytecode with taint
propagation code. One interesting aspect of the system is that the non-
taken branch is not tainted until the context taint is untainted. Until the
untainting of context taint happens any reference to the variables will al-
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ways include the correct taint due to the inclusion of the context taint in
the taint propagation process. The assumption is that untainting of con-
text taint will happen infrequently, thus providing an optimisation over the
process of tainting the non-taken branch every time, like in Trishul.
However, the approach used by Chandra has several shortcomings. For
example, when considering native methods the return value of the native
method is tainted with the method parameters’ taints. This works only if
the native methods are referentially transparent–the return value depends
only on the parameters. In reality this is most often not the case. Further-
more the native methods can modify any value in the system and hence a
more radical approach like the manual annotation system used by Trishul
is required to fully capture the information flow in them. Exceptions are
also handled incorrectly in their system–though throw statements are cor-
rectly identified as a form of goto, they ignore the effect of stack unwind-
ing caused due to exceptions and the fact that method invocations can turn
into conditional statements, leading to control flow attacks as explained in
Section 3.3.6. Their work also does not implement any policy engine ex-
pression framework like Trishul-P nor is the architecture flexible enough
to implement the range of policies that Trishul can.
Newsome and Song [Newsome and Song, 2005], Argos [Portokalidis
et al., 2006], TaintBoch [Chow et al., 2004] and Haldar et al. [Haldar et al.,
2005a] use taint tracing to track the use of untrusted data from poten-
tially unsafe input channels, like networks. Haldar et al. [Haldar et al.,
2005b] also attempt to extend this idea by using bytecode instrumentation
to perform mandatory access control on Java objects, in order to enforce
security policies. The level of granularity that is considered [Haldar et al.,
2005a, b]–objects–is however too coarse-grained to be useful in many ap-
plications. For instance, they provide as an example a class method that
tries to leak a secret file into a public file [Haldar et al., 2005b]. This is pre-
vented by tagging the whole class instance as ‘secret’ as soon as the secret
file is read and denying access to public channels once this tag has been set.
The coarse nature of this tagging however prevents the class method from
accessing any public channels even if the operation it wishes to perform
is not on the data read from the secret file. Furthermore these systems are
designed in general to solve specific application problems and do not con-
sider the enforcement of general access and usage policies like Trishul nor
provide any mechanism like Trishul-P to write policy enforcement engines
for using the system in other application scenarios.
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Le Guernic et al. consider an automaton-based dynamic monitoring
of information flow for a single execution of a sequential [Guernic et al.,
2006] and concurrent [Guernic, 2007] program. Like in our system, the
mechanism is proposed as a combination of dynamic and static analysis
allowing or rejecting a single execution of the program without doing the
same for all other executions, unlike pure static system. The automaton is
used to guarantee confidentiality of secret data and takes into account ex-
plicit and implicit flows. However, the work is purely theoretical in nature
and while interesting theoretical results have been derived, no implemen-
tation has been attempted. Our IFC system can be seen as a generic imple-
mentation of this work. Instead of confining to a binary high-low system,
our system allows for propagation of arbitrary taint labels which the policy
enforcement engine can then use to implement the required guarantee. It is
not far-fetched to assert that the policy enforcement engine of our system
can be programmed to enforce the confidentiality high-low policy.
Le Guernic’s work can thus be thought of as a theoretical treatment of a
simplified version of Trishul. While formalisation and soundness proof of
Trishul was not part of the work covered in this dissertation, Le Guernic’s
work provides a good starting point for such an effort.
Information-Based Access Control (IBAC) [Pistoia et al., 2007] has
been proposed as an alternative to the traditional stack-based and history-
based access control for ensuring that all codes that influence a security
sensitive action is sufficiently authorised. The work also presents a mech-
anism to convert an access-control policy into an implicit integrity policy
in order for IBAC to enforce it. While the work proposes the use of static
as well as dynamic enforcement of IBAC using PDGs, no implementa-
tion is reported. Unlike our system, the proposed IBAC system addresses
the specific problem of code security in Java and .Net Common Language
Runtime and does not provide a generic policy enforcement system.
Xu, Bhatkar and Sekar [Xu et al., 2006] use a notion of taints, similar
to taint mode in Perl [Wall, 1987], to track dangerous data that originate
from user in order to prevent execution of bad data and prevent attacks like
SQL injection. Their source code analysis of C takes into consideration
direct flows and some indirect explicit flows but do not consider indirect
implicit flows as they assume that such an analysis is not necessary for the
kind of attacks they aim to prevent. Lam and Chiueh [Lam and Chiueh,
2006] proposed another similar framework for dynamic taint analyses but
again does not take any indirect flows into consideration.
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Polymer [Bauer et al., 2005] is a general purpose policy engine for
Java that rewrites the application bytecode as well as instruments the sys-
tem libraries to enforce security policies. While Trishul-P’s language syn-
tax is inspired by Polymer, the implementation is a complete rewrite since
Polymer worked as a Java-Java compiler system that rewrote the system
libraries independently of the specification of the security policy and ap-
plication bytecode as per the policy specification, both permanently. Pol-
icy enforcement engines written in Trishul-P on the other hand is compiled
into Java code and then into Java bytecode, which in turn uses the hooks in
place in the Trishul JVM system to interposition itself between the method
calls at runtime. One consequence is that the system libraries need not be
instrumented outside the run of the JVM against a static set of method calls
specified in Polymer’s action declaration file. Furthermore, Trishul-P also
supports the ability to introduce taint labels into the system (the various
taint Orders), something which was not considered at all in the Polymer
system. Polymer, being an execution monitor, also does not address the in-
formation flow problem inherent in process of enforcing security policies.
The side-effect of using a Polymer-like structure for Trishul-P is that
the policy engine can be informally thought of as an edit automata based
monitor, which is proven to enforce a much wider class of properties [Ligatti,
2006].
Viega et al. [Viega et al., 2001] has proposed the use of aspect oriented
programming to security by using an aspect language to specify security
transformations on a program. At compile-time, their language takes any
specified aspects along with regular C program and weaves them into a
single C program which is then compiled. The aspect language is similar
to Trishul in that it supports wildcards, allows for insertion of code before
or after point of interest or replace the code at the given point of interest.
The aspect language is more similar to Polymer than Trishul as it does not
support for specifying taint labels or introduction of these taints into the
system. In fact information flow is not at all considered in the system.
One aspect that has not been considered in the design and implemen-
tation of Trishul is that of multi-threading in programs. Enforcing infor-
mation flow control when dealing with synchronisation and concurrency
issues brought on by threading can lead to subtle information flow chan-
nels that are difficult to capture. Synchronisation commands may prevent
some output sequence from occurring and when the execution of such a
synchronisation command is conditioned by a tainted data, the value of
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the data may be revealed whenever the program outputs a sequence which
cannot occur if synchronisation command is executed. Compile-time so-
lutions to the problem has been proposed [Barthe et al., 2007; Roy et al.,
2009] but a dynamic runtime monitor-based solution has not been imple-
mented as of yet. That being said, the theoretical treatment of the problem
for runtime monitors presented in [Guernic, 2007], even though restricted
to high-low lattice systems, offer a possible route towards implementing
such a solution.
There have been several work done in designing system call interposi-
tioning architectures. It has been used in recent years for addressing both
the confinement problem [Acharya and Raje, 2000; Goldberg et al., 1996]
and intrusion detection [Wespi et al., 2000]. Janus, for example, originally
prototyped by Goldberg et al. [Goldberg et al., 1996] and later implemented
as a loadable kernel module, provides one such mechanism to restrict the
application’s interaction with the underlying operation system at the level
of the system method calls performed by the application. However, hardly
any of these dynamic systems have been built with the intention of sup-
porting information flow control. That said, the lessons learnt [Garfinkel,
2003] from building such interpositioning systems, like protecting against
canonical attacks, can be equally applied in the implementation of the de-
cision logic within Trishul’s enforcement engine.
3.7. CONCLUSION
In this chapter we presented the design and implementation of Trishul,
the information flow based policy enforcement architecture that forms the
core of this dissertation work. In particular we discussed in detail the
Trishul-P language syntax which can be used to write modular policy en-
forcement engines and the Trishul Java Virtual Machine capable of sup-
porting tracing of information flow caused by both direct and indirect flows.
Design decisions to handle complications arising from control flow instruc-
tions, exceptions and native methods are also discussed.
In order to have a better idea of how the system works, we then looked
at how Trishul can be used in solving some small application scenarios
like protecting the password file of a Unix platform and implementing an
enhanced Multi-Level Security (MLS) system.
We then demonstrated through performance measurements that Trishul,
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though burdened by the extra effort involved in the load-time analysis and
the run-time taint propagation mechanism, is still a practically usable sys-
tem. The measurements helped us identify that the major overhead is intro-
duced by the taint pattern matching steps associated with the enforcement
engine hooks, in particular those that deal with dynamic taint label patterns.
Finally, we also presented various optimisations that have been identi-
fied which could potentially improve the performance of the Trishul system
by a large factor. These form part of future work along with considering
other possible optimisation avenues.
In the next two chapters we consider the use of Trishul in implementing
larger applications in order to prove its usability in more real life scenarios.
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CHAPTER 4
Application: Digital Rights
Management
Now that the design and implementation of Trishul has been presented, we
consider an application scenario for the architecture.
In this chapter we present Trishul-UCON (T-UCON), an implementa-
tion of a Digital Rights Management (DRM) system based on the UCONABC
usage control model, built using the Trishul system. T-UCON is designed
to be capable of enforcing not only application-specific policies, as most
existing software-based DRM solutions do, but also DRM policies across
applications. This is achieved by binding the DRM policy only to the con-
tent it protects with no relation to the application(s) which will use this
content. Since T-UCON is implemented as a JVM-based middleware that
mediates the usage requests of any Java application to the protected con-
tent, it can be used to enforce the guarantee that the usage policy is continu-
ously enforced. Each request is granted or denied as per the rules laid down
by the usage policy of the content. We illustrate the unique features of T-
UCON by using typical examples of DRM policies such as the pay-per-use
and the use only N times scenarios. Preliminary results on the overhead of
our solution are also provided.
4.1. INTRODUCTION
As more and more digital content is being distributed online, the own-
ers of this content are increasingly relying on digital rights management
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Figure 4.1: Stakeholders involved in a typical DRM setup.
systems to help in monetising the content. These systems manage the var-
ious usage aspects of the content. For example the content could be re-
stricted as to how many times it can be played or in the case of digital
redistribution, how many times the content can be resold.
After being in the news for some years now, DRM is currently ap-
proaching a more mature phase, gradually attracting a steadier research
community. This trend is partially reflected in the industry too. Despite
less emphasis compared to the early heady days, there are still many com-
panies [Jobs, 2007] and industry alliances [OMA, 2009] highly interested
in flexible, cheap and secure DRM technologies. This is motivated by the
indisputable fact that an increasing amount of digital content is produced
everyday and there is an overwhelming desire to protect both its distribu-
tion and consumption.
A generic DRM setup is composed of three prominent stakeholders and
two less prominent ones as shown in Figure 4.1.
SEC. 4.1 INTRODUCTION 97
The three prominent stakeholders are:
– Producers: The producers are the entities that own the rights to the
content. They form the starting point of the DRM chain and heavily
influence the business model associated with the content. They could
be individual artists, bands or record labels (like EMI, Sony, Time
Warner etc.)
– Consumers: The consumers occupy the other end of the DRM chain
and are made up of individual users who wish to obtain the digital
content and consume them as per the restrictions laid down by the
producers. It is assumed that the consumers can access protected
digital content only by means of compliant devices. Compliant de-
vices, by definition, enforce the policies set by the producers.
– Publishers: The publishers are responsible for managing and run-
ning the DRM network used to distribute the digital content to the
consumers. They form the middleman between the producers and
the consumers. iTunes is an example of a publisher.
The two less prominent stakeholders involved in the framework are:
– Device manufacturers: These are the manufacturers of certified com-
pliant devices. It is assumed that there exists a industry-wide set of
specifications that define the minimum capability of these devices,
much like the specifications of the Open Mobile Alliance [OMA,
2009].
– Licensing organisation: This central entity is responsible for testing
the devices made by the manufacturers and (digitally) certifying the
manufacturers as complying to the industry-wide set of specifica-
tions. It is trusted by all parties involved in the system and its public
key is embedded in all compliant devices and forms the root of trust
for digital certificate chains. It is also responsible for certifying pub-
lishers as being part of the DRM system.
While a lot of work has been done at the cryptographic protocol level
defining the interaction of the various players with respect to each other,
less work has been done in examining the actual enforcement of the DRM
policies at the consumer side, on the compliant devices. In this chapter
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we try to address this shortcoming by considering the design of a policy
enforcement architecture for the DRM system.
Broadly speaking, existing DRM solutions can be classified as hardware-
based and software-based. Trying to determine which one is better in terms
of security alone could be misleading since each of them serves different
needs. In practice the main discriminant between the two is the business
model of the distribution system rather than their actual security strength.
Hardware-based solutions (e.g. Zune, iPod, etc.) present closed sys-
tems consisting of compliant devices that are, by construction, made to
conform to the DRM specifications. The security of these systems rely on
the impossibility to fake a compliant device and on the admission control
protocol that allows only compliant devices to interact with other compliant
devices. An advantage of these solutions is the simplicity of the design, but
the disadvantage is the cost of the device and the infrastructure. Building
devices impossible or hard to fake or break is expensive. Thus in prac-
tise an acceptable compromise between manufacturing costs and estimated
loss of revenue due to DRM failure is often considered in deciding which
approach to implement.
On the other hand, software-based solutions, like iTunes Fairplay, are
cheaper and more flexible since they do not require special hardware and
they can share a computer with other non-DRM applications. These so-
lutions build a software-protected environment (e.g. player, reader, etc.)
within which (and only within which) the protected content can be con-
sumed. Other applications cannot access the protected content since it is
typically encrypted with a decryption key embedded in the protected en-
vironment. Software-based solutions are secure, assuming the operating
system is trustworthy and that it is hard to extract the encryption key em-
bedded in the software. These software-based solutions are the best choice
in all those scenarios where the content provider does not have control
over the hardware used by the consumers, but it is still in its own interest
to make the DRM content available to as many users as possible.
Despite being more flexible than hardware-based systems, current soft-
ware based solutions still suffer from many drawbacks that limit the type of
DRM policies they enforce. Due to their design, existing solutions cannot,
for example, implement cross-application DRM policies. Thus typical use
only N times policies like ‘play the song “Imagine" no more than 5 times’
cannot be enforced. Rather, what is now enforced are policies like ‘play
the song “Imagine" no more than 5 times using ‘ThisPlayer’,’ thus bind-
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ing the policy to a specific application. Similarly, pay-per-use policies like
‘the cost of playing the song “Imagine” is 50 cents the first 10 times, then 5
cents for the next 10 times and 1 cent for the next 100 times’ are impossible
to implement if one tries to enforce them at the song level rather than for a
specific application.
While there has been previous work done on modelling DRM archi-
tectures and associated policy languages [OMA, 2009; Park and Sandhu,
2004], there are fewer implementations of such systems. In this chapter we
present the design and implementation of T-UCON, an open and generic
software-based architecture that enforces DRM policies. In particular, we
will show how T-UCON can be used to enforce DRM policies both appli-
cation specific and more importantly across applications. After providing
solutions for the two examples mentioned above we show that T-UCON
also enforces DRM policies that use obligations. Preliminary performance
tests confirm the feasibility of our approach.
4.2. MODELLING DRM
A formal model for the DRM system goes a long way in ensuring that
all the various usage restrictions that can be specified as part of DRM poli-
cies can be captured correctly. It has been argued that the notion of DRM
is more than a set of enabling technologies and that it overlaps a lot with
the notion of access control and usage decision models [LaMacchia, 2002].
At the same time, traditional access control models (MAC, RBAC etc.) do
not capture the requirements of modern DRM application scenarios.
The UCONABC model [Park and Sandhu, 2004] provides such a model.
In this section we briefly recap this model, first introduced in Chapter 2,
and explain how it can be used to model various DRM scenarios.
4.2.1. The UCONABC Model
Historically the UCONABC model was introduced as an extension of the
traditional access control model in order to take into consideration various
missing requirements needed to model the wide range of usage restrictions
seen in real-life scenarios.
The main components of the UCONABC model, as shown in Figure 4.2,
are the Subjects, which wishes to assert various Rights over certain Objects.
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Figure 4.2: Components of the UCONABC model.
Subjects and objects are endowed with Attributes that capture the proper-
ties and/or capabilities of these components.
The usage decision on the requested rights by the subject on the object
is made based on 3 factors: Authorisation (A) where attributes of subjects
and objects are checked in order to make decisions on whether the sub-
ject is authorised to access the object, oBligation (B) where checks are
performed to ensure that certain actions are performed by the subject and
Conditions (C) where environmental (system) attributes are checked to see
if they are in a predefined secure state.
The generality required by complex usage control scenarios is achieved
by adding the notion of decision continuity and subject and object attribute
mutability to the model. The continuity property is added to the decision
phase by allowing the decision to be made before the usage is permitted
(pre) or during the usage session (on), while the attributes mutability is
supported by allowing them to be updated before (pre), during (on) or after
(post) the usage has been granted. These notions of usage decision conti-
nuity and attribute mutability addressed by UCONABC enable it to meet the
requirements of the generic DRM model laid down by Erickson [Erickson,
2003]:
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– Use of information resource by user: this forms the very premise of
usage control models
– Implementation of control: while [Erickson, 2003] considers authen-
tication, metadata and proprietary infrastructures for data distribu-
tion, identification and cryptography, the UCONABC model (being a
generic system model) does not cover in specific detail how to ad-
dress these issues. However, it does provide basic control mecha-
nisms to achieve control based on the various forms of checks and
attribute updates
– Set of policies for controlling use of resources: In both the DRM
model and UCONABC every action on a resource is governed by a
corresponding set of checks which form one or more policies
– Fixed or built-in policies: refers to how policies are attached to the
content they are protecting. Neither UCONABC nor DRM models
address this issue, but in both cases the aim is to cryptographically
ensure that the policy is inseparable from the object being protected.
4.3. TRISHUL-UCON ARCHITECTURE
Trishul-UCON was designed and implemented on top of the Java Vir-
tual Machine architecture provided by Trishul and hence can work for all
Java applications. Unlike traditional DRM solutions that restrict policy
enforcement to specific applications, T-UCON is therefore capable of en-
forcing policies independent of and across Java applications. This is done
by associating the DRM policies to objects, mediating any access to these
policy-restricted contents using the T-UCON system and by capturing the
state of the system across application runs in the object and subject at-
tributes.
Figure 4.3 provides a high level overview of the various components of
T-UCON and their relationship with each other. The Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP) intercepts Java method calls made by the applications that are
of interest to the DRM system. Once the relevant calls are intercepted, the
control is passed to the Policy Decision Point (PDP). It is the responsibility
of the PDP to decide whether the application call can be allowed to proceed
or not. To make this decision, the PDP consults the policy associated with
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Figure 4.3: A schematic representation of (a) T-UCON inter-
cepting application methods calls and (b) various components
of the Trishul-UCON architecture.
the object through the Object Attribute Module (OAM). The OAM also
provides an interface to query and update the object attributes. The Subject
Attribute Module (SAM) provides an interface for querying and updating
the subject attributes, while the Condition Module (CM) provides a similar
functionality for the system attributes. Once a decision has been made by
the PDP on whether to allow the action, it is communicated to the PEP.
The PEP forwards this decision to the JVM, which then halts the action by
throwing an exception, if needed. The Obligation Module (OM) is tasked
with enforcing obligations in the policies while the History Module (HM)
provides logging and log querying capability to the system.
In the rest of this section, we look at each of these components in detail.
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
The Policy Enforcement Point is the central point where the application
and the policy enforcement mechanism of T-UCON intersect.
When T-UCON is launched, the PEP registers all the Java method calls
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(actions) that are of interest to the DRM system. For generic DRM sce-
narios, these include the file open and read method calls which need to be
mediated and any network based calls which are denied by default.
When an application tries to execute any of the restricted methods, the
PEP intercepts it and passes control to the PDP, sending along all the avail-
able information regarding the method call. Once the PDP makes a deci-
sion on whether to allow the call or not, the decision is passed to the PEP,
which enforces the decision by letting the application call to proceed or by
terminating the application run.
The PEP is implemented using a combination of the Trishul JVM hooks
that intercept the method calls at runtime and Trishul-P language based en-
forcement engine that lists the signature of these method calls. Exploit-
ing the flexible engine hierarchy inherently provided by Trishul, T-UCON
starts off with a default policy enforcement engine which can be extended
by loading additional engines as the need arises.
Policy Decision Point (PDP)
Once an action is intercepted by the PEP, it is passed on to the PDP. The
PDP implements the core of the decision logic of the decision engine and
is responsible for ensuring that the required authorisations, obligations and
conditions are met for the method call to proceed and if they are not, to
disallow the action.
The PDP is responsible for interpreting the object policy and enforc-
ing the various constraints associated with the usage of the object. T-
UCON by design does not support one specific Rights Expression Lan-
guage (REL) for expressing the object policy, instead it allows the PDP to
load individual expression language parsers to support any standard RELs
like XACML [OASIS, 2008], and ODRL [ODRL, 2002] or even propri-
etary ones.
The PDP is written in Java and uses the Trishul-P Order object to pass
back the decision to the PEP. Since the SuppressOrder and ExceptionOrder
are implemented in Trishul as Java exceptions, a T-UCON aware applica-
tion, knowing that a method call it is invoking is a restricted call, like open-
ing an MP3 file, could be written in such a way as to catch and handle the
exception. A T-UCON unaware application on the other hand is terminated
when SuppressOrder and ExceptionOrder is received. Since HaltOrder is
handled by Trishul as an exit call which halts the application and does not
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allow the application to recover, it should be used only in extreme circum-
stances.
The rest of the helper modules of T-UCON: OAM, SAM, OM, HM and
the CM, are implemented as normal Java classes and invoked by the PDP
as required in the normal Java style, in order to handle the various DRM
policy scenarios.
Object Attribute Module (OAM)
The OAM provides an interface to query and update object attributes. The
OAM can be independently called by the PDP and the OM as both these
modules need access to the object attributes. This modular design allows
the OAM to rely on the PDP and the OM to initiate the pre/ongoing/post
updates to the attributes while freeing them from having to interpret the
syntax of the attribute specification.
As the policy associated with the object is considered as an object at-
tribute, the OAM is also designed to query this information. It should be
noted however that the OAM itself is not responsible for interpreting the
policy nor the state of the object as stored in the attributes. These are still
the responsibility of the PDP. For the current prototype implementation
the object policy is assumed to be placed at a fixed location /etc/tucon/ob-
ject_id.xml where object_id is a unique identifier of the DRM object. The
policy is expressed in an ad-hoc XML format, an example of which is
shown in Listing 4.1, though support for other formats can be easily added.
1 < o b j A t t r i >
2 <song>
3 < c l a s s i f i c a t i o n > l e v e l 2< / c l a s s i f i c a t i o n >
4 < v a l u e >15< / v a l u e >
5 <usageNum>3< / usageNum>
6 < r o l e >pRole < / r o l e >
7 < / song>
8 < / o b j A t t r i >
Listing 4.1: Example Object policy.
Subject Attribute Module (SAM)
The SAM provides a similar functionality to query and update the subject
attributes. These are again invoked by the PDP and the OM when they need
to perform pre/ongoing/post attribute updates. In the current implementa-
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tion, the attributes implemented are those required by the pay per-use, use
n-times and metered payment DRM scenarios, as explained in detail later.
Condition Module (CM)
System attributes are queried using the CM. These include the date, time
and other system variables that can be considered as conditions in the
UCONABC model. The CM contains platform dependent codes that pro-
vide the relevant system information to the query. Since system attributes
should not in general be changed, the CM does not provide the functional-
ity to update these attributes.
History Module (HM)
Many DRM policies require history based decisions, since they typically
span across several usage sessions of the object. Such history based de-
cisions are often associated with obligation policies that could potentially
need to check if particular actions were performed by the subject before
certain rights are allowed. We implement the history by associating with
each object a state that is global with respect to the applications and time.
The History Module provides two distinct functionalities: a convenient
mechanism to log events/actions that have occurred and an efficient mech-
anism to query these logged events. As seen from Figure 4.3, the HM is
called from the PDP as well as the OM to log and query actions, associated
decisions as well as any other relevant checks performed prior to making
the decision.
In order to provide an efficient service, the current implementation of
the HM logs only the essential details including a timestamp, the action
identified by the intercepted method’s name and parameters, the identity
of the logging entity (PDP/OM), the decision returned (in case of PDP),
the state of obligation requirement (in case of OM) and the identity of the
object. The query functionality accepts queries based on the action name,
while additional constraints can be specified on the parameters, logging en-
tity as well as the time period. The query response contains the timestamp
of the matched query, the decision returned as well as the identity of the
object.
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Obligation Module (OM)
In the model, obligations are actions that are required to be performed by
the subject before, during or after the usage of an object (e.g. subject must
accept the license agreement before using the software application).
While most of the authorisation and condition requirements are suffi-
ciently straightforward for the PDP to check and enforce by itself, the com-
plicated nature of obligation requirements warrants a dedicated enforce-
ment module: the Obligation Module (OM). When the PDP encounters an
obligation requirement (e.g. user needs to accept the license agreement) in
the object policy passed to it by the OAM, it passes the obligation part of
the check to the OM for handling. The OM implements all the logic needed
to enforce the obligations requirement. Such a modular architecture allows
all the logic required to interpret, check and enforce the obligations to be
completely contained within the OM.
Currently, we have only implemented a subset of possible obligation
types. In particular, we do not deal with obligations that require calls ex-
ternal to the applications. For example, if a service requires that the subject
has a digital certificate, the system does not proactively make the external
call to obtain the certificate. Rather it checks if the certificate is present in
the system and if not, disallows the access.
Figure 4.4 provides an overview of the obligation enforcement process.
The PDP, on encountering an obligation in the usage policy invokes the OM
to handle the obligation, passing it the associated policy fragment. The OM
first checks whether the obligation has already been fulfilled by querying
the HM. If it has, the OM returns a true value to the PDP which then con-
tinues to process the rest of the usage policy restrictions. If the HM query
turns up f alse, the OM interprets, checks and enforces the requirements
of the obligation and sends back the result of the enforcement action back
to the PDP. Based on whether the enforcement by the OM was successful
or not, the PDP continues with the rest of the restrictions or terminates the
resource usage.
If the policy specifies an ongoing obligation, the OM registers a timer
with the PDP, associating it with a unique identifier to identify the specific
obligation. When the timer fires, the PDP passes the control back to the
OM to check for the obligation compliance.
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PDP OM
handleObligation()
interpretObligation()
checkObligation()
enforceObligation()
HM
IsObligationFulfilled()
isObligationFulfilled: boolean
if (obligationFulfilled == true) return Result
return ObligationEnforcementResult
checkHistory()
A.
B.
A. prior-to-usage obligation checking 
B. prior-to-usage attribute update added to case A., by calling attribute modules
Figure 4.4: Working of the Obligation Module of T-UCON.
4.4. ENFORCING DRM POLICIES
In this section we look at some typical DRM scenarios and explain how
the architecture has been used to develop prototypes that implement such
scenarios.
As with the generic UCONABC model, a DRM system consists of two
main entities: subjects and objects. Subjects are users or applications (e.g.
a multimedia player) being executed on behalf of the user. Objects are
content files, such as music or video files, whose access and use are subject
to various restrictions (when, where or how they can be used).
Subject attributes are properties and capabilities associated with the
user that allow him/her to exercise rights over objects. Attributes relevant
to DRM systems include credit card details, prepaid credit balance and sim-
ilar financial details of the user. Object attributes are properties associated
with object’s usage, like the cost of the media file, meta-data, like artist
name, bitrate of the MP3 file, etc. Properties like the remaining play count
and age of the file are also considered as object attributes in our system.
Conditions are used to express environment variables (e.g., date, time) that
could be used to evaluate DRM policies. As in the original model obliga-
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tions express actions that must be executed to use the object (e.g., accept
the license first).
4.4.1. Pay-per-use
Conceptually a pay-per-use service is one of the simplest DRM scenar-
ios. An object (o) has a value associated with it, which forms its attribute
AT T (o). The subject’s (s) credits form his attribute AT T (s). The policy
associated with the object states that every use right (R) (say view) of the
object requires the value of the object to be decremented from the credit
balance of the user. In order to implement this scenario the authorisation
for use of the object is checked before the usage is allowed and the muta-
ble subject attribute is updated as a pre-update process. Using UCONABC,
a generic pay-per-use policy can be modelled, using the notation in [Park
and Sandhu, 2004], as:
M is a set of monetary amounts
credit : S →M
value : O×R→M
AT T (S) : credit
AT T (O,R) : value
allowed(s,o,r)⇒ credit(s)≥ value(o,r)
disallowed(s,o,r)⇒ credit(s) < value(o,r)
preU pdate(credit(s)) : credit(s)− value(o,r)
The value(o,r), specified as its object attribute, could be a static value
like $0.50 per play or could change over usage, being 50 cents for the first
10 times, 10 cents for the next 10 and 1 cent from then on.
When the application, on behalf of the user, tries to perform a file-open
operation on the object, the PEP–in the form of Trishul–hooks intercepts
the action for mediation in order to enforce the policy. The intercepted
action is then forwarded to the PDP, which then queries the OAM to check
the exact policy associated with the object. After interpreting the policy,
the PDP queries the OAM again to read object attribute value and the SAM
for the subject attribute credit. It then decides on the authorisation based
on the the value of credit and value. Figure 4.5 shows the details of the
steps involved in the process.
SEC. 4.4 ENFORCING DRM POLICIES 109
A
p
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
P
E
P
P
D
P
O
A
M
re
a
d
(O
b
je
c
t)
h
a
n
d
le
(r
e
a
d
, 
o
b
je
c
t,
 a
p
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
)
re
tr
ie
v
e
P
o
lic
y
(o
b
je
c
t)
S
A
M
re
a
d
S
u
b
je
c
tC
re
d
it
(s
u
b
je
c
t)
re
a
d
O
b
je
c
tV
a
lu
e
(o
b
je
c
t)
in
te
rp
re
tP
o
lic
y
()
If
 (
s
u
b
je
c
t 
h
a
s
 e
n
o
u
g
h
 c
re
d
it
 
n
o
w
) 
A
llo
w
 e
ls
e
 D
e
n
y
p
re
U
p
d
a
te
A
tt
ri
b
u
te
(s
u
b
je
c
t)
H
M
lo
g
E
v
e
n
t(
a
c
ti
o
n
, 
o
b
je
c
t,
 s
u
b
je
c
t)
A
llo
w
/D
e
n
y
if
 a
llo
w
e
d
 
th
e
n
 r
e
a
d
Figure 4.5: Implementing pay-per-use policy using T-UCON.
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4.4.2. Use N times
Next, let us consider the often-discussed DRM policy of ‘use only N times’.
Of course, the semantic of ‘use’ is application dependent. In our example
it is “play.” This scenario can be complicated by the practice followed by
many content providers of letting anybody play a certain percentage (say
50%) of the song as a means of advertising the song for free. We support
this feature too in our model. So a “play” action counts as such only if at
least 50% of the song has been played (read from the file). In UCONABC
such a policy can be expressed as:
B is number of bytes
N is an integer
size : S → B
played : S → B
plays_le f t : O→ N
allowed(s,o,r1)⇒ plays_le f t > 0
disallowed(s,o,r1)⇒ plays_le f t ≤ 0
allowed(s,o,r2)⇒ true
postU pdate(played(s),r2) : played(s)+ read
postU pdate(plays_le f t(o),r2) : plays_le f t(o)−1; if played(s)> size(o)/2
Where r1 is the open right and r2 the read right and in this example O is an
audio file. The last line of the listing is the one which decreases the count
of plays left if the amount of file read is more than half the size of the file.
On interpreting the policy, the PDP queries the OAM for the objects’
use_le f t attribute. The action is allowed if this value if greater than 0.
This implementation has the limitation however that once the use_le f t has
reached 0, the object can never be opened, even for providing a preview of
the content. If such an access is to be allowed, the following logic is used
instead:
allow(s,o,r2)⇒ use_le f t > 0∨ read(s) < size(o)/2
disallow(s,o,r2)⇒ use_le f t ≤ 0∧ read(s) > size(o)/2
The process-flow involved in implementing this modified policy using
T-UCON is shown in Figure 4.6. As these steps show, T-UCON performs
an update of plays_le f t object attribute irrespective of which application
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is playing the file, ensuring that the the object policy is enforced across
different applications and application runs.
4.4.3. Metered payment
A membership-based metered payment DRM system presents a slightly
different scenario. In such a system, the subject needs to be a valid mem-
ber possessing an expense account to access the object and the expense
associated with the usage is dependent on the usage duration. Thus the
membership is the object attribute while the subject attributes is the cost of
usage per unit time. The DRM scenario usage control can be expressed as:
M is monetary amount
IDmem is a set of membership IDs
Time is a current usage unit of time
expense : S →M
usage : S → Time
member : S → IDmem
valuet(o,r) : O×R→M, cost of usage right per unit time
AT T (S) : member,expense,usage
AT T (O,R) : valuet
allowed(s,o,r)⇒ member(s) 6= φ
disallowed(s,o,r)⇒ member(s) = φ
postU pdate(expense(s)) : expense(s)+ valuet(o,r)×usage(s)
As the formalisation above shows, the key subject attributes are its
membership ID, the total expense and the current usage time while the
object attribute is its usage value in unit time. What exactly constitutes the
action/rights (R) is scenario dependent. For example, in our implementa-
tion, a simple read of the object is used as R.
On parsing the policy and noting the metered payment restriction, the
PDP asks the OAM to look up the object attribute. At the same time,
the subject attributes are queried using the SAM. The PDP then performs
the necessary authorisation checks, the results of which are used to decide
whether to allow the rights or not. Once the method call has been executed,
the PDP then performs the post update on the subject attribute expense by
calling the SAM, as shown in Figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.6: Implementing the ‘play N times’ policy using T-
UCON.
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Application PEP PDP OAM SAM
read(Object)
handle(read, object, application)
retrievePolicy(object)
interpretPolicy(policy)
getObjectAttributes(object)
getSubjectAttributes(application)
checkSubjectID()
if ID==valid Allow else 
Deny
HM
logDecision()
setPostUpdateFlag()
Allow/Deny
if (postUpdateFlag == true) updateAttributes
if Allow 
read
Figure 4.7: Implementing metered payment policy using T-
UCON.
4.5. PERFORMANCE
The T-UCON architecture is designed with the conscious aim of being
modular and generic enough to implement a wide range of DRM policies in
an application-independent manner. Such a design however has the down-
side of introducing performance overhead. In this section we perform an
empirical study of these overheads by examining the results of performance
measurements conducted using our prototype implementation of T-UCON.
The measurements were performed on an Intel Core 2 Duo 2 GHz machine
with 2 GB RAM running Ubuntu 7.10 with a 2.6.22 Linux kernel.
We consider the specific example of pay-per-use policy discussed ear-
lier, specifically to a music player application playing an MP3 file. The
open access to an MP3 file is allowed only if the credit remaining for the
user is more than the per-use value of the file and the appropriate object
attribute is updated after the decision to allow the read is made.
In the first set of measurements, the time taken between the application
invoking the file open command and the actual creation of the file object is
measured. When an unmodified JVM is used, with no policy enforced, the
application was able to start reading from the MP3 file in just over 1 ms.
114 APPLICATION: DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT CHAP. 4
Environment time (ms)
Unmodified JVM, no policy 1
T-UCON, no policy 10
T-UCON, pay-per-use (XML) 1783
T-UCON, pay-per-use (txt) 241
Table 4.1: Performance comparison of T-UCON prototype in
pay-per-view microbenchmark.
Environment time (s)
Unmodified JVM, no policy 303
Unmodified JVM, SM policy 303
T-UCON, no policy 304
T-UCON, pay-per-use (XML) 311
T-UCON, pay-per-use (txt) 308
Table 4.2: Performance comparison of T-UCON prototype in
pay-per-view application run.
In the second case the application was inside the T-UCON enabled
JVM but the setup was done in such a way that the PDP invokes the OAM,
which instead of returning the object policy, returns a null string and the
PDP in turn returns an OKOrder. This set of experiments was intended to
measure the overhead due to interception process and the loading of the
basic T-UCON modules. It was observed that a high extra overhead of 9
ms, 9 times the original value, was introduced.
In the next experiment, the pay-per-use policy was enforced using T-
UCON. With the subject and object attributes being represented using
XML, to simulate the use of an XACML [OASIS, 2008]-like REL lan-
guage, resulting in an observable overhead of 1780 ms. This includes the
time taken to read the policy, the object and subject attributes, the execu-
tion of the decision logic and return of the decision to the JVM from the
PEP. Closer analysis revealed that more than 75% of this overhead is in-
troduced by the process of reading, parsing and updating the XML files. In
order to estimate a less biased overhead, simple text files were used next
to represent the attributes of the subject and the object. The overhead re-
duced to a lower value of 240 ms. Table 4.1 summarises the results of
the measurements. The lower overhead observed in the second and last
set of experiments when compared to the overhead observed when using
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XML shows that the system overhead is dependent on the complexity of
the policy checks involved and on the way the policy and attributes are
represented and as such cannot be attributed solely to the architecture.
Furthermore once the action is allowed and the necessary object up-
dates have been carried out, T-UCON does not have to perform any further
mediation and hence the overall overhead should be small when the appli-
cation run is considered in its entirety. To verify this, we next considered
the case of playing a 5.6 MB, 4.56 minute long MP3 file, again subject to
the pay-per-use policy. Table 4.2 shows the time required to play the file
for various test cases, averaged over 5 runs. The base measurements was
performed on an unmodified Kaffe JVM as noted in row one of the table.
The second row denotes the time taken for the unmodified JVM to play the
file when a simple grant read permission policy is specified by the Java Se-
curity Manager, while the rest of the rows of test cases are similar to those
in Table 4.1. It is worth noting that the current Security Manager supports
only simple access control policies and not usage control restrictions. The
low overhead figures observed when using T-UCON supports our claim
regarding the practicality of using our architecture.
4.6. TRUSTED SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS
The T-UCON architecture proposed here, being a pure software based
solution, does not rely on any hardware functionality to perform policy en-
forcement. However, a software-only solution to DRM policy enforcement
on open platforms is hard, since it is susceptible to attacks from the owner
of the platform who might attempt to circumvent even sophisticated soft-
ware protection by trying to replace the middleware, or even the underlying
operating system. Thus, in order to ensure the integrity of the architecture,
it is imperative to leverage on security provided by trusted hardware tech-
nologies.
While integrity measurement architectures [Sailer et al., 2004] provide
a mechanism by which TPM-based hardware can endorse the configuration
of the system’s boot process and the libraries loaded in the system to a third
party, this by itself does not prevent a malicious replacement of the DRM
architecture by the user or the attempt to play the DRM enabled content by
an application that does not reply on the T-UCON middleware, basically
non-Java based applications.
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The basic functionality required to prevent such exploitation by com-
pletely replacing the middleware or circumventing its invocation is to en-
sure that applications do not get access to the DRM content if it is not
accessed within the T-UCON middleware setup. The ‘seal’ functionality
of the TPM [Trusted Computing Group, 2006] is the key to implementing
this restriction. McCune et al. took the first step in this direction in the
Flicker [McCune et al., 2008] project whereby the dynamic root of trust
of the TPM and the secure kernel hardware support (SKINIT instruction)
of modern CPU architectures is used to provide an isolated execution en-
vironment for a Piece of Application Logic (PAL). This combined with
the TPM-based sealed storage functionality allows for maintaining state
across multiple Flicker sessions. They have demonstrated the use of this
architecture in protecting SSH password authentication mechanism on the
server side by implementing part of it as a PAL and also in protecting the
private key of a certificate authority server. While such work shows the
potential of using the TPM’s dynamic root of trust in association with the
CPU features to provide a sealed environment for running T-UCON, the
size of T-UCON, a whole JVM implementation, would be a big hurdle in
protecting it using a similar approach.
One way of assuring integrity of the T-UCON architecture is through
the deployment of a trusted subsystem similar to the one proposed by
Zhang et al. in [Zhang et al., 2008b]. Using such a system, a TPM’s seal-
ing and trust chain based attestation functionality are used to ensure that
the objects can be accessed only by applications running inside T-UCON.
The concept of trusted channel introduced by Sadeghi et al. [Sadeghi
et al., 2007] provides the most feasible mechanism to provide the TPM-
sealed environment required for protecting the T-UCON setup. A trusted
channel is defined as a secure channel that can validate the configuration
of the other endpoint of the compartment and bind the data to this con-
figuration such that only the compartment with the specified configuration
can access the data. The compartment configuration in their architecture
maps to a hash value of the software binary (T-UCON in our case) and all
the initialisation information including the default policy enforcement en-
gine. The trusted channel is powered by the trust manager that abstracts
the trusted computing services and the storage manager that provides per-
sistent storage while preserving integrity, confidentiality and authenticity.
In the proposed architecture, very similar to the one in [Sadeghi et al.,
2007], the publishers verify the bootstrapping of the trusted computing
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base and once accepted, asks the trust manager on the DRM device to cal-
culate the configuration of the compartment running T-UCON. If this con-
figuration matches the globally known and approved configuration value,
the publisher, using a protocol similar to the one proposed in [Sadeghi
et al., 2007] ships off the DRM content and the license (policy) encrypted
in such a way as to be sealed against the verified configuration value. The
DRM content, in the encrypted state, is not useful outside the compart-
ment. An application that tries to access it outside the scope of a compart-
ment running T-UCON will not be able to get to the unencrypted content
as the storage manager part of the trusted computing base would refuse to
decrypt the DRM content to any compartment that does not match up to the
same configuration as what was used to seal the content. When the com-
partment with T-UCON running in it attempts to access the DRM content
and the configuration integrity check has been passed, the storage manager
goes ahead and decrypts the contents and passes it to the T-UCON com-
partment for its use within the compartment. The vitalisation layer of the
architecture ensures strong isolation between the compartments.
4.7. RELATED WORK
The financial incentive involved in developing an architecture for en-
forcing the usage restriction of digital content has seen the development of
several DRM systems.
Most of the work has however been in the form of proprietary systems.
Windows Media DRM [Microsoft Corporation, 2009] (WMDRM) from
Microsoft allows protected audio and video to be played on Windows PCs
and portable devices. The WMDRM provides the full infrastructure of the
DRM structure including the content packaging, distribution and licensing
as well as restricted playback. The Open Mobile Alliance [OMA, 2009]
provides one of the few open specifications for a DRM system, specifically
for mobile service providers and device manufacturers. But even in these
specifications, the actual mechanism for policy enforcement is left as an
open problem for the device manufacturers. In that respect the work we
have reported in this chapter compliments these specifications and DRM
systems.
Jamkhedkar and Heileman [Jamkhedkar and Heileman, 2004], taking
inspiration from the OSI layer framework, propose a generic layered ar-
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chitecture for DRM systems. The upper layer made up of application and
negotiation layer are the end-to-end layers that create services that are used
by the applications that involve DRM. In the middle, the rights expression
layer provides the minimal support for the management of the digital rights
while the lower layer is concerned with the actual enforcement of rights re-
strictions. This layer is itself divided into upper category layer, responsible
for handling content according to its type and then lower category layer
which is responsible for ensuring that no low-level illegal access to the
DRM program are allowed. T-UCON system sits somewhere in between
the upper and lower category layers, providing a middleware based DRM
enforcement system.
Michiels et al. [Michiels et al., 2005] extends the work of [Jamkhedkar
and Heileman, 2004] by extracting the high level usage scenarios accord-
ing to the functionality of the players, the content producers, publishers
and consumers. Though they claim to present the "next step towards a soft-
ware architecture that supports reuse and co-operation of multiple domain-
specific DRM technologies and standards," the discussion is confined to
the higher framework level and the actual enforcement mechanism is not
considered.
Recent years have seen an increased interest in the area of enforcing
usage control policies in distributed systems. Considering this area as a su-
perset of the DRM enforcement studies, here we take a look at the existing
proposals and highlight their differences compared to our approach.
Berthold et al. [Berthold et al., 2007a], tackle the enforcement of usage
control requirements in Service Oriented Architectures. The paper sug-
gests a client-side architecture which is able to support domain separation
and policy enforcement for various Java services or objects. The granu-
larity of usage decisions supported by their architecture is at the level of
applications, while T-UCON provides a very fine-grained control at the
level of Java method calls. Furthermore in T-UCON, applications are not
assumed to be trusted.
The client-side enforcement approach proposed by Schaefer [Schaefer,
2007] considers the use of a reference monitor to enforce usage policies
on the objects of interest. Although the architecture is similar to that of T-
UCON, in their approach the monitor on the client side needs to be contin-
uously updated with the information on a usage control server. Moreover,
the work is purely theoretical in nature, while in this thesis work we present
the design and implementation of a practical enforcement architecture.
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A slightly different approach is taken by Zhang et al. [Zhang et al.,
2008a] where they propose an authorisation enforcement architecture for
collaborative systems. While their focus is on the general collaborative
systems, ours concerns enforcement on the consumer-side. Although typ-
ical UCONABC mechanisms like attribute updates and obligation checks
are dealt with in detail, the proposed solution commits to the study of au-
thorisations rather than usage control and hence among others, ongoing
obligations are not considered. Trusted computing in usage control is ap-
proached in [Zhang et al., 2008b], and while the suggested architecture
is similar to [Zhang et al., 2008a], the focus is on the integrity of inner
security modules and details of specific enforcement scenarios are not pre-
sented.
Katt et al. [Katt et al., 2008] extends the original UCONABC model by
adding the notion of post-obligations. Focusing on obligations from the
point of view of subject, object and fulfilment time, the paper stresses an
enforcement framework incorporating these aspects. However, in their ar-
chitecture the PEP is embedded with the target application. This prevents
policies from being enforced across applications and assumes a trusted ap-
plication or the existence of a mechanism to safely direct application ac-
tions, neither of which are explained in detail in the paper. T-UCON, on the
other hand, is firmly based on the premises of controlling untrusted appli-
cations and allows the policies to be associated with objects and enforced
across applications.
Jamkhedkar and Heileman draws inspiration from the UCONABC model
to propose a formal conceptual model for rights statements that aims to re-
duce interoperability complexity between various RELs [Jamkhedkar and
Heileman, 2008]. T-UCON’s OAM would be able to handle such a formal
expression model equally well, if a suitable parser is available.
4.8. CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have presented the design and implementation of
T-UCON, a generic software-based Digital Rights Management architec-
ture using Trishul framework. Being a middleware solution, unlike other
DRM solutions T-UCON is able to enforce policies associated with DRM
objects across multiple applications and application runs. Performance re-
sults show that while the checks associated with the DRM logic have the
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potential to introduce larger overheads, the framework in itself adds a small
amount of overhead.
CHAPTER 5
Application: Web Services
Over the years business operations of various organisations have used ad-
hoc setups to interact with each other over the Internet. This has, how-
ever, lead to the emergence of a large number of incompatible frameworks.
In order to tackle this problem the Web service (WS) technology [W3C,
2009] along with associated specifications have been developed to provide
a standards-based open framework for application-to-application interac-
tion.
In its current form, WS technologies have been widely used to imple-
ment the Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) paradigm by which mono-
lithic standalone systems are decomposed into smaller loosely coupled
modular systems that can then be used in an on-demand fashion to compose
larger service offerings in a heterogeneous environment by various organi-
sations. This allows for business processes to be composed of these smaller
services that could even span across organisational boundaries. This also
allows a service provider to offer the user, be it an individual or an or-
ganisation, a standard public endpoint for accessing a particular service
while at the same time allowing it to compose the service internally us-
ing various sub-component services, while hiding the complexity from the
user. All aspects of the service discovery as well as inter-service interac-
tions and communications are structured using open standards allowing for
maximum interoperability.
With more and more users relying on the WS platform for their needs,
the question of data integrity, confidentiality and equally importantly the
user’s ability to impose specific usage restrictions on the data, are be-
coming big issues. Recent work like WS-Policy [W3C, 2006c] and WS-
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ABAC [Shen and Hong, 2006] have allowed users to specify basic autho-
risation rules for accessing a service and/or the data used by the service.
Most of the existing work has, however, concentrated on protecting the
web service, specifying and enforcing policies that define who can access
the service and how it can be used. However, much less has been done
on specifying and enforcing access and usage policies as defined by the
data provider. In general the provider would like to ensure that the data it
had provided to a remote WS is being used only by services it trusts and
has explicitly allowed and in ways specifically allowed by policies it has
defined.
In this chapter we describe an architectural framework that exploits the
capabilities of Trishul to implement a policy enforcement architecture for
user-defined policies in a Web Service environment.
5.1. WEB SERVICES
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) paradigm promises simple, fast,
secure and interoperable integration of services, enabling the creation of
large business processes and service using a collection of smaller self-
contained components. By allowing the overall service to be accessed at a
publicly addressable service endpoint, the individual component services
that make up the service are hidden from the view of the service user.
At present, Web Services (WS) are the only concrete technology that
is used in implementing an SOA framework. These technologies in turn
use various XML-based open standards to implement such services. In
this section we provide a brief introduction to the main standards used in
most WS systems. While the actual process of forming and using Web
Services use a top-down approach, expressing the business process first
and then implementing and expressing various aspects of the process using
different services, in this discussion we use a bottom-up approach in order
to describe the various technologies involved.
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) [W3C, 2007] is an XML-based
protocol that aims to standardise the communication aspect of the WS tech-
nology. It is used for messaging and remote procedure calls between ser-
vice components as well as the user and the service endpoint, as shown in
Figure 5.1. At the transport level, SOAP reuses the existing HTTP proto-
col to carry the message, which, when stripped to its essentials, is an XML
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document containing a header and a body. The header section contains
metadata associated with the message while the body contains the actual
payload of the SOAP message. WS-Security [OASIS, 2006] specification
provides protocol level security by specifying means of supporting encryp-
tion and digital signing of SOAP messages.
Business
Logic Processing
Message Message BusinessLogicProcessing
Service Requestor Service Provider
Request
SOAP
SOAP
Reply
Figure 5.1: The use of SOAP messages between web service
entities.
The Web Service Description Language (WSDL) [W3C, 2006a] pro-
vides a way to formally describe the service being offered at the WS end
point as well as the structure of the expected client-service interactions. It
allows for specification of the vocabulary of the message, the interaction
of the application-level abstract interface as well as the protocol-dependent
details that the user must follow to access the service. A WSDL document
consists of two parts: logical and physical. The logical part defines types of
data being carried, message representing the input and output parameters
associated with an operation, the actual operation, which defines an actual
action performed by the service and portType, which defines an abstract
set of operations supported by the service. The physical part of WSDL
describes more concrete aspects of the service including binding associ-
ating a concrete protocol and message format to operations and message
defined within a particular portType, the port that associates the endpoint
with a physical network address and service that contains one or more port
elements representing related endpoints.
Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) specifica-
tion [OASIS, 2004] provides potential users a unified and centralised way
to find service providers. It specifies the definition of how to define infor-
mation about the service as well as the query and update APIs for accessing
and updating this information from/at the centralised listing.
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Once all the services required to implement an SOA has been imple-
mented, it needs to be brought together. The most common way to do
that is using Web Service Business Process Execution Language (WS-
BPEL) [OASIS, 2007], a language used to create orchestrations, which
are composite, controller services defining how the services being con-
sumed will interoperate to provide the SOA functionality. At the core, it
is an XML-based programming specification that is used to describe high
level business processes as interactions between different businesses fash-
ioned as Web Services. An alternative to Web Services Orchestration is
Web Services Choreography and its associated specification Web Services
Choreography Description Language (WS-CDL) [W3C, 2005] which de-
fines a more descriptive process-less service-service relationship between
various WS endpoints.
Yet another XML-based specification, WS-Policy [W3C, 2006c], is
used to express the capabilities, requirements and characteristics of Web
Services involved in a SOA framework. A policy is composed of pol-
icy alternatives, each of which is a collection of policy assertions. An
assertion is defined as “an individual preference, requirement, capability
or other property." Examples of policy assertions include authentication
schemes, privacy policy, QoS guarantees etc. WS-Policy provides a com-
mon fine-grained syntax for specifying these different kinds of assertions
in a consistent manner. An example of a WS-Policy document is shown
in Listing 5.1. It describes a web service instance invocation which uses
a ‘SecurityToken’ assertion of the type ‘Kerberos’ [Kerberos Consortium,
2009].
1 <wsp : Po l icy >
2 <wsp : ExactlyOne >
3 <wsse : Securi tyToken >
4 <wsse : TokenType>wsse : Kerberosv5GTGTS </wsse : TokenType>
5 </wsse : Securi tyToken >
6 </wsp : ExactlyOne >
7 </wsp : Po l icy >
Listing 5.1: Example of WS-Policy specifying that a WS instance uses a Kerberos token.
As there are several entities involved in the life-cycle of a Web Ser-
vice, it follows that these actors would be interested in specifying their
own policies at various phases in the service life-cycle. Figure 5.2 shows
these actors and the various policies they define.
Service policies are defined by the developers of the web services as
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Figure 5.2: WS-Policy definitions.
properties that must hold true for all instances of the web service irrespec-
tive of the hosting environment. Server policies on the other hand are de-
fined by the hosting providers and specify the features that are supported
by a specific application server on which the service is instantiated. Sup-
ported policies are formed by the intersection of these two policies and
represent the effective policy of a WS running on a specific hosting infras-
tructure. The WS user is also able to state the features of the services it
would like to invoke, to support. These policies are called the requested
policies. The intersection of the supported policies and requested policies
form the effective policies of the Web Service instance. Approaches to pol-
icy intersections are discussed in [Mukhi and Plebani, 2004; Verma et al.,
2005].
WS-Policy by itself does not provide all the functionalities required for
using policies in web services. For example, while it can be used to specify
service policies, it does not concern itself with how the policies are attached
to a web service. Yet another specification, WS-PolicyAttachment [W3C,
2006b], defines the required mechanism. Specifically, it defines a mecha-
nism to reference policies from a WSDL document, associate them with a
specific instance of a WSDL service as well as with UDDI entities.
While the specifications discussed above provide a standards based
framework for enforcing policies, the actual design and implementation
of a policy enforcement architecture has been less common. In this chapter
we consider the use of Trishul in designing such an architecture.
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5.2. SCENARIO OVERVIEW
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Figure 5.3: Example scenario providing motivation for the pol-
icy enforcement architecture.
Consider the example scenario shown in Figure 5.3 in which an entity
I1 provides a web service WS1 at the publicly addressable endpoint WSEP.
The service offered at WSEP is internally fulfilled by using the capability of
the local WS1 and another Web Service WS2 provided by an external entity
I2. A client C wishing to use the service provided by I1 sends the required
confidential input data D to WSEP for processing. Assume that the data
consists of two independent segments: D1 and D2, each to be used by I1
and I2 respectively. On receiving the input data, WS1 sends D2 to WS2
for processing and uses the response R2 obtained from WS2 along with the
user-submitted data piece D1 to compute R, and sends the response to the
user.
The client C wishes to associate policies (these policies are discussed
below) P1 and P2 to the data segments D1 and D2 respectively. It would
like to ensure that D2 is sent to I2 alone and that the policies specified by
the client and attached to the data are enforced at WS1 and WS2.
5.2.1. Policy Classes
The classes of policies that a WS client would like to see enforced remotely
on the submitted data can be broadly divided into two – access control and
usage control.
Previous studies on access control policies in the context of web ser-
vices [van Bemmel et al., 2005; Shen and Hong, 2006] have concentrated
on issues related to allowing the services to define and control who invokes
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it or on allowing the user to specify the requested policies to form the ef-
fective policy of the web service instance. In this work, we extend this
by allowing the clients to specify the identity of the web services that can
access the confidential client data as well as specify the conditions under
which such access can be provided.
Usage control policies on the other hand specify how input data can be
used by the web service components once access rights have been granted
to it, either unconditionally or after a specified policy requirement has been
fulfilled. Such policies could span a wide range of functional restrictions.
For example, C could specify that the data D2 should not be stored in the
remote WS’s permanent storage device but rather be used for processing
entirely in the memory. Another possible policy could be that the data
should not be sent outside the WS host unless encrypted beforehand or that
all network communication using the data should use secure end-to-end
encryption protocol TLS 1.2 or higher.
5.2.2. Threat Model
In a traditional web service setup the resource provided by the service com-
ponents are considered to be the asset to be protected from attackers who
might be interested in exploiting the setup to gain unauthorised or unac-
counted access to them. However, in our scenario, the user data is the
protected asset while the web service components are assumed to be un-
trusted. They cannot be trusted to enforce the policies on their own, that
is, the remote service component may be able to violate the usage control
requirements that data provider has imposed on the data.
We also assume that since the remote platform on which the service
is running is not directly under the control of the data provider, it cannot
be blindly trusted to enforce the policies specified by the provider. Further
steps need to be taken in order to ascertain the integrity and functional state
of the software stack that is running on the remote side before such trust
can be placed.
In the next section we introduce Trishul-WS, an architecture proposed
to implement a policy enforcement framework in a Web Service framework
using Trishul.
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5.3. TRISHUL-WS
As discussed before, the WS architecture provides a framework for
user-submitted data to be processed by the various component services
that make up the WS. However, the problem of ensuring that the poli-
cies associated with the submitted data is enforced at these services has
largely remained unresolved. Trishul-WS architecture aims to fill this gap
in research by implementing a middleware-based WS policy enforcement
architecture.
5.3.1. System Architecture
The proposed architecture of Trishul-WS is shown in Figure 5.4.
Let us consider the various components involved in the system by fol-
lowing the data as it traverses the system. Before the service user sends any
data to the web service instance, it invokes the Attestation Service Module
(ASM) of the WS to check for its compliance with the policy enforcement
architectural requirements (1). The detailed working of ASM is discussed
in Section 5.3.4.
Once the compliance check is successfully completed, the user sends
the data to the WS at the endpoint advertised in the UDDI document (2).
When this 〈data, policy〉 packet is received at the remote endpoint, the
Access Policy Enforcement Point (PEPA) enforces any access control re-
strictions specified in the policy of the user of the WS. For this, it invokes
the Policy Decision Point (PDP) (3) to check whether the conditions for
access have been met.
The PDP is internally assisted by the various helper modules in its de-
cision making process, making the architecture extensible. The detailed
working of these modules are not explicitly defined in the architecture it-
self since they depend on the specific policies that would be enforced at the
WS, allowing for the architecture to support various classes of access con-
trol and usage policies. For example, all system specific attribute checks
(“Java version should be Sun Java ≥ 1.5") could be provided by a ‘System
Attribute Module’ which could then be queried by the PDP during the de-
cision process to check whether Sun Java is installed and if so, whether the
version is ≥ 1.5.
The decision is sent back to the PEPA (4), which forwards the data to
the service component if access restrictions are met (5). Once the data has
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Figure 5.4: The architecture of Trishul-WS designed to de-
velop policy enforcement in web services framework.
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been passed on to the service, every action performed on it is subject to
usage restrictions specified by the user requested policy. To enforce this,
each action that involves the use of the policy-tagged data is intercepted
by the Usage Policy Enforcement Point (PEPU) of the middleware (6) and
passed on to the PDP (7) to make a decision on whether it should be al-
lowed to be executed as per the (usage) policy attached to the data. The
decision made by the PDP is conveyed to the PEPU (8) which then informs
the application of the negative decision (9a) or lets the application’s action
through (9b).
One special action that needs to be handled differently is that of writing
the data to a network socket. When a data segment leaves the system for an
entity other than the service user, it has to be re-tagged with the effective
policy that is currently associated with the data. This data segment under
consideration need not be the user provided data as such but rather any data
that has been tainted explicitly or implicitly by information flow from the
user provided data. This process of data re-tagging is handled by the Policy
Insertion Point (PIP).
5.3.2. Properties
The architecture described above is designed with the following properties
in mind:
– Modular: the functionality provided by the various components are
compartmentalised in such a way as to make the system very modu-
lar.
– Policy language agnostic: the architecture does not specify or depend
on a specific policy specification language that C needs to use. WS-
Policy [W3C, 2006c] and its extensions like WS-CoL [Baresi et al.,
2006] and other similar expressive languages can be used to specify
the policy as long as the PDP has the equivalent interpreter engine to
parse the policy and understand the specification syntax.
– Message passing independence: the architecture is not tied down to
any specific message passing specification, allowing for the use of
SOAP-like XML based message passing protocol which is normally
used in web services framework or any other markup language that
might be used in other SOAs.
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– Extendable: extra helper modules can be added to the architecture
and invoked by the PDP to help enforce a wider range of policies.
– Technology independence: the architecture does not explicitly de-
pend on or use specific technology properties in its design. This
means that in principle, a implementation of the architecture could
be realised using Java, .Net or any other technologies. However, the
system-base used for implementation does need to provide certain
functionalities, as described below, for the actualisation of the archi-
tecture.
5.3.3. Functional Requirements
While the proposed architecture is independent of any implementation tech-
nology, the platform choice for implementation of such a system should be
made with the following requirements in mind:
– Interception capability: when a service uses a policy-tagged data in
an operation, the PEP has to intercept the action and pass the control
to the PDP. Whether this interception is done at application level
(harder to implement but easier to express and interpret the policy)
or at a lower level, for example at the Java method calls level, (easier
to implement but harder to translate high level semantics to low level
calls) is implementation dependent.
– Information flow tracing: the ability to associate a policy with the
data and robustly trace the flow of the data within the system is a
crucial requirement of the architecture, without which the (untrusted)
application could try and disassociate the policy from the data, in an
effort to circumvent the policy enforcement.
Furthermore, as the web service components work on the data, the
policies associated with the data can change. For example, consider
the following operation performed by the service on two data pieces
it received:
Dtemp = D1 + D2
As per the information flow principles [Denning, 1975], the policy
associated with Dtemp should effectively be P1∪ P2, that is the poli-
cies P1 and P2. This means that when the service use Dtemp in later
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stages, the PDP needs to ensure that both P1 and P2 are adhered to.
Similarly if the service is trying to send the data to an external party,
the PIP should tag Dtemp with these two policies and the tuple sent
into the network should be 〈Dtemp, P1, P2〉.
In short, the implementation should be able to handle both normal
and malicious explicit and implicit flow tracing problems described
in earlier chapters of the dissertation.
5.3.4. Platform Security
For the proposed architecture to be able to enforce client-specified policies,
every WS component involved in providing the service has to implement
the middleware platform and run its component service on top of this mid-
dleware.
Since the assurance of policy enforcement depends on the existence of
the middleware at the remote web service, C needs some form of check
to ensure that the policy enforcing middleware is indeed running on the
remote system before it can safely send the data to the WSEP of WS1.
Furthermore, access to the data should be prevented if the middleware
is found not to be running, in order to protect it against the untrusted plat-
form owner. In a similar manner, WS1’s middleware needs to ensure that
the WS2 is also running the expected middleware before sending the data
across.
In our architecture, this is implemented by the use of the Trusted Plat-
form Module (TPM) [Trusted Computing Group, 2006] hardware. TPM
provides the technology to confirm that a remote machine is in a specific
(trusted) state using the core root of trust for measurement and the process
of remote attestation [Trusted Computing Group, 2006]. It also provides
a functionality called secure sealing that enables data to be encrypted to
a specific state of the machine in such a way that decryption can be per-
formed successfully only if the machine is in the same state for which it
was encrypted for. These functionalities are used in our architecture to
provide platform security.
At startup, the state of each of the components of the layers below the
middleware – the BIOS, the boot record and the operating system – is cap-
tured by binary hashing and stored in a Platform Configuration Register
(PCR) of the TPM. The OS, or a dedicated kernel module [Sailer et al.,
2004], can in turn capture the state of all the code running in the system,
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including the Trishul-WS middleware, and again binary hash it and store
the new value by extending the PCR value. Whenever a remote party, like
the service users, wishes to validate the state of the software stack running
on the system, it can initiate an attestation challenge to the TPM which will
report the value of the stored PCR value, signed with a hardware-protected
Attestation Identity Key (AIK). A certificate from a mutually-trusted Cer-
tification Authority can in turn bind the AIK to a specific legitimate TPM.
Semantic Remote Attestation [Haldar, 2006] has been proposed to help
the attestation process capture the dynamic state of the application running
on top of the middleware. All these functionalities are provided by the
Attestation and Security Module (ASM) of our middleware shown in Fig-
ure 5.4.
Once the remote system is verified to be in a state that is known to be
trusted, data can be sent to it encrypted such that it can be decrypted only
if the machine is in the same trusted state.
Client WS1
Attestation Response
<D1,P1,D2,P2>
WS2
<D2, P2>
Attestation Response
Attestation Challenge
Attestation Challenge
Figure 5.5: Steps involved in the platform attestation process.
Figure 5.5 provides an overview of the attestation process. The client
C kick-starts the process by issuing an attestation challenge to WS1 and
only if the attested value matches a known trusted value would it submit
the data to the WSEP. Similarly, the middleware on WS1 would issue an
attestation challenge to a remote component service WS2 before a policy-
tagged data is sent to it. This is a typical implementation of the attestation
procedure proposed by the TCG. In fact, the attestation process described
here is similar in nature to the WS-Attestation [Yoshihama et al., 2005]
specification.
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Recent advances in technology in the form of support for Secure Vir-
tual Machine (SVM) [Strongin, 2005] extensions in modern CPUs have
provided a more dynamic way to ensure the integrity of the platform and
confidentiality of the submitted data. McCune et al. [McCune et al., 2008]
have developed Flicker architecture that allows a piece of code to execute
in isolation by disabling direct memory access (DMA) and interrupts. In
our architecture the Flicker code can be fashioned to run the ASM.
On its first run, the ASM creates a private-key public-key pair pair and
seals the private key using the TPM such that no other code can gain access
to the key. The attestation of this step can assure the remote client that a
trusted ASM was run to generate the key. The public key is then made
widely available. When the client needs to send any data over to the remote
host, it can be encrypted with the public key of the ASM.
When the ASM receives the encrypted data, it uses TPM unsealing
functionality to retrieve the private key and use it to decrypt the data. This
decrypted data is used by the rest of the middleware for processing. As
long as the PDP prevents the data from being stored locally, any untrusted
application will be unable to circumvent the policy enforcement specifica-
tion associated with the data.
5.3.5. Implementation
The Trishul framework is well suited for implementing the WS policy en-
forcement architecture proposed earlier in this chapter due to its support
for information flow tracing and the ability to perform method call inter-
ception needed to monitor the web service actions.
The PEPA is implemented by extending the Axis2 [Apache Software
Foundation, 2009] SOAP engine as it anyway needs to interact with the
SOAP engine of the already existing WS framework. The PEPU interface
is implemented using the Trishul JVM hooks that intercept the method
calls invoked by the web service components. In the current prototype
implementation, it is assumed that the identity of these method calls that
need to be trapped are known in advance.
In the simplified prototype developed to demonstrate the feasibility of
using Trishul to implement the Web Service policy enforcement frame-
work, we consider a simple WS system which accepts two strings as input
data, concatenate them and return the resulting string back to the user. An
extension of the SAML [OASIS, 2005] condition element in an SAML as-
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sertion was used to specify the user restriction attached to the use of the
data supplied to the web service. WS-PolicyAttachment is used to attach
the policy to the user supplied data.
In the example policy in Listing 5.2, the input data is associated with
the policy that the data can be used only if the JVM version is at least 1.5
and that the data cannot be sent to any other third party over the network.
1 <Asser t ion Asser t ion ID=" 3425 ">
2 <Condi t ions NotOnOrAfter= " 2009 -01 -12 T09:03:187 ">
3 < p o l i c y Co n d i t i o n >
4 < p o l i c y xmlns=" h t t p : / /www. s r i j i t h . net / t -ws">
5 <appl iesTo s e r v i c e I d ="T-WS Example ">
6 <URL> h t t p : / / s r i j i t h . net / t - ws1< /URL>
7 < / appl iesTo>
8 < p a r t y I d >TWS1< / p a r t y I d >
9 <JVMVersionMin>1.5< / JVMVersionMin>
10 < t h i r d p a r t y >
11 <a l low>No< / a l low>
12 < / t h i r d p a r t y >
13 < / p o l i c y >
14 < / p o l i c y Co n d i t i o n >
15 < / Condi t ions>
16 < / Asser t ion>
Listing 5.2: SAML based policy attached to user submitted data for prototype
implementation.
The enforcement of the policies using the Trishul-WS architecture ob-
viously impacts the performance of the Web Service infrastructure. In or-
der to gauge this performance overhead of the prototype implementation
of Trishul-WS, a number of measurements were performed, comparing the
enforcement architecture prototype performance with that of the normal
setup. All tests were performed with the Web Service component imple-
mented on a single node of a four-node AMD Opteron system (model 852,
1Mb cache, 2593 MHz) with 1.5 GB of RAM. Table 5.1 lists the measure-
ment results of the processing time between the instance the input data is
received at the WS and the instance the result data is sent to the user.
In the case where Trishul-WS is used, the web service is executed in a
policy complying environment, i.e. JVM version 1.5 is used and the com-
ponent does not attempt network access. As the measurements in Table 5.1
show, the use of the policy enforcement T-WS architecture introduces a
processing overhead of 97%. Given the overhead introduced by the Tr-
ishul framework as seen in the microbenchmark reported in Chapter 3, this
finding is not surprising.
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Setup Processing time (ms) Overhead
Normal WS 39 -
T-WS 75 97.4%
Table 5.1: Performance comparison of normal web service pro-
cessing time and that using the T-WS policy enforcement archi-
tecture for policy in Listing 5.2.
5.3.6. Advertising Enforceable Policies
The set of policies that a Web Service can enforce at its end can be con-
sidered as description of services that is offered to the client. Hence, just
like in the case of typical Web Services properties, it should be able to ad-
vertise the types of policies that are available for the user to attach to the
submitted data. Just as WSDL is used to describe the services offered, a
similar extension of the XML-based specification language may be used
to describe the set of policies the WS can enforce at its end. This is not
considered as within the scope of this work.
In order for the client to specify which parts of the data can be accessed
by which specific internal components of a WS setup, the identity of all
components that make up the service must be advertised to the user. For
example, C should know that the service at WSEP is composed of two
individual services WS1 and WS2. With this knowledge, C could then
specify the access control policy that WS2 can have access to say, only D2.
Again, support for this is not considered as essential part of current work
and is deferred for further research.
5.4. RELATED WORK
Some of the works done in the area of Web Services security has been
in providing protocol level integrity and confidentiality assurance, for ex-
ample WS-Security [OASIS, 2006]. They mainly deal with specifications
on how to use cryptographic primitives to protect the SOAP messages sent
between the different components of the Web Service. Our proposal on the
other hand is an architectural solution to the problem of enforcing user-
specified policies for the data provided by them. In fact solutions like
WS-Security can be used within our architecture, just like in the normal
WS setup.
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WS-Policy [W3C, 2006c] and WS-PolicyAttachment [W3C, 2006b]
specifications provide a framework to define and attach policies (capabil-
ities, requirements etc.) to various entities associated with a WS based
system. Unlike our proposed architecture however, they do not specify the
actual system design needed to ensure the enforcement of the associated
policies. Our architecture uses these specifications to define the policies
that the data provider would like to attach to the data submitted to the Web
Services.
van Bemmel, Wegdam and Lagerberg have proposed 3PAC, an en-
forcement architecture for credential-based access policies for Web Ser-
vices [van Bemmel et al., 2005]. Similar in concept to the working of
Kerberos [Kerberos Consortium, 2009], but for Web Services, the 3PAC
architecture provides a signed token-based system for controlling access
to Web Service resources. Other than access control decisions based on
tokens, 3PAC does not support any other policy restrictions, specifically
usage control restrictions. In fact the actual implementation of the 3PAC
access control engine at the Web Service can be implemented using the
Trishul-WS architecture proposed in this chapter as a modular helper mod-
ule to the PDP.
Attribute-based access control (WS-ABAC) [Shen and Hong, 2006]
was proposed as an alternative to the identity-based access control model
for Web Services in order to address the administrative scalability and con-
trol granularity of the identity-based approach. XACML [OASIS, 2008] is
used as the policy specification language. The implementation architecture
is similar in design to that of Trishul-WS, with a SOAP handler, PEP, PDP
among others to implement the access control model.
Baresi, Guinea and Plebani have proposed a monitoring framework and
a language named WS-CoL for letting the user specify requirements on the
execution of Web Service composition in WS-BPEL processes in [Baresi
et al., 2006]. However, their work in itself is mainly concerned with re-
strictions to be placed on execution of composed Web Services, i.e. the
WS-BPEL process. This is done by instrumenting the original WS-BPEL
specification such that at all locations specified in the policy, the invocation
of the WS-BPEL activity is substituted by a call to the monitor manager.
The policy restrictions specified in WS-CoL can, in theory, be supported by
Trishul-WS by writing a suitable parser and decision engine logic, while
the monitor manager is similar in design to the Trishul-WS architecture.
The policies supported in their work can be considered as a subset of the
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policies that can be implemented using Trishul-WS. One main difference
between their work and Trishul-WS is that in our work, the policies can
be attached to the data in a very secure manner using the information flow
tracing functionality while in their work the policies are specified for busi-
ness processes between Web Service compositions.
Berthold et al. have proposed an approach to model usage control re-
quirements on remote clients in Service Oriented Architectures [Berthold
et al., 2007b]. While in some way this is similar to our approach, their work
is aimed at providing, for example, a secure client environment in which
confidential data can be used. More importantly, their approach assumes
that the applications at the client side are trusted to behave according to
the policy specification. Our proposed solution explicitly assumes that the
service running on the remote WS host is untrusted and proposes a middle-
ware based solution that works at the granularity of the Java method calls
to enforce the policies associated with the data these applications/services
use.
In Entropia [Chien et al., 2003], the authors propose an architecture
similar to [Berthold et al., 2007b] but in context of desktop grid systems
where the data to be processed is sent to the desktop of the client in a secure
way and the client is trusted to use the data only in the correct way. Their
architecture does not consider generic usage policies and the only overlap
with our work is its ability to provide an encryption mechanism protocol
to ensure the integrity of the data on the desktop grid.
5.5. CONCLUSION
In this chapter of the dissertation we have presented Trishul-WS, a
generic middleware based architecture for the enforcement of user spec-
ified data-centric policies in WS and SOA frameworks, making use of the
information flow tracing and method call interpositioning capability of Tr-
ishul.
Through the use of TPM technologies, the user (and the middleware)
ensures that the remote machine is indeed running the trusted middleware
and only then is the data sent to the endpoint. Once the data is received,
the information flow tracing property of the middleware ensures not only
that the data and policy cannot be separated but also that the application’s
operation on the data will preserve the correct policy requirements as per
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the information flow principles. The middleware also enables the intercep-
tion of application action performed on the data and ensures that these are
allowed as per the policies specified by the data provider.
Performance measurements performed on an unoptimised prototype
implementation of the architecture showed a high overhead. While this is
not surprising given the performance overhead measured for Trishul frame-
work in the earlier chapter, this means that Trishul-WS would need a lot
more work before it can be considered for use within production environ-
ments of Web Services.
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CHAPTER 6
Summary and Conclusions
This last chapter concludes the dissertation and is organised as follows:
Section 6.1 summarises the previous chapters, in Section 6.2 we present
our conclusions and lessons learnt from this research work and in Sec-
tion 6.3 we discuss future directions for research.
6.1. SUMMARY
In Chapter 1, we introduced the research issues motivating this disser-
tation, namely the need for an architecture that enables the enforcement of
various classes of policies that are attached to sensitive data submitted by
external parties and processed by the end system. Our proposal was to de-
sign and implement a Java middleware based security architecture in order
to realise this requirement.
Chapter 2 presented some of the background work related to this disser-
tation. We discussed some basic access control and usage control models
that are usually used to specify restrictions on when access can be allowed
to a protected resource and once this access has been given, what restric-
tions can be placed on the actual usage of that resource. The need for
information flow tracing and its control was also discussed in this chapter
with references to previous works done in this area. The stack based Java
security model was shown to be inadequate in helping us implement the
envisioned policy enforcement architecture. In the last part of this chapter
we discuss the trusted computing technology, in particular the functionality
provided by the TPM in the form of remote attestation and sealed storage.
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In Chapter 3 we introduced Trishul, the Java based policy enforcement
architecture that forms a major part of this dissertation work. Explaining
the design of the system, we looked at the two main design techniques used
by Trishul: information flow tracing and Java method call interception.
Trishul-P was also introduced as a Java-like language that helps policy en-
gine writers specify the method calls that Trishul should intercept and also
as a way to introduce taints into the system that helps in information flow
tracing. In the section on implementation of Trishul we explained in detail
how Trishul performs information flow tracing accurately using a hybrid
load-time and run-time analysis process. The implementation description
covered both interpreted as well as just-in-time modes of the Trishul Java
Virtual Machine. To get a better understanding of how Trishul works we
then looked at couple of example applications where Trishul’s generic pol-
icy enforcement framework has been used to enforce basic access control
policies.
Microbenchmark performance measurements conducted to infer the
overhead introduced by interception and information flow tracing function-
ality of Trishul were reported. The measurements showed that the method
call pattern matching and interception module incurred heavy overheads
while the hybrid load-time and run-time process used to perform correct
taint propagation introduced moderate overhead into the Trishul system.
Possible design and implementation optimisations that have been identi-
fied were also mentioned in this chapter. A comprehensive review of the
related works in the area of information flow control, which forms the ma-
jor part of Trishul, and policy enforcement, is presented at the end of the
chapter.
In chapters 4 and 5 we presented the application scenarios where the
Trishul policy enforcement architecture is used in solving the problem of
digital rights management and the enforcement of policy attached to user-
supplied data in Web Services systems.
In Chapter 4 we looked at how Trishul can be used to implement a
DRM solution based on the UCONABC usage control model. We described
the various functional components of the resulting T-UCON system and
how Trishul’s functionalities can be exploited to implement them. Then
we showed how T-UCON could be used to enforce three kinds of DRM
scenarios. Performance measurements, reported in the chapter, showed
that T-UCON incurs only marginal overhead in exchange for being able to
enforce common DRM policies.
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In Chapter 5 we considered the problem of policy enforcement in a
Web Services framework. Departing from the usual model of considering
the offered service as the restricted resource and the need to control who
can access to it, the application scenario considered in the chapter assumes
that the data submitted by the service user to the web service is the valued
commodity. The policies, specified by the data provider, that govern this
data’s access and usage need to be enforced at the Web Service component
levels. We then described the design of a system architecture that can be
used to enforce such policies in a WS setup. After noting that Trishul’s
framework would suit the implementation of such a system, we went on
to describe the prototype implementation of Trishul-WS for a simple Web
Service application scenario and examine its overhead.
The purpose of this last chapter is to summarise the work reported in
this dissertation, the conclusions of this research and to point out directions
for future research work.
6.2. CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation presented, discussed and evaluated the main ideas be-
hind the design and implementation of a Java Virtual Machine based policy
enforcement framework named Trishul. The goal of the research presented
in this dissertation was to examine whether it was possible to develop a
generic policy enforcement architecture, in which the policy was attached
to the data that were being operated on and which defined the access and
usage restrictions on that data. To answer this question we analysed the
shortcomings of the policy enforcement mechanisms available currently,
especially with respect to the Java architecture. We then went on to pro-
pose a new policy enforcement architecture as an extension of the normal
Java Virtual Machine that was more powerful and flexible than the current
available solutions.
One of the key functionalities introduced into this new JVM framework
was that of information flow control, which allowed for very precise track-
ing of the data as they are used within the system as well as very flexible
control over how the data can be used within the system. We also proposed
a Java-like language for developing the core decision engine of Trishul.
The microbenchmark performance analysis performed on the just-in-
time mode implementation of Trishul revealed areas of high overhead in
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the system. Subsequent analysis revealed design and implementation choices
that could potentially decrease these overheads, which can be considered
for potential future work. The inevitable overhead present in pure run-time
policy enforcement systems like Trishul (remember that Trishul performs
the traditional static analysis steps at load-time of the application) suggests
that any analysis that can be done offline in a secure manner, say of the sys-
tem libraries, should be done so. The analysis also showed that Trishul is
not the best system to enforce policies for computation heavy applications.
In order to highlight the power and flexibility of the developed Trishul
system, and to demonstrate that the system does indeed help in enforcing
data-attached policies, we then used it as the building block of a policy
enforcement architecture for two different application scenarios. In the
first scenario, we designed and implemented a Digital Rights Management
(DRM) system that was capable of enforcing several typical DRM policies
attached to the multimedia content rendered by DRM applications running
on top of the enforcement architecture. In the second application scenario,
the Trishul framework was used to build a policy enforcement architecture
for Web Services (WS), in which policies attached to the user data submit-
ted to the WS were enforced by all the component services that make up
the WS.
By verifying that the various component services run on top of the pro-
posed enforcement architecture and in turn by designing and implementing
the policy enforcement architecture using Trishul in a secure and extend-
able (modular) manner, we achieved the set objective of demonstrating the
power and flexibility of the Trishul framework.
6.3. FUTURE WORK
There are a number of possible directions for future work, among oth-
ers, open issues that have been identified.
The prototype implementation of Trishul, while ideal for showcasing
the power and flexibility of the system to be used in various application
scenarios, is far from an efficient implementation. As discussed in Sec-
tion 3.5.4, several points of improvements have been identified, the imple-
mentation of which could constitute a direction for future work. Reusing
JVM’s internally calculated control flow graph, omitting tainting of vari-
ables and objects that are modified in each branch of a CFI, completely
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skipping recalculation of context taint if the variables that influence its
value has not been modified in the branches of the CFGs and the offline
computation and storage of CFGs for system libraries are some of them.
We have developed the Java-like Trishul-P language to allow policy en-
gine writers to express the logic of the decision engines and hook it to the
Trishul framework in an efficient manner. While the Java-like nature of the
language lowers the barriers to adaptation of the system as well as makes
it a powerful development tool, this same property makes it harder to theo-
retically analyse the expressibility of the language and the overall power of
the enforcement system in terms of the classes of policies that can be en-
forced by it. As referred earlier in Section 3.6, several works have analysed
the power of dynamic monitoring systems whose internal decision engine
logic are expressed as automaton-based process steps. The structured and
logical expression of these systems make them ideal for structured anal-
ysis in comparison to the Turing-complete nature of Java-like languages.
In fact the work done by Le Guernic et al. [Guernic et al., 2006; Guernic,
2007] in analysing information flow based dynamic systems is very similar
to the internal working of Trishul, except for the fact that in their work, the
decision engine logic is expressed as automaton transitions.
Hence, a different direction of work would be to investigate either the
implementation of Trishul-P with an automaton-based internal engine or
the development of a front-end to the Trishul-P interface in the form of
an automaton-based system. In the latter architecture, the policy engine
writer would define the engine logic in the form of automaton transitions
of allowed and disallowed states, which would then be transformed into
Trishul-P code that, as before, can be compiled into loadable Java classes
for use within Trishul. This allows for a more structured analysis of the
power of Trishul architecture while at the same time making the develop-
ment easier by reusing the existing solutions.
Trishul does not consider or address the impact of multi-threading in
information flow or in application execution. As discussed earlier, multi-
threading introduces a set of new challenges [Guernic, 2007] and handling
them could form a direction for future work.
In our work we have leveraged on trusted computing technologies to
attest the integrity of the platform in order to ensure that the remote com-
puting environment is what it is supposed to be. However, more works
needs to be done in ironing out the specific details of how this will be im-
plemented in practice, in particular to ensure that the policies associated
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with the data are neither separated from the data nor tampered with. While
this dissertation proposed some basic mechanisms to enforce such a ‘sticky
policy’ functionality [Karjoth et al., 2002], further work needs to be done
and latest developments [Tang, 2008] need to be investigated to make it
more secure. This could also thus form part of future work.
SAMENVATTING
Nu het bereik en mogelijkheden van Internet en genetwerkte systemen
steeds groter worden en dankzij de opkomst van paradigma verschuiven-
de technologieën als Web Services (WS) en Software as a Service (SaaS)
sturen steeds grotere aantallen gebruikers enorme hoeveelheden privé ge-
gevens naar externe systemen waar zij geen controle over hebben. Aan de
andere kant van dezelfde technologie-munt gebruiken commerciële aan-
bieders van digitale informatie het grote bereik van het Internet om pro-
ducten zoals muziek, video’s en software te verspreiden naar individuele
computers van cliënten, zijnde generieke desktop machines of consumen-
tenelectronica zoals multimediaspelers.
Over het algemeen hechten deze gegevensaanbieders groot belang aan
het beschermen van hun gegevens tegen misbruik. Zij willen graag dat
hun gegevens alleen gebruikt worden zoals zij dat gespecificeerd hebben,
en alleen toegankelijk zijn voor expliciet toegestane externe partijen. Ster-
ker nog, zelfs nadat toegang verleend is mogen slechts bepaalde specifieke
acties op de gegevens uitgevoerd worden.
Deze toegangs- en gebruiksregels worden gewoonlijk uitgedrukt in de
vorm van voorwaarden, welke dan gebundeld kunnen worden met de ge-
gevens wier toegang zij reguleren, en vervolgens samen verstuurd naar de
externe machines.
Een aantal eerdere onderzoeken heeft zich gericht op hoe de beperkin-
gen in de voorwaarden uitgedrukt kunnen worden op het niveau van spe-
cificatietalen, terwijl andere onderzoeken het probleem vanuit een meer
theoretische hoek benaderden door het formeel definiëren van modellen en
klassen van voorwaarden die gehandhaafd kunnen worden gebaseerd op
verscheidene aannamen en mogelijkheden van het systeem. Veel minder
onderzoeken hebben echter de vereisten op systeemniveau onderzocht die
daadwerkelijk nodig zijn voor het handhaven van de voorwaarden op de
externe machines. Dit is de invalshoek van waaruit wij dit probleem bena-
deren in deze dissertatie.
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PROBLEEMBESCHRIJVING
Het globale probleem dat aangepakt wordt in deze dissertatie kan als
volgt worden uitgedrukt:
Gegeven een dataobject dat een gebruiker wenst op te sturen naar een
externe computer en voorwaarden die toegangs- en gebruiksregels specifi-
ceren op het dataobject, ontwerp en implementeer een architectuur die het
handhaven van deze voorwaarden op de externe computer mogelijk maakt.
Bij het ontwikkelen van een volledig functioneel raamwerk voor het
handhaven van voorwaarden zijn meerdere complementaire onderzoeks-
gebieden betrokken zijn, waaronder talen voor voorwaarden, modellering
van voorwaarden, formele analyse en systeemarchitectuur ontwikkeling.
Deze dissertatie gaat alleen in op het laatste onderzoeksgebied. Waar mo-
gelijk wordt bestaand werk in de andere gebieden benut om de ontbrekende
delen in het raamwerk op te vullen.
ONZE AANPAK
Het probleem van het handhaven van voorwaarden, zoals hier gede-
finiëerd, kan vanuit verschillende invalshoeken benaderd worden en op
verschillende niveaus van abstractie. Een aantal eerdere werken en sys-
temen richten zich op handhaving van voorwaarden voor specifieke appli-
caties of klassen van applicaties. In deze werken is de logica die vereist
is om de handhavings-besluiten te maken ingebouwd in de applicatiecode
zelf. Anderen pakken het probleem aan op het lage niveau van het bestu-
ringssysteem en verkennen de complexiteit op het niveau van processen in
het besturingssysteem en bepalen welk proces met welk ander proces mag
communiceren of toegang heeft tot specifieke invoer- en uitvoerkanalen.
De klassen van voorwaarden die geïnterpreteerd (en dus gehandhaafd)
kunnen worden hangen af van het niveau waarop voorwaarden worden ge-
handhaafd. Handhaving op het niveau van het besturingssysteem beperkt
de klassen tot die welke direct te beschrijven zijn op proces- en system
call niveau, terwijl handhaving op het niveau van specifieke applicaties de
klassen beperkt tot die van applicaties en hun semantiek.
In deze dissertatie beschouwen we het probleem van handhaving van
voorwaarden vanuit een gegevens-centrisch oogpunt, waarbij aangenomen
wordt dat de voorwaarden gebundeld zijn met de gegevens waarop de ap-
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plicaties werken. Ons werk benadert het probleem op middleware niveau,
met de intentie om de mogelijkheden van de oplossingen op hoger en la-
ger niveau te exploiteren. Deze aanpak stelt de architectuur in staat om
gegevens-specifieke en niet applicatie-specifieke gebruiksvoorwaarden te
handhaven over meerdere applicaties. Dit echter zonder het risico dat in-
formatie op het niveau van de applicatiesemantiek verloren gaat, welke
waardevol is bij handhaving van een grotere verscheidenheid aan klassen
van voorwaarden. In het bijzonder beschouwen wij de handhaving van
voorwaarden voor applicaties die in de Java Virtual Machine (JVM) omge-
ving draaien. De reden voor deze keuze en de details van het ontwerp van
zo’n architectuur worden in deze dissertatie in detail beschreven.
Eén van de sleutelconcepten waarop wij bouwen in onze architectuur
is Information Flow Control (IFC), wat zich bezig houdt met beperkin-
gen op hoe informatie overgedragen kan worden van één entiteit naar een
andere. Hoewel IFC als onderzoeksonderwerp vanuit verscheidene invals-
hoeken onderzocht kan worden, bekijken wij het vanuit het perspectief van
de semantiek van de programmeertaal van de applicatie. Onderzoek op het
gebied van IFC kan grofweg onderverdeeld worden in twee verschillende
categorieën: compile time en run time. In compile-time systemen worden
de restricties op informatiestromen gecontroleerd en geverifiëerd ten tijde
van het compileren. Run-time systemen, aan de andere kant, voeren deze
controles dynamisch uit tijdens de uitvoering van de applicatie. Hoewel
beide aanpakken hun voor- en nadelen hebben gebruikt onze architectuur
een hybride aanpak, waarbij het run-time mechanisme wordt versterkt met
statische control flow analyse. Hiervoor zijn twee hoofdafwegingen: het
versterkte run-time systeem kan werken zonder toegang te hebben tot de
daadwerkelijke broncode van de applicatie en deze hybride run-time aan-
pak kan een groter aantal klassen van voorwaarden handhaven.
BIJDRAGEN
In deze dissertatie presenteren wij het ontwerp, de implementatie en
de toepassing van een architectuur voor het handhaven van voorwaarden
gebaseerd op een Java Virtual Machine. De bijdragen van dit werk zijn als
volgt:
– Wij onderzoeken in detail het eerdere werk gedaan op het gebied
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van het handhaven van voorwaarden en identificeren de gaten die
ons werk tot doel heeft te vullen.
– We presenteren het ontwerp en de implementatie van een op een
JVM-gebaseerde middleware architectuur, genaamd Trishul, gericht
op het handhaven van voorwaarden dat geassociëerd is met dataob-
jecten.
– De ontwikkelde middleware wordt gebruikt om een applicatie onaf-
hankelijk Digital Rights Management (DRM) systeem te implemen-
teren met als basis een veel gebruikt model voor de beheersing van
gebruik.
– Het JVM-raamwerk wordt ook gebruikt om een Web Service archi-
tectuur te ontwerpen die in staat is om gebruiksvoorwaarden te hand-
haven dat geassociëerd is met aangeleverde gegevens, zoals gespeci-
ficeerd door de gegevens-aanbieder.
Eén van de sleutelfunctionaliteiten geïntroduceerd in dit nieuwe JVM-
raamwerk was dat van Information Flow Control, welke het mogelijk maak-
te om zeer precies de gegevens te volgen terwijl deze in het systeem ge-
bruikt werden, en welke ook zeer flexibele controle gaf over hoe de gege-
vens gebruikt konden worden in het systeem. We hebben ook een Java-
achtige taal voorgesteld voor het ontwikkelen van de core decision engine
van Trishul.
De prestatieanalyse d.m.v. microbenchmarks van de implementatie van
Trishul in just-in-time modus bracht enkele delen van het systeem met hoge
overhead aan het licht. Verdere analyse leverde ontwerp- en implementa-
tiekeuzen op die deze overhead mogelijkerwijs kunnen verminderen. Deze
keuzen kunnen beschouwd worden als toekomstig werk.
Om de kracht en flexibiliteit van het ontwikkelde Trishul systeem te
laten zien en om aan te tonen dat het systeem inderdaad helpt bij het hand-
haven van aan gegevens verbonden voorwaarden, hebben we het als bouw-
steen gebruikt voor een architectuur voor het handhaven van voorwaarden
voor twee verschillende applicatiescenario’s. In het eerste scenario ontwor-
pen en implementeerden we een Digital Rights Management systeem dat
in staat was meerdere typische voorbeelden van DRM-voorwaarden af te
dwingen, geassociëerd met de multimediabestanden die weergegeven wer-
den door de DRM applicaties die draaiden bovenop deze architectuur. In
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het tweede scenario werd het Trishul raamwerk gebruikt om een architec-
tuur voor het handhaven van voorwaarden voor Web Services te bouwen.
Hierin werden de voorwaarden die door de gebruiker verbonden was met
de gegevens en vervolgens opgestuurd naar de Web Service gehandhaafd
in alle componentdiensten waaruit de Web Service opgebouwd was.
We hebben geverifiëerd dat de verschillende componentdiensten bo-
venop de voorgestelde uitvoeringsarchitectuur draaien en, vervolgens, heb-
ben we de architectuur voor het handhaven van voorwaarden ontworpen
m.b.v. Trishul op een veilige en uitbreidbare (modulaire) manier. Hiermee
hebben we onze doelstelling van het aantonen van de kracht en flexibiliteit
van het Trishul raamwerk bereikt.
TOEKOMSTIG WERK
Er zijn een aantal verschillende richtingen voor toekomstig werk, onder
meer, open vragen die zijn geïdentificeerd.
De prototype-implementatie van Trishul, die ideaal is voor het tonen
van de kracht en flexibiliteit van het systeem voor verschillende applicatie-
scenario’s, is verre van efficiënt. Zoals besproken in Sectie 3.5.4 hebben
we verschillende verbeterpunten geïdentificeerd. Het implementeren van
die verbeterpunten zou als een richting voor toekomstig werk kunnen wor-
den beschouwd.
We hebben een Java-achtige Trishul-P taal ontwikkeld om de ontwik-
kelaars van de voorwaarden engine in staat te stellen de logica van de deci-
sion engines uit te drukken, en deze op een efficiënte manier in het Trishul
raamwerk te hangen. Hoewel de gelijkenis van de taal met Java de adoptie
van het systeem makkelijker maakt, maakt dit het tegelijkertijd ook moei-
lijker om de uitdrukkingskracht van de taal en de algehele kracht van het
handhavingssysteem met betrekking tot de klassen van de gehandhaafde
gebruiksvoorwaarden te analyseren. De gestructureerde en logische be-
schrijving van systemen wiens interne decision engines beschreven wor-
den als automaat-gebaseerde processtappen zijn ideaal voor gestructureer-
de analyse in vergelijking met de Turing-complete aard van Java-achtige
talen.
Een andere onderzoeksrichting zou daarom ook zijn het onderzoeken
van de implementatie van Trishul-P met een interne automaat-gebaseerde
engine of de ontwikkeling van een front-end voor de Trishul-P interface in
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de vorm van een automaat-gebaseerd systeem. In de laatste architectuur
zou de schrijver van een voorwaarden engine de logica van de engine defi-
niëren in de vorm van automaat transities van toegestane en niet-toegestane
toestanden, die dan vervolgens, zoals eerder, gecompileerd zouden worden
naar laadbare Java klassen voor gebruik in Trishul. Dit maakt een meer
gestructureerde analyse van de kracht van de Trishul architectuur mogelijk
en maakt tevens het ontwikkelen ervan makkelijker door bestaande oplos-
singen te hergebruiken.
Trishul laat zich niet uit over de invloed van multi-threading op infor-
matiestromen of op de uitvoering van de applicatie. Multi-threading intro-
duceert een nieuwe verzameling uitdagingen die in de toekomst aangepakt
zouden kunnen worden.
In ons werk hebben we trusted computing technologieën benut om de
integriteit van het platform te garanderen zodat zeker is dat de externe re-
kenomgeving is wat deze zou moeten zijn. Echter, het uitwerken van de
details hoe dit in de praktijk te brengen is, vergt nog meer werk, in het bij-
zonder om te zorgen dat de gebruiksvoorwaarden onlosmakelijk verbonden
blijven met de gegevens en niet ongewild veranderd kunnen worden. Hoe-
wel deze dissertatie een aantal basale mechanismen voorstelt om ‘klevende
voorwaarden’ te dwingen blijft toekomstig werk noodzakelijk om dit ver-
der te beveiligen.
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